

General Assembly Engagement on Peace and Security in the 79th Session

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Introduction

In 2024, the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) produced a Digital Handbook on behalf of the Office of the President of the General Assembly: [Assembly for Peace: a digital handbook on the UN General Assembly's past practice on peace and security](#). This Digital Handbook was requested in [resolution 77/335](#).¹ It examined five areas of past practice: General Assembly engagement with peace operations, responses to uses of force or ongoing conflicts, recommendations with regard to sanctions or sanctioning measures, creation of or support for accountability mechanisms and initiatives, and support for good offices. The 2024 Handbook also covered procedural developments, such as the history of the Uniting for Peace (UFP) resolution and the 2022 Veto Initiative ([A/RES/76/262](#)). This research brief summarizes key resolutions and initiatives of the General Assembly related to the maintenance of peace and security since the publication of the Handbook, in the 79th session.

This research brief is distinct from the 2024 Handbook and does not fall within the mandate of resolution 77/335. However, it was supported as part of an initiative aimed at increasing awareness and understanding of the 2024 Handbook's findings. In the spirit of the 2024 Handbook, its underlying goal is to provide Member States with information on the powers and past practice of the General Assembly with respect to the maintenance of peace and security. It is also consistent with the conclusions of the biannual resolution on "Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly" passed in the 79th session, which took note of the 2024 Handbook and encouraged its annual update and wider dissemination ([A/RES/79/327](#), para. 12).²

The 2024 Handbook was designed to be accessible and user-friendly, with a streamlined main text hyperlinked to 61 mini-case studies of past practice within 7 thematic annexes. All UN resolutions and documents were hyperlinked to the original source material. This document adopts a similar style, hyperlinking the text to all cited UN sources and resolutions, as well as to some of the case studies and material in the 2024 Handbook. This brief also includes four annexes, mirroring those in the 2024 Handbook, with further details on some of the resolutions and initiatives detailed in this brief.

Also, in keeping with the style adopted in the 2024 Handbook, for brevity, United Nations (UN), General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (SC) will be abbreviated hereinafter. In this brief and the 2024 Handbook, where historical situations are discussed, the country names appear as they were recognized by the General Assembly at the time of the issue or resolution under discussion, which may differ from the present spelling or accepted names of those Member States. As with the 2024 Handbook, the work of the [six main GA committees](#) is not the focus. Nonetheless, some resolutions (primarily recurring resolutions) that arose on the report of one of the six main GA committees are cited below. This is noted wherever such resolutions are cited.

After providing a condensed background on the legal basis for the GA to engage on the maintenance of peace and security under the UN Charter, this brief summarizes some of the key GA resolutions and initiatives related to peace and security matters in the 79th session.

¹ [Resolution 77/335](#) recognized the functions, powers and role of the GA in the maintenance of international peace and security. It underlined the need to foster continued interaction with the SC, and for greater awareness and practical information on the functions and powers of the GA with respect to peace and security.

² The GA passes a resolution on revitalizing the work of the GA on a biannual basis. The last iteration of this resolution ([A/RES/77/335](#)) was the basis for the 2024 Handbook. The UN document for resolution 79/327 was not available at the time of publication, but the version voted upon is available at [A/79/995](#).

Background: General Assembly powers and authorities with respect to peace and security

While the UN Charter vests primary responsibility for peace and security in the SC, it also creates a clear role and joint responsibilities for the GA. [Article 10](#) authorizes the GA to discuss or make recommendations on “any matters within the scope of the present Charter”. [Article 11](#) empowers the GA to “discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security” and to “make recommendations” on them. [Article 14](#) further authorizes the GA to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation”.

The Charter also creates an additional accountability role for the GA vis-à-vis the SC on matters related to peace and security. [Article 11\(1\)](#) explicitly provides that the GA may make recommendations to the SC with respect to the maintenance of peace and security, and [Article 11\(3\)](#) notes that “the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security”. The GA has frequently relied on these powers to call issues to the SC’s attention, suggest greater attention to a peace and security matter, or to suggest alternate courses of action.

There are limitations on the GA’s powers. [Article 12](#) of the UN Charter was initially interpreted as restricting the GA from taking up matters already being considered by the SC; however, over time consideration of matters by the SC and GA in parallel has become “accepted practice” and deemed consistent with the UN Charter by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).³ Nonetheless, the ICJ has observed that the GA should still refer matters that require coercive or mandatory effect back to the SC.⁴ This is because while the GA may make recommendations on any matter, its recommendations are not binding. The ICJ clarified that this does not mean that the GA’s powers are “confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations”, but can “have dispositive force and effect”.⁵ For example, throughout its history, the GA has relied on [Article 22](#) of the UN Charter – which empowers the GA to establish “such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions” – to create mechanisms or bodies that can take forward action, including establishing peace operations, commissions of inquiry, reconciliation committees or other [conflict management or resolution bodies](#).⁶ Further discussion of the above Charter powers and legal interpretations, and ICJ rulings on them, are available in the [2024 Handbook](#).

In practice, the GA has tended to show deference to the SC on peace and security matters, and has waited to respond until the SC has done so, or until after it has failed to respond due to vetoes or threats of vetoes by permanent members.⁷ Some of the most significant examples of GA engagement on peace and security documented in the 2024 Handbook took place after divisions within the Council barred further action. Where the SC has taken action and passed a resolution on the matter, the GA has often passed resolutions supporting the SC recommendations, for example by urging compliance. In keeping with its accountability role, the GA has also in some cases adopted resolutions that take

³ [A/ES-10/273](#), paras. 27, 28. The Court also observed a division of labour in which the “Security Council has tended to focus on the aspects of such matters related to international peace and security”, while the GA has “taken a broader view, considering also their humanitarian, social and economic aspects”, but that this did not preclude the GA from engaging on peace and security. *Ibid.*, para. 27.

⁴ *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion, *I.C.J. Reports 1962*, p. 151, p. 164.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Because the GA cannot authorize mandatory action where these subsidiary bodies, for example, peace operations, deploy on another State’s territory, they must do so with its consent. ICJ, *Certain Expenses*, p. 164.

⁷ Separately, as part of the larger follow-on initiative to the GA Handbook, UNU-CPR analysed patterns of GA response within 45 situations of conflict outbreak, crisis management or response. These included those in the 2024 Handbook and others. In 33 of 45 cases examined, the GA waited until the SC had clearly either passed a resolution or had failed to act due to a veto or threat of a veto before adopting a resolution on the matter. Of the remaining eight situations, these were either longstanding issues connected to matters that had previously triggered a veto, or there was other evidence at the time that the SC was not going to take up the issue.

issue with SC recommendations or conclusions, suggesting alternate courses of action or stronger enforcement pathways.

While most of the GA's engagement with peace and security matters occurs during its regular sessions, some GA resolutions related to peace and security issues have been passed during special sessions or within emergency special sessions convened in connection with the Uniting for Peace (UFP) resolution from 1950 ([A/RES/377\(V\)](#)). The UFP resolution created a special procedure to facilitate prompt (can be within 24 hours) GA consideration when there is a veto or threat of veto in the SC over a peace and security matter.⁸ The UFP does not create any additional powers; any GA resolutions adopted in those emergency special sessions still rely on the Charter-based powers outlined above. However, activation of the UFP resolution often provides an additional degree of impetus and political expediency that may facilitate action on ongoing conflict and crisis situations over which the SC is deadlocked. Beginning with the [7th emergency special session](#), on the "Question of Palestine", the GA established the precedent that these sessions can be adjourned and reconvened on the request from Member States. A new instance of a veto or threat of a veto is not required to reconvene a session, although this has often been the impetus.

General Assembly engagement on peace and security matters in the 79th session

Throughout the 79th session, the GA continued to pass resolutions related to the five areas of practice highlighted in the 2024 Handbook: [peace operations](#), [uses of force and responses to conflict](#), [sanctions and related measures](#), [accountability mechanisms](#), and [good offices](#). For example:

- **Peace operations:** In addition to its regular role in approving financing for existing peace operations, the GA adopted resolutions mandating a review of peace operations ([A/RES/79/1](#)) and encouraging greater coordination and cooperation in support of missions, including with regional organizations, with the host Government and between the GA, SC and the Peacebuilding Commission ([A/RES/79/92](#)).
- **Responses to conflict and use of force:** The GA adopted multiple resolutions in response to ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip and Ukraine (detailed further below), while also passing recurring resolutions related to use of force issues like disarmament, regulation of mercenaries and private security companies, and conflict minerals.⁹
- **Sanctioning measures:** The GA recommended that Member States adopt sanctions against Israel, and encourage boycotts or other limitations on products originating in Israeli settlements, to reinforce Israel's compliance with international obligations, as identified in a recent [ICJ case](#) ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#), para. 5 (b)(c)). The GA also continued to pass its recurring resolution (since 1996) critiquing the impact of "unilateral coercive measures", such as sanctions, for human rights and "friendly relations" between States ([A/RES/79/167](#)).¹⁰

⁸ Further discussion of the procedural requirements connected with the UFP are available in the [2024 Handbook](#), with a separate [Annex 2](#) containing 13 case studies of situations connected with the UFP.

⁹ Recurring resolutions on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation ([A/RES/79/64](#); [A/RES/79/74](#)), mercenaries and private security companies ([A/RES/79/162](#)) were passed in the 79th session, on the reports of the First and Third Committees. The GA also adopted a resolution on conflict minerals ([A/RES/55/56](#)), which has also been part of a recurring series adopted without reference to a committee. It connects to the Kimberley Process.

¹⁰ This resolution is part of a recurring series passed since 1996 on the report of the Third Committee. A related resolution entitled "Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries" has also been adopted regularly since 1997, on the report of the Second Committee. However, it is not adopted annually, and a version of this recurring resolution was not adopted in the 79th session.

- **Accountability mechanisms:** In contexts including Myanmar, Gaza, Ukraine and Syria, the GA supported human rights promotion and accountability mechanisms, calling for States to comply with the judgments and advisory opinions of the ICJ,¹¹ and supporting existing accountability mechanisms and welcoming new ones.¹²
- **Good offices:** The GA promoted several new good offices initiatives, including convening a conference on a two-State solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#); [A/RES/79/81](#)) and proposing a high-level conference in 2025 to develop a time-bound strategy for a durable resolution to the Rohingya crisis ([A/RES/79/182](#), paras. 36-37).¹³

Related to its role in facilitating good offices and diplomatic initiatives, the GA used its convening power to facilitate the Summit of the Future in September 2024 and adopted the outcomes document of the Summit, the [Pact for the Future](#), as resolution 79/1 ([A/RES/79/1](#)). The overall tone of the Pact was oriented around reinvigorating multilateralism and collective action, making its broadly supported adoption notable at a time when these principles and the international normative architecture are under stress. The Pact also contained numerous commitments related to strengthening the peace and security architecture, reinforcing international law and Charter norms, strengthening the GA's role, encouraging SC reform, as well as other key peace and security commitments.

Although most resolutions related to peace and security matters in the 79th session were adopted during regular sessions, the majority of these were recurring resolutions passed on the report of GA committees. The more active arenas for GA engagement were the two ongoing emergency special sessions, the [10th emergency special session](#) and the [11th emergency special session](#), as well as other GA resolutions related to the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Gaza. These more active arenas of engagement are discussed below, with further details on key sessions or resolutions included in the annexes. This will be followed by a discussion of how these and other resolutions reflect synergies as well as accountability dynamics between the SC and the GA, and then concluding observations.

The 10th emergency special session and other resolutions related to the situation in the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Responding to SC vetoes on the situation in Gaza: One of the leading peace and security issues before the SC this session concerned ceasefire negotiations and blockages of humanitarian aid going to Gaza, which contributed to a declaration of famine on 29 July 2025.¹⁴ The GA stepped in to pass a series of resolutions on these issues within the three convened sessions of the 10th emergency special session after SC divisions obstructed further SC action. Following two US vetoes of draft SC resolutions,¹⁵ one in November 2024 and another in June 2025 related to ongoing hostilities and the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the GA adopted three resolutions ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#); [A/RES/ES-10/26](#); [A/RES/ES-10/27](#)) that collectively took up many of the vetoed provisions within the SC resolutions. GA resolution ES-10/25 ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#)), adopted in December 2024, focused on support to the continued operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) after Israeli legislation passed in October 2024 threatened to halt its operations on Israeli territory.¹⁶ The two subsequent resolutions, resolution ES-10/26

¹¹ The two GA resolutions passed on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and Ukraine called for parties to respect prior ICJ judgments and orders ([A/RES/79/182](#); [A/RES/79/184](#)). Both were part of a recurring series of resolutions on the human rights situations in these countries, adopted on the report of the Third Committee. A resolution welcoming the recent ICJ advisory opinion related to legal obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Gaza included several demands to comply with the legal obligations identified in that opinion ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#)).

¹² A recurring resolution on the "Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic" on the report of the Third Committee reinforced the mandate for the [International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism \(IIIM\)](#), an accountability mechanism that the GA had created in 2016. The resolution encouraged further engagement between the IIIM and the newly created Independent Institution on Missing Persons ([A/RES/79/185](#), paras. 29-32).

¹³ The proposal for a conference was part of a recurring resolution passed annually on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (on the report of the Third Committee) but this recommendation for a conference was a new addition. The conference was set to be held on [30 September 2025](#).

¹⁴ World Health Organization, "IPC Gaza Strip Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Alert", 29 July 2025.

¹⁵ See [S/2024/835](#) (2024); [S/2024/353](#) (2025), and further discussion in the [Annex 2](#).

¹⁶ UNRWA is a UN agency providing basic services and coordinating humanitarian relief for Palestinians that has been mandated by the GA since 1949 ([A/RES/302\(IV\)](#)). In response to the passage of the Israeli laws and other restrictions on UNRWA, the Secretary-General appealed to the GA for guidance and

(adopted in November 2024) and resolution ES-10/27 (adopted in June 2025), both focused on demands for a ceasefire in Gaza. Both resolutions incorporated language from the vetoed SC resolutions, demanding an “immediate, unconditional, and permanent” ceasefire and release of all hostages, as well as full compliance with SC resolution 2735, which had proposed a ceasefire deal ([A/RES/ES-10/26](#); [A/RES/ES-10/27](#)).

In addition to adopting some of the language from the two vetoed SC resolutions, the three GA resolutions offered more detailed provisions and recommendations on what was needed to support UNRWA’s operations ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#)) and for humanitarian relief to Gaza more broadly ([A/RES/ES-10/27](#)), as well as on accountability issues and the linkage with a permanent, two-State solution ([A/RES/ES-10/26](#)). The resolution passed in June 2025, resolution ES-10/27, went further than the draft SC resolution preceding it by strongly condemning “any use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” ([A/RES/ES-10/27](#), para. 5) and demanding that Israel “immediately end the blockade, open all border crossings and ensure that aid reaches the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip” (ibid., para. 9). This followed warnings by leading UN officials in early June 2025 that the population in Gaza was on the brink of “mass starvation” due to the blockade on humanitarian aid ongoing since March 2025.¹⁷

New initiatives on conflict resolution and aid to Gaza: Beyond simply responding to SC vetoes, GA resolutions passed in the 10th emergency special session and in regular sessions kickstarted new initiatives with the potential to shape political, legal, security and humanitarian dynamics in the OPT and Gaza. Noting concerns about restrictions on UNRWA and the urgency of upholding essential assistance, the GA referred a [new legal matter to the ICJ](#)¹⁸ regarding Israel’s obligations as an occupying power with respect to facilitating basic services and humanitarian and development assistance ([A/RES/79/232](#)). The decision has the potential to affect the continued operations and provision of humanitarian aid in the OPT and Gaza, as well as other legal status questions with larger political and diplomatic implications.

A second set of resolutions introduced a new good offices initiative on the Israel-Palestine conflict. In a resolution welcoming and responding to the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the [legal consequences of Israeli policies and practices in the OPT, including East Jerusalem](#), the GA decided to convene an international conference on the “question of Palestine and the two-State solution” ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#), para. 13). Subsequently, independent efforts of several Member States led to a more concrete proposal to hold a [high-level international conference on Palestine and a two-State solution](#) in 2025, which was welcomed in resolution 79/81 ([A/RES/79/81](#), para. 2, annex). The conference was held from 28 to 30 July 2025 in New York, under the auspices of the GA. In the resulting outcome document, conference participants committed to implementing a two-State solution. They also proposed measures for addressing the ongoing conflict that included reinvigorating a January 2025 ceasefire agreement and mandating a temporary UN “stabilization mission” to monitor it ([A/CONF.243/2025/1](#)). Subsequently, in the first week of the 80th session, the GA adopted a resolution endorsing the outcome document by a vote of 142-10-12.¹⁹

On the sidelines of the conference, some of those Member States participating promised to recognize Palestine as an independent State in the 80th session, and placed [conditions their recognition](#) that might lend pressure toward a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Although the impact of this conference is yet unclear, it represented an attempt to

support at this “critical juncture in the history of UNRWA” ([A/79/558](#)). The SC draft resolution vetoed in November ([S/2024/835](#) (2024)) had extolled UNRWA as the “backbone of the humanitarian response in Gaza” and called on parties to enable its operations fully.

¹⁷ By 1 June 2025, the continuing Israeli blockade of aid going into Gaza presented an imminent risk of “mass starvation”, according to UN officials. UN News, “Lifting of Israeli blockade ‘the only way to avert mass starvation’ in Gaza: UNRWA chief”, 1 June 2025. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1163916>. World Health Organization, “People in Gaza starving, sick and dying as aid blockade continues”, 12 May 2025. Available at: <https://www.who.int/news/item/12-05-2025-people-in-gaza-starving-sick-and-dying-as-aid-blockade-continues>.

¹⁸ The GA is empowered under [Article 96](#) of the Charter to “request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. Prior to the 79th session, the GA had made 18 requests for advisory opinions from the ICJ (see [Annex 6](#) of the 2024 Handbook).

¹⁹ The digital copy of the resolution was not yet available at the time of publication, but the draft resolution voted upon was available through: [A/80/L.1/Rev.1](#).

open new diplomatic pathways for reaching a more durable solution to the ongoing conflict, following two years of failed efforts to reach a sustained ceasefire through SC-led or other Member State-led negotiations.

The 11th emergency special session and the conflict in Ukraine

In February 2025, the GA reconvened its [11th emergency special session](#) related to the conflict in Ukraine, resulting in two resolutions adopted at the third anniversary of the Russian invasion. One of these, resolution ES-11/7, reiterated language adopted in prior GA resolutions on the matter – raising concern with the Russian Federation’s “full-scale invasion”, reaffirming its commitment to the “sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine”, deploring the human rights and consequences of the “aggression against Ukraine”, and recalling demands for de-escalation, full withdrawal and cessation of hostilities by the Russian Federation ([A/RES/ES-11/7](#), adopted with 93 in favour, 18 against and 65 abstentions).

The US introduced a competing, one-sentence draft resolution called “The Path to peace” ([A/ES-11/L.11](#)), which contained no reference to acts of aggression but mourned “the tragic loss of life throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation”, and implored a “swift end to the conflict” and a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace”. The US had tried to introduce a similar draft resolution earlier in the SC to “pre-empt” the GA’s consideration of the matter, but due to delayed consideration in the SC, the SC and GA resolutions were ultimately considered on the same day.²⁰

The US draft resolution was only adopted by the GA as resolution ES-11/8 after some notable amendments incorporating language on the “full-scale invasion” of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and recognizing that a lasting peace should be in line with the UN Charter and principles of “sovereign equality and territorial integrity” ([A/RES/ES-11/8](#)). Resolution ES-11/8 was adopted by a vote of 93 to 8 with 73 abstentions (including the US). The parallel US-introduced text was also adopted by the SC ([S/RES/2774](#)) on the same day, but without the amended language brought into resolution ES-11/8. Two of the proposed amendments to the language on the SC draft were vetoed by the Russian Federation.

The difference in the resolutions adopted in the GA and the SC on the same matter, particularly as relates to the amended language, illustrates the space for the GA to offer broader or differing perspectives on ongoing peace and security matters. Also in this vein, the GA adopted another resolution on Ukraine outside of the emergency special session that went into greater detail on human rights and other legal obligations, as well as accountability measures for international law violations ([A/RES/79/184](#)). It is part of a recurring series of resolutions adopted on the report of the Third Committee annually since 2016.

Veto responses and the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council

The resolutions passed in the 10th and 11th emergency special sessions demonstrate the complementary role that the GA can play on peace and security matters, taking up issues when vetoes in the SC prevent further action, and in some cases pushing the SC on some of its recommendations and conclusions. As such, the GA can enable collective decision-making and action where the SC is deadlocked, and can hold the SC to account where vetoes or threats of vetoes prevent the SC from responding at critical peace and security moments.

The Veto Initiative and follow-on action: Related to this accountability role, the GA continued its practice of holding debates whenever a veto is cast, as called for in the [Veto Initiative](#) adopted in 2022 ([A/RES/76/262](#)).²¹ There were five

²⁰ Richard Gowan, “U.S. Volte-Face on Ukraine Exposes Depths of Divide in the UN”, International Crisis Group, 26 February 2025. Independent reporting also notes US efforts to persuade Ukraine to drop the resolution that was ultimately adopted as ES-11/8. Ibid.

²¹ Resolution 76/262 of 2022 stipulates that every time a veto is used in the SC, the GA will meet within 10 working days and “hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast, provided that the Assembly does not meet in an emergency special session on the same situation” ([A/RES/76/262](#)).

vetoed cast by permanent members of the SC in the course of the 79th session, listed in the chart in [Annex 1](#). Two of these were dealt with within the framework of the 10th emergency special session (those discussed above related to the situation in Gaza), and so under the terms of the Veto Initiative did not require a separate debate. Separate debates were held on the Russian Federation veto of a draft resolution on Sudan ([S/2024/826](#)) in November 2024, as well as on Russian Federation vetoes of proposed amendments to the resolution that the SC ultimately passed on the situation in Ukraine ([S/RES/2774](#)).

The [Pact for the Future](#) highlighted the continued relevance of GA mechanisms such as the Veto Initiative, as well as the [Uniting for Peace resolution](#) ([A/RES/79/1](#), para. 69(c)), but also noted a need to enhance the GA's ability to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security "by taking action" (*ibid.*, para. 70(b)). The GA's biannual resolution on "Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly" touched on similar issues, emphasizing the importance of strengthening the relationship, transparency and interaction between the SC and the GA, and highlighting measures like the Veto Initiative ([A/RES/79/327](#), paras. 1, 5).²² The opening paragraphs showcased the GA's role under the UN Charter in the maintenance of peace and security, but also placed emphasis on the GA "taking action" in accordance with the Charter (*ibid.*, para. 1).

The record on the Veto Initiative in the 79th session highlights the challenge of moving from accountability to action. By holding debates to consider SC vetoes, the GA provided some measure of SC accountability. However, outside of the resolutions passed in the 10th emergency special session, there were no resolutions or GA action in response to these Veto Initiative debates. For example, similar to the GA resolutions on the situation in Gaza (several of which adopted verbatim provisions from vetoed SC resolutions on the matter), the GA might have considered a resolution that picked up some of the provisions of the vetoed draft SC resolution on Sudan ([S/2024/826](#)). Several of the provisions of that vetoed draft resolution – calling for a "humanitarian pause" or calling on conflict parties not to block humanitarian access – are the type of provisions that the GA has passed in similar situations, including during previous periods of conflict in Sudan (see, e.g., [A/RES/53/1\[OI\]](#) (1998)). However, no GA resolutions were proposed on the matter. This illustrates the continued hesitance to take action following SC vetoes, with the exception of select issues and matters.

Conclusions

Many of the GA resolutions passed in the 79th session engaged with important peace and security matters. The resolutions adopted on Gaza and the OPT (both in the 10th emergency special session and beyond) represented a high level of engagement with that matter, keeping up pressure on the need for a ceasefire amidst SC vetoes, and spearheading new good offices and legal review measures that might shape larger conflict resolution and political dynamics. The difference in the resolutions passed in the GA and the SC with respect to Ukraine also highlights the important voice that the GA can bring to ongoing disputes and conflict resolution efforts.

Nonetheless, the GA failed to propose or pass resolutions on other matters where there was clear SC inaction. As noted above, the GA did not propose any resolutions or take other action responding to the continuing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan, following the vetoed SC resolution in November 2024. In 2025, conflicts have also broken out in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and on the border between India and Pakistan, and there has

²² The resolution also noted the need to strengthen the relationship between the GA and the Peacebuilding Commission, and the latter's advisory role, as well as to enhance the "synergy, coherence and complementarity" between the GA and the Economic and Social Council ([A/RES/79/327](#), paras. 3,5).

been escalating conflict in the Middle East beyond Gaza and the OPT, such as the US and Israeli strikes on Iran in June 2025,²³ and Israeli strikes and incursions on Syrian territory.²⁴

While these issues were on the SC agenda, for most of these situations no SC resolution was passed,²⁵ and the GA did not step in to take them up. The lack of GA response was all the more notable given that the GA has responded to similar patterns of conflict outbreak or escalation involving some of the same countries in the past – for example, calling for a ceasefire following the outbreak of [India-Pakistan hostilities](#) in 1971; condemning an Israeli attack on [Iraqi nuclear installation](#) in 1981 and US aerial attacks on the [Libyan Arab Jamahiriya](#) in 1986; repeatedly lending support for humanitarian access and corridors during the conflict in Sudan in the 1990s;²⁶ and calling for a ceasefire and international humanitarian law (IHL) compliance following internal conflict and external intervention in the DRC during the 1990s ([A/RES/53/160](#); [A/RES/54/179](#)). The lack of action on these other crises demonstrates the still limited degree of GA engagement on the full span of peace and security issues.

There was a much broader range of GA engagement on other peace and security issues within the work of the GA's committees, and in the numerous recurring resolutions that came out of those committees. This included resolutions on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, self-determination rights for contested areas and on the human rights situation of many countries.²⁷ While some new issues were introduced alongside the recurring provisions, many of these resolutions have been passed with largely identical provisions annually or bi-annually for more than two decades (and some since the 1970s). As a result, while they may keep certain issues formally on the agenda, the pro forma character of many of these resolutions over time makes them less powerful as a statement or expression of global political will. They do not tend to attract the same level of attention and interest that might lend toward conflict resolution or other changes in these situations.

Overall, the record of the 79th session highlights the important role that the GA can play in the maintenance of peace and security, but that there are still some missed opportunities in terms of the GA stepping up more fully into this role. It underlines the importance of the commitments endorsed by Member States in the [Pact for the Future](#) to “[f]urther enhance and make full use of the role and authority of the General Assembly to address evolving global challenges ... in particular by taking action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” ([A/RES/79/1](#), para. 70 (b)(c)).²⁸

²³ UN News, “US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites ‘marks perilous turn’: Diplomacy must prevail, says Guterres”, 22 June 2025.

²⁴ The GA has annually passed resolutions on the [Israeli occupation of the Golan in Syria](#) since 1981, when the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) passed legislation effectively annexing it.

²⁵ The one SC resolution passed on these matters related to the conflict in the DRC ([S/RES/2783](#)).

²⁶ Annual consideration of Operation Lifeline Sudan began with resolution [A/RES/44/12](#) in 1989, followed by [A/RES/45/226](#) (1990); [A/RES/46/178](#) (1991). After 1991, the annual resolution was re-named “Emergency assistance to the Sudan” and continued through the late 1990s (see, e.g., [A/RES/52/169\[F\]](#) (1997); [A/RES/53/1\[Q\]](#) (1998); [A/RES/54/96\[J\]](#) (1999)).

²⁷ See notes 8-11. Other examples include the recurring resolutions on Palestinian self-determination ([A/RES/79/163](#)), and the human rights situation in Iran ([A/RES/79/183](#)), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ([A/RES/79/181](#)).

²⁸ The resolution on “Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly” endorsed similar commitments ([A/RES/79/327](#), paras. 1, 5).

Annex 1: The Veto Initiative and Security Council accountability

On 26 April 2022, the GA passed resolution 76/262 (without a vote), subsequently known as the [Veto Initiative](#), which stipulates that every time a veto is used in the SC, the GA will meet within 10 working days and “hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast, provided that the Assembly does not meet in an emergency special session on the same situation” ([A/RES/76/262](#)).

There were five vetoes cast by permanent members of the SC in the course of the 79th session, including two vetoes of amendments to a draft resolution, which subsequently passed. On 18 November 2024, the Russian Federation vetoed a resolution concerning the situation in Sudan. In accordance with the Veto Initiative, the GA held a discussion on the veto and the surrounding issues on 26 November 2024, but passed no subsequent resolutions on it.²⁹ The US cast two vetoes on draft resolutions concerning the situation in Gaza (both including demands for a ceasefire), in November 2024 and June 2024. These did not require a separate GA debate under the Veto Initiative because they were addressed within the framework of the [10th emergency special session](#), with the GA ultimately passing resolutions that took up many of the provisions of the vetoed draft resolutions.

Two further vetoes cast by the Russian Federation on amendments to a draft resolution on Ukraine ([S/2025/115](#) and [S/2025/116](#)) triggered a debate under the Veto Initiative, which was held on 6 March 2025, despite the fact that related matters were also discussed in the 11th emergency special session, and also that the SC resolution ultimately was adopted notwithstanding the vetoes on these amendments.

Table 1: Debates held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 76/262 following Security Council vetoes in the 79th session

Date of SC consideration	SC draft resolution	Matter considered in vetoed resolution	Veto by	GA debate on veto
4 June 2025	S/2025/353	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	United States	Dealt with in ESS-10 (A/ES-10/L.34), 5 June 2025
24 February 2025	S/2025/116	Maintenance of peace and security in Ukraine - Amendment to the draft resolution S/2025/112	Russian Federation	*N.A., 6 March 2025
24 February 2025	S/2025/115	Maintenance of peace and security in Ukraine - Amendment to the draft resolution S/2025/112	Russian Federation	*N.A., 6 March 2025
20 November 2024	S/2024/835	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	United States	Dealt with in ESS-10 (A/ES-10/L.33), 5 December 2024
18 November 2024	S/2024/826	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Russian Federation	*N.A., 26 November 2024

*N.A. indicates that the official UN documents for these meeting records were not yet available at the time of publication.

Permanent members’ use of the veto, the Veto Initiative itself, and the relationship between the GA and the SC were the subject of several commitments within the [Pact for the Future](#) ([A/RES/79/1](#)). One of the action points focused on strengthening and reforming the SC included commitments to fully implement and adhere to all Charter provisions,

²⁹ In accordance with that resolution, the Russian Federation was invited to explain its use of the veto before the GA, and Member States were given the opportunity to discuss implications of the veto.

including [Article 27\(3\)](#), which provides that in SC decision-making “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” when the SC considers a matter under [Chapter VI](#) or [Article 52\(3\)](#) (ibid., para. 69(a)). The Pact also included commitments to intensify discussions on the “future of the veto, including on limiting its scope and use” (ibid., para. 67(g)). In a section encouraging a stronger relationship between the SC and the GA and greater accountability and transparency over the SC’s work, the Uniting for Peace resolution and the Veto Initiative were both cited as useful tools (ibid., para. 69).

Annex 2: Uniting for Peace-related emergency special sessions

GA actions following the exercise of the UFP resolution are among the most well known examples of GA engagement in peace and security. The two case studies below detail updates to the two emergency special sessions that were convened in the 79th session. Each case study also provides background on previous resolutions and issues discussed in previous GA sessions, largely drawing from the case studies on these emergency special sessions in the [Annex 2 of the 2024 Handbook](#).

10th emergency special session: Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (1997–2024)

Background: The 10th emergency special session has been convened over multiple sessions, from 1997 through 2025.³⁰ The origin of the [10th emergency special session](#) was the SC’s failure to adopt two draft resolutions ([S/1997/199](#); [S/1997/241](#)) in 1997 that would have called for a halt to construction of the Jebel Abu Ghneim settlement and other settlement activities. The first sessions convened under the 10th emergency special sessions resulted in several resolutions in 1997 that condemned Israel’s construction of Jebel Abu Ghneim, demanded the “immediate and full cessation” of Israeli actions that altered the character of Jerusalem, and reinforced the obligations of the Geneva Convention in occupied territories ([A/RES/ES-10/2](#); [A/RES/ES-10/3](#); [A/RES/ES-10/4](#)).

As the 10th emergency special session was adjourned and reconvened over the subsequent seven years, the matters considered became more wide-ranging, including: expansion of Israeli settlements in the OPT (i.e., [A/RES/ES-10/2](#); [A/RES/ES-10/6](#)); the Israeli response to the second intifada, such as Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 (i.e., [A/RES/ES-10/10](#); [A/RES/ES-10/11](#)) and the construction of a separation wall in the OPT from 2002 on (i.e., [A/RES/ES-10/15](#); [A/RES/ES-10/17](#)); operations and activities in Gaza under Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (which commenced on 27 December 2008) (i.e., [A/RES/ES-10/18](#)); and legal and humanitarian obligations in the context of violence in Israel and Gaza in 2023 and 2024 (i.e., [A/RES/ES-10/21](#); [A/RES/ES-10/22](#)).³¹

GA consideration in the 79th session: The 10th emergency special session was reconvened three times (17 & 18 September 2024, 4 & 11 December 2024, 12 & 17 June 2025) during the 79th session.

It was first reconvened from 17 to 18 September 2024 to consider the ICJ’s opinion on the [legal consequences of Israeli policies and practices in the OPT, including East Jerusalem](#), an advisory opinion that was released in July 2024. In addition to welcoming and responding to the ICJ’s advisory opinion, resolution ES-10/24 called for an [international conference](#) on the “question of Palestine and the two-State Solution” for peace in the Middle East ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#), adopted by 124-14-43).

³⁰ The 10th emergency special session was resumed in 1998 (17 March), 1999 (5, 9 February), 2000 (18, 20 October), 2001 (20 December), 2002 (7 May, 5 August), 2003 (20–21 October, 8 December), 2004 (16–20 July), 2006 (17 November, 15 December), 2009 (15–16 January), 2017 (21 December), 2018 (13 June), 2023 (26 October–2 November and 12–20 December) and 2024 (10–13 May).

³¹ Further details on these resolutions are available in the 2024 Handbook, in the case study on the [10th emergency special session](#).

The emergency special session was reconvened in December 2024, following the US veto of a draft SC resolution in November 2024 ([S/2024/835](#)). The two resolutions that the GA adopted on 11 December 2024 ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#); [A/RES/ES-10/26](#)) focused on the subject matter of this vetoed resolution, and contained many provisions that were nearly identical to those in the vetoed draft resolution:

- GA resolution ES 10/25 lent support to the presence, mandate and continued operations of UNRWA ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#), adopted by a vote of 159-9-11), following the October 2024 passage of a law (by the Israeli Knesset) banning it from operating on Israeli territory.³² This reflected similar recommendations to provisions in the vetoed draft SC resolution underscoring UNRWA's role as the "backbone of the humanitarian response in Gaza" and calling on all parties to enable UNRWA to carry out its mandate ([S/2024/835](#), para. 6). The GA resolution also included more detailed provisions on UNRWA's role ([A/RES/ES-10/25](#), para. 3-8), on Israel's obligations with respect to its operations (*ibid.*, para. 2, 10-14), on the financial needs of UNRWA and the need for greater humanitarian support by other actors (including donors) (*ibid.*, para. 25-30), as well as other provisions related to reparations for violations of international law in the OPT (*ibid.*, para. 15).
- GA resolution ES 10/26 ([A/RES/ES-10/26](#), adopted by a vote of 158-9-13) responded to other operative provisions of the SC draft resolution vetoed by the US in November 2024 ([S/2024/835](#)), pertaining to an "immediate, unconditional, and permanent" ceasefire in the context of the ongoing hostilities and operations in Gaza. Also similar to the language in the vetoed SC resolution, resolution ES-10/26 included provisions demanding "immediate access by the civilian population in the Gaza Strip to basic services and humanitarian assistance indispensable to its survival" and demanded the full and unconditional implementation of the ceasefire proposal within SC resolution 2735 (2024),³³ including release of all hostages and full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza ([A/RES/ES-10/26](#), paras. 3, 5; [S/2024/835](#), paras. 3, 5). GA resolution ES-10/26 also contained additional provisions emphasizing its support to UNRWA, stressing the need for accountability and reiterating its commitment to a two-State solution.

In the interceding months, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continued, and by 1 June 2025, the continuing Israeli blockade of aid going into Gaza presented an imminent risk of "mass starvation", according to UN officials.³⁴ A more limited SC draft resolution again demanding an "immediate, unconditional, and permanent" ceasefire; recalling the demand for release of all hostages; and demanding the "immediate and unconditional lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza and its safe and unhindered distribution at scale" was again vetoed by the US on 4 June 2025 ([S/2024/353](#)).³⁵ In response, the 10th emergency special session was reconvened again,³⁶ and on 12 June the GA adopted resolution ES-10/27 ([A/RES/ES-10/27](#), by a vote of 149-12-19). It recalled its demand for an "immediate, unconditional, and permanent" ceasefire, for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, and stressed the need to comply with the provisions of SC resolution 2735 (*ibid.*, 1-4). However, it went further than the draft SC resolution had, by strongly condemning "any use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare" (*ibid.*, para. 5) and by demanding that Israel "immediately end the blockade, open all border crossings and ensure that aid reaches the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip" (*ibid.*, para. 9). The resolution also included provisions related to international law violations and accountability measures, and recalled its [December 2024 request to the ICJ](#) to offer an advisory opinion

³² The "physical, political and operational attack(s)" on UNRWA, including laws adopted by the Knesset of Israel calling for the cessation of UNRWA activities, were reported on by the Commissioner-General to the GA on 28 October ([A/79/558](#)).

³³ Security Council resolution 2735 ([S/RES/2735](#)), passed on 10 June 2024, laid out a ceasefire proposal which had been accepted by Israel but not Hamas. The proposal took a three-phase approach beginning with a ceasefire, queueing negotiations for a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement, and finally the start of a reconstruction plan for Gaza. Each phase also guaranteed the release of additional Israeli hostages.

³⁴ UN News, "Lifting of Israeli blockade 'the only way to avert mass starvation' in Gaza: UNRWA chief", 1 June 2025. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1163916>.

³⁵ The SC draft resolution 353 vetoed in June 2025 represented a much more pared down version of that presented to the SC in November 2024, with only 3 substantive operative paragraphs compared to the 8 in the previous version.

³⁶ The Permanent Representatives of Cameroon and Yemen referenced the blockade and the "Security Council's paralysis" directly in their request to reconvene the 10th emergency special session following the US veto ([A/ES-10/1036](#)).

on Israel's obligations with respect to UN and other international actors' provision of assistance to the occupied territories (ibid., paras. 7, 8, 10). It reiterated UNRWA's role as the "backbone of the humanitarian response" in Gaza (ibid., para. 17), reflecting language in the SC resolution vetoed by the US in December 2024 ([S/2024/835](#), para. 6).

At the time of writing, the 10th emergency special session remains open and can be resumed at any time at the request of Member States.

11th emergency special session: Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (2022–2023)

Background: The [11th emergency special session](#) of the GA was convened following Russian forces' act of "aggression" (as later characterized by the GA ([A/RES/ES-11/1](#))) against Ukraine beginning on 24 February 2022. After the Russian Federation vetoed a draft SC resolution on the matter ([S/2022/155](#)),³⁷ the 11th emergency special session was convened on 2 March 2022. The GA adopted six resolutions during the 11th emergency special session convenings in 2022. The first of these conveyed the GA's commitment to the "territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders", deplored "aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter" and called on the Russian Federation to withdraw its forces and reverse efforts to change the status of Donetsk and Luhansk ([A/RES/ES-11/1](#), paras. 1, 2, 4, 6). Follow-on resolutions within the same emergency special session called for an immediate halt to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure ([A/RES/ES-11/2](#)); suspended the membership rights of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council ([A/RES/ES-11/3](#)); condemned the organization of "illegal so-called referendums" in Ukrainian territory ([A/RES/ES-11/4](#)); recognized "that the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine" and recommended the creation of "an international register of damage" ([A/RES/ES-11/5](#), paras. 2, 3).

The 11th emergency special session was reconvened on 22–23 February 2023, the first anniversary of the hostilities. In the sole resolution adopted, the GA reiterated many of the points of the previous resolutions, including recalling the obligation of States under article 2 of the UN Charter, reaffirming that "no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal" and deploring the "dire human rights and humanitarian consequences of the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine" ([A/RES/ES-11/6](#), preamble). It also underscored the need to reach a just and lasting peace in line with the principles of the UN Charter, called upon Member States to redouble diplomatic efforts, reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for full adherence to international humanitarian law principles, among other operative provisions ([A/RES/ES-11/6](#)).

GA consideration in the 79th session: The conflict in Ukraine continued during the 79th session, and on 24 February 2025, the conflict's three-year anniversary, the emergency special session was reconvened. Two draft resolutions and various amendments were considered. The US put forward a short draft resolution, "The Path to Peace", that mourned the "tragic loss of life" in the conflict, implored a "swift end to the conflict" and urged a lasting peace between the Russian Federation and Ukraine ([A/ES-11/L.11](#)). It was a substantially different text from those previously passed in the 11th emergency special session, with no reference to acts of "aggression", to territorial integrity or other guarantees under the UN Charter, nor to any violations of international law. Fifty-three Member States put forward an alternate draft resolution, "Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine", which was more similar in content, length and form to the previous resolutions adopted in the eleventh emergency special session ([A/ES-11/L.10](#)).

³⁷ In this draft resolution, the SC "deplores in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter" and "decides that the Russian Federation shall immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine" ([S/2022/155](#), paras. 2, 3).

Both texts were adopted, with amendments in the case of the US-proposed resolution ([A/RES/ES-11/8](#)).³⁸ “Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” was adopted as resolution ES-11/7; it recalled the previous resolutions, noted with concern that the Russian Federation’s “full-scale invasion” continued to have “devastating and long-lasting consequences” for Ukraine and the region, and reaffirmed its commitment to the “sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” ([A/RES/ES-11/7](#)). It emphasized the need to “ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law” committed in Ukraine, called on all parties to the conflict to fully comply with humanitarian law and to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access, and urged all Member States to address the global impacts of the war on food security, nuclear security and the environment (*ibid.*, paras. 5, 7, 9).

Parallel to these deliberations in the GA, the US put forward a draft resolution in the SC that was similar to the text it introduced in the GA ([A/ES-11/L.11](#)). After significant debate on the text, with five proposed amendments either failing to garner sufficient votes or vetoed by the Russian Federation, the resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none with 5 abstentions ([S/RES/2774](#)).³⁹

At the time of writing, the 11th emergency special session remains open and can be resumed at any time at the request of Member States.

Annex 3: Accountability mechanisms and initiatives

GA support for [accountability mechanisms and initiatives](#), including fact-finding and investigatory bodies and referrals to the ICJ, was one of the five main practice areas of the 2024 Handbook, with 18 case studies in a linked [annex](#). This included case studies of some of the 18 requests for advisory opinions from the ICJ prior to the 79th session (see [Annex 6](#) of the 2024 Handbook).⁴⁰ The GA is empowered under [Article 96](#) of the Charter to “request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. This annex provides additional details on the two ICJ referral cases that the GA passed resolutions on in the 79th session. The ICJ also returned an advisory opinion that had been requested by the GA in a prior session, on the [obligations of States in respect of climate change](#); however, the GA did not pass any resolutions or take further steps on it in the 79th session so it is not detailed further below.⁴¹ A notable inclusion in the [Pact for the Future](#) ([A/RES/79/1](#)) was a commitment that Member States “comply with the decisions and uphold the mandate of the International Court of Justice” (*ibid.*, Action 17) and “take appropriate steps” to ensure the Court can “fully and effectively discharge its mandate” (*ibid.*, para. 38(a)).

International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (2022)

Background: On 30 December 2022, the GA [adopted resolution 77/247](#) requesting an ICJ advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the OPT, including East Jerusalem ([A/RES/77/247](#)). The advisory opinion had been requested after increasing settler violence, UN expert reports on the excessive use of force by Israeli forces and other systematic human rights violations in the OPT, as well as concerns about de jure and de facto

³⁸ The language introduced in the amendments included language describing the events in 2022 as a “full-scale invasion”.

³⁹ For an outline and chart of the proposed text changes in the amendments, see Security Council Report, “Ukraine: Briefing and Vote on a Draft Resolution”, What’s in Blue Series (23 February 2025).

⁴⁰ For a full list of the GA’s requests for advisory opinions from the ICJ, see International Court of Justice, “Organs and agencies authorized to request advisory opinions”. Available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/organs-agencies-authorized>.

⁴¹ ICJ, *Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change*, I.C.J. Reports 2025. Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/187>.

annexation of Palestinian territory.⁴² The GA asked the Court to advise on the legal consequences arising from Israel's occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the "demographic composition, character and status" of Jerusalem as well as other legislation and policies. It also asked the Court to advise on the "legal status of the occupation" and the "legal consequences that arise for all States and the United Nations from this status".

The ICJ rendered its opinion⁴³ on 19 July 2024 during the previous GA session. The Court's findings included that "Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful,"⁴⁴ and that "the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible."⁴⁵ It found that a number of Israel's policies were in violation of its obligations under IHL and international human rights law. In terms of the legal consequences and obligations of other States, the ICJ found that "all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."⁴⁶ The ICJ also decided that "the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, which requested this opinion, and the Security Council, should consider the precise modalities and further action required to bring to an end as rapidly as possible the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."⁴⁷

GA consideration in the 79th session: At the start of the 79th session, Mauritania, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda requested that the 10th emergency special session be resumed to "consider urgent follow-up on the advisory opinion" ([A/ES-10/1009](#)). The emergency special session reconvened from 17 to 18 September 2024 and adopted resolution ES-10/24 as the primary response to the ICJ opinion, although subsequent resolutions passed in the 79th session also referenced the opinion.

Resolution ES-10/24 demanded that Israel end its presence in the OPT within 12 months and called on States "to comply with their obligations under international law ... as reflected in the advisory opinion" by not recognizing Israel's occupation as legal; by not rendering "aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's illegal presence" in the OPT; and by not recognizing "any change in the physical character or demographic composition" of occupied areas, including East Jerusalem ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#), paras. 2, 4). Relatedly, the resolution called for all States to take steps to ensure that nationals, companies and entities under their jurisdiction do not facilitate the continued "unlawful" occupation or presence of settlements in the OPT, encouraged sanctions and boycotts of products originating from settlements, and supported travel bans and asset freezes for those maintaining the "unlawful presence" of settlers or facilitating settler violence (*ibid.*, para. 5). It also called for Israel to comply with all legal obligations under international law, as stipulated by the ICJ, including putting an end to all new settlement activity, evacuating settlers from the OPT, dismantling parts of the separation wall in that territory, allowing displaced Palestinians to return and making reparations for damage caused (*ibid.*, para. 3).

Resolution ES-10/24 included several provisions encouraging accountability for violations of international law in the OPT, including calling for a convening of the parties to the Geneva Convention and reiterating prior recommendations for an

⁴² [A/76/333](#). The resolution referenced the findings of a [Special Committee](#) that the GA had previously created to investigate the effect of Israeli practices, and also the ICJ's previous 2004 advisory opinion on [Israel's construction of a wall in the OPT](#). Additionally, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel – created by the Human Rights Council ([A/HRC/RES/S-30/1](#)) – had concluded that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory was against international law and recommended that the General Assembly request an ICJ advisory opinion ([A/77/328](#), paras. 75, 92(a)).

⁴³ *Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2024*.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 285(3).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 285(4).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 285(7).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 285.

international mechanism of reparation for damage, loss or injury (ibid., paras. 9-12). The resolution also called for a [conference](#) on a two-State solution to be convened under GA auspices (ibid., para. 13).

Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States

Background: Following attacks by Hamas and other armed groups on Israeli territory and citizens on 7 October 2023, Israel launched an intensive series of operations in Gaza, which resulted in the mass displacement of large portions of the population and which were also accompanied by significant limitations on humanitarian aid and relief.⁴⁸ On 28 October 2024, the Israeli Knesset adopted two laws to bar UNRWA from operating within Israel, strip UNRWA of its privileges and immunities and prohibit Israeli authorities from having any contact with UNRWA staff.⁴⁹ UNRWA's mandate stems from the GA's response to the Palestinian refugee crisis during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war ([A/RES/302\(IV\)](#) (1949)).⁵⁰ In a 28 October 2024 letter to the GA, the Secretary-General noted that UNRWA had been the "main provider of basic and essential services" in Gaza, including health services to 1.1 million people and food assistance to 1.9 million people, and warned there was no "realistic alternative to UNRWA which could adequately provide the services and assistance required" should UNRWA's operations be halted due to these laws ([A/79/558](#)). The Secretary-General also requested "guidance and support" from the GA "at this critical juncture in the history of UNRWA" (ibid.). Other international organizations and Member States reported Israeli limitations on their efforts to provide or support basic services and humanitarian and development assistance in the OPT.⁵¹

The ICJ issued an advisory opinion on 19 July 2024 for a related but separate case considering the legal consequences of Israel's policies and practice in and related to the OPT ([A/78/968](#)). In it, the ICJ determined that Israel's continued presence in the OPT is "unlawful" (ibid., para. 285(3)), but that this does not release Israel from its obligation to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law, and its obligations as an occupying power (ibid., para. 272). Although the opinion was more focused on policies and measures that might alter the status of the OPT, the Court observed that among other obligations, "the occupying Power bears a duty to administer the territory for the benefit of the local population" and with consideration for its rights of self-determination (ibid., para. 105).

GA consideration in the 79th session: In the context of these limitations on UNRWA's operations and on other humanitarian and development assistance by international actors, on 19 December 2024, the GA requested an ICJ advisory opinion on Israel's obligations in relation to the presence and activities of the UN, other international organizations and third States in and in relation to the OPT ([A/RES/79/232](#), adopted by 137-12-22). Specifically, the GA requested the ICJ to consider:

What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and

⁴⁸ For an overview of displacement trends, affected areas and aid distribution points as of August 2025, see OCHA, "Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip", 20 August 2025. Available at <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-20-august-2025>. On the nature of limitations on UN provision of assistance, see, e.g., Elinor Hammarhjöld, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, "Written reply of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the questions put by Vice-President Sebutinde and Judge Gómez Robledo at the end of the hearing held on 2 May 2025". Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/196/196-20250507-oth-14-00-en.pdf>.

⁴⁹ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Bureau Calls Knesset's Decision to Ban Palestinian Refugee Agency 'Unlawful as the Occupation Itself'", 21 October 2024. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2024/gapal1474.doc.htm>.

⁵⁰ The GA provided UNRWA with the dual mandate to provide direct relief and to implement "works" projects to foster self-sufficiency, as well as to engage on political aspects of the refugee crisis ([A/RES/302\(IV\)](#)).

⁵¹ Some examples of these limitations were identified by Member States in response to questions from members of the Court following a 2 May 2025 hearing of this case, including: "Written reply of Türkiye to the question put by Vice-President Sebutinde at the end of the hearing held on 2 May 2025", International Court of Justice website, 7 May 2025; "Written reply of Norway to the question put by Vice-President Sebutinde at the end of the hearing held on 2 May 2025", 7 May 2025. These and other supporting evidence area available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/196/other-documents>.

facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination? ([A/RES/79/232](#), para. 10).

In the same resolution, the GA had contextualized its request by expressing grave concern about the recent legislation adopted by Israel to interfere with UNRWA's operations, and by recalling the legal protections and principles of the UN Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and other applicable principles and rules of international law.

Public hearings were held at the ICJ from 28 April to 2 May 2025, with 39 States, the UN and three other international organizations offering oral statements and a number also providing written submissions.⁵²

Annex 4: Good offices and related diplomatic initiatives

GA support for [good offices and diplomatic initiatives](#) was one of the five main practice areas of the 2024 Handbook. This annex provides additional case studies of two major good offices or diplomatic initiatives that took place in the 79th session.

The Pact for the Future

Background: In 2020, as part of a commemoration of the UN's seventy-fifth anniversary, the GA adopted resolution 75/1 ([A/RES/75/1](#)) supporting reinvigorated multilateralism and strengthened international cooperation across the three core pillars of the UN. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to report back with recommendations to "advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges" (ibid., para 20). In response, the Secretary-General submitted his 2021 report *Our Common Agenda* ([A/75/982](#)), which outlined proposals to address a range of global challenges.⁵³ On 15 November 2021, the GA welcomed the proposals set out in *Our Common Agenda* and requested the President of the GA to initiate an intergovernmental process to consider its recommendations ([A/RES/76/6](#)). This initiated a multi-year intergovernmental process, involving all 193 Member States and culminating in the Summit of the Future in September 2024.

GA consideration in the 79th session: At its 79th session, the GA adopted the *Pact for the Future* and its annexes ([A/RES/79/1](#)). Resolution 79/1 was ultimately adopted without a vote. However, prior to this vote, the Russian Federation and other Member States had raised objections over the process by which the Pact was reached, and introduced an amendment to that effect ([A/79/L.3](#)).⁵⁴ A vote was taken on the amendment, with Member States voting 143 to 7 with 15

⁵² Further details on the oral statements and written submissions are available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/196>.

⁵³ To advance the proposals of *Our Common Agenda*, the Secretary-General subsequently issued a series of policy briefs, including the *New Agenda for Peace*, which set out recommendations on prevention, peace operations, and strengthening multilateral cooperation. Several of its ideas are reflected in the *Pact for the Future*. See United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General, "A New Agenda for Peace: Our Common Agenda", Policy Brief 9 (United Nations publication, 2023).

⁵⁴ In debate over the resolution, the Russian Federation expressed discontent with the process by which the Pact was reached, objecting that the final text did not have the consensus of Member States ([A/79/PV.3](#)). As such, the Russian representative suggested that the "best option" would be to "decide to continue negotiations until the document acquires a character that suits everyone without exception" (ibid.). If not, the Russian Federation noted that they, Nicaragua, and the Republic of Belarus would introduce an amendment to the Pact emphasizing "the key role of the intergovernmental nature of decisions taken at the UN", and "the need to avoid duplication of efforts" (ibid.). Belarus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria proposed a draft amendment ([A/79/L.3](#)) to the Pact which would have reaffirmed the "intergovernmental" nature of decision-making at the UN and demanded that the System "shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". The amendment would also have suggested evaluation of "duplication of efforts" as a result of the adoption of the Pact (ibid.). This amendment was set aside through a motion of "no action" (initiated by the Republic of the Congo on behalf of the Group of African States) that was accepted by a vote of 143 in favour, 7 against, with 15 abstentions ([A/79/PV.3](#)).

abstentions to take no action on the proposed amendment ([A/79/PV.3](#)). This made way for resolution 79/1 to be adopted without amendment.

The *Pact for the Future* was the main outcome document of the Summit of the Future, a high-level event held in New York from 22 to 23 September 2024, involving all 193 Member States. It was a culmination of a multi-year process. While broad in scope, the Pact contains a dedicated chapter (chapter II) on international peace and security, which recognized profound changes in the global security landscape and the complex challenges to maintaining peace and security ([A/RES/79/1](#), paras. 32-48). Through the “action” points of the Pact, Member States committed to act in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter, to fully respect principles of sovereignty and self-determination and commit to the peaceful resolution of disputes (*ibid.*, paras. 32, 37). They also affirmed the “indispensable role” of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security, the need for greater cooperation and the “intensified use of diplomacy” (*ibid.*, paras. 33, 37). The Pact’s action points also reinforced commitments in key thematic areas of peace and security, such as related to civilian protection in armed conflict, support to those facing humanitarian emergencies, on disarmament obligations (including elimination of nuclear weapons), on “women, peace and security”, and “youth, peace and security” (*ibid.*, Actions 14, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26).

In action points discussing how particular tools or UN mechanisms can better respond to peace and security challenges, the Pact called for a system-wide review of all forms of UN peace operations to enable more “agile, tailored responses” (*ibid.*, para. 42(b)), and called on States to provide assistance, including through the Peacebuilding Commission, to “nationally owned prevention efforts” and efforts to “address the root cause of violence and conflict” (*ibid.*, para. 39(e)). The Pact also introduced new areas of emphasis, including commitments to address digital threats and emerging military technologies (*ibid.*, para. 48), and expressed concern about the erosion of international norms governing the use of force and the implications of rising global military expenditures (*ibid.*, para. 34(c)). Member States also committed to “comply with the decisions and uphold the mandate of the International Court of Justice” (*ibid.*, Action 17) and “take appropriate steps” to ensure the Court can “fully and effectively discharge its mandate” (*ibid.*, para. 38(a)).

In a separate chapter on global governance, there was substantial emphasis given to the role of the GA and its relationship with the SC (*ibid.*, Actions 41, 42). This included commitments to further action on SC reform (*ibid.*, Action 39), as well as to enhance “ways in which the General Assembly can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by taking action” (*ibid.*, para. 70(b)). Specific provisions took note of the continued relevance of GA mechanisms such as the [Uniting for Peace resolution](#), and the [Veto Initiative](#) (*ibid.*, para. 69(c)).

Conference on the question of Palestine and a two-State solution

Background: The question of a two-State solution, and of according recognition for a Palestinian State, have recurred since the GA first addressed the Palestinian question in 1947. Resolution 181(II) of 1947 envisioned independent Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and stipulated that “when the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective ... sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the UN” ([A/RES/181\(II\)](#), Part I, C, Chapter 4 (F)). The “Partition Plan” proposed in resolution 181(II) was not accepted by the parties, and was immediately overtaken by the change in situation following the first Arab-Israeli war. However, the GA remained continuously engaged in trying to support good offices and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict over the subsequent seven decades, in particular to ensure Palestinian representation and to keep the idea of a two-State solution on the agenda.

Following the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1947, the GA appointed the first UN mediator or envoy position – the United Nations Mediator in Palestine – in 1948 ([A/RES/186 \(S-2\)](#)). After his assassination, the GA created the UN

Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), a committee of representatives of three Member States, to help mediate the conflict ([A/RES/194\(III\)](#)).

In the 1970s, the Geneva Conference – first convened in 1973 under the co-chairmanship of the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – emerged as the main forum for Middle East peace talks, both to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue and disputes with neighbouring States following the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The GA took an active role in promoting Palestinian representation at these talks, and in other international discussions. In 1975, the GA passed resolution 3375(XXX) calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in all Middle East peace talks and conferences held under UN auspices, arguing that Palestinian representation was a “prerequisite to achieving a just and lasting peace in the area” ([A/RES/3375\(XXX\)](#)).⁵⁵ After the collapse of these talks, the GA twice tried to reinvigorate the process by calling for the Geneva Conference to be reconvened ([A/RES/31/62](#) (1976); [A/RES/32/20](#) (1977)).

Due to concerns about the stalled Middle East peace talks and “lack of progress” on Palestinian rights to self-determination, the GA in 1975 created the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP) to enable further recommendations and action ([A/RES/3376\(XXX\)](#)). The CEIRPP subsequently functioned as a support body for promoting good offices, regularly engaging with Member States, regional organizations, the Palestinian authorities (initially the PLO) and other civil society organizations in preparatory talks. Following regional preparatory meetings by the CEIRPP, the GA in 1983 called for a UN-convened “International Peace Conference on the Middle East” ([A/RES/38/58](#)[C], para. 3), which buttressed diplomatic efforts by the Secretary-General, the CEIRPP and regional actors, but ultimately did not materialize in a major conference due to lack of agreement by major parties ([A/39/130/Add.1-S/16409/Add.1](#)).⁵⁶ The GA reiterated these calls in 1988 ([A/RES/43/176](#)), with similar results.

As the Oslo process and its “roadmap” for Palestinian self-governance emerged as the central Middle East peace process in the 1990s, the GA expressed support for the agreement ([A/RES/48/58](#), para. 3) and furnished the authority for a UN Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories to facilitate further talks ([SG/A/585/SG/SM/5298](#)). This office was restructured and renamed the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) in 1999 ([S/1999/983](#)). The GA continued to express support for the UN’s role in reaching a two-State solution in the context of the Middle East peace process during the 1990s and early 2000s.⁵⁷ Additionally, since 1996 ([A/RES/51/26](#)), the GA has passed an annual resolution titled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, nearly all of which reference or explicitly lend support to a two-State solution.⁵⁸

GA consideration in the 79th session: In September 2024, the GA reconvened the 10th emergency special session and adopted resolution ES-10/24 ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#)). Resolution ES-10/24 was predominantly focused on welcoming and responding to the [ICJ’s advisory opinion on the legal consequences of policies and practices in the OPT and East Jerusalem](#). However, in it the GA also included the proposal to convene an international conference on “the implementation of the United Nations resolutions pertaining to the question of Palestine and the two-State solution for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East” (ibid., para. 13). Following independent initiatives of several Member States, a more concrete proposal for a conference within 2025 was highlighted in a

⁵⁵ Also in 1975, the GA granted the PLO UN observer status ([A/RES/3237\(XXIX\)](#), para. 2).

⁵⁶ See also United Nations Office of Public Information, “Chapter IX. Middle East”, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1984, vol. 38 (United Nations publication, 1988), pp. 263–268.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., [A/RES/ES-10/3](#) (1997); [A/RES/ES-10/4](#) (1997); [A/RES/ES-10/7](#) (2000); [A/RES/ES-10/12](#) (2003). These resolutions have often been passed during convenings of the 10th emergency special session.

⁵⁸ The first of these resolutions, in 1996, expresses support for the ongoing peace process and references a 1948 GA resolution endorsing the two-State partition plan ([A/RES/51/26](#)). Subsequent resolutions tend to explicitly endorse a two-State solution and the right to self-determination for Palestinians, including that passed in the 79th session (See, e.g., [A/RES/64/19](#) (2009), para. 18; [A/RES/77/25](#) (2022), para. 1; [A/RES/79/81](#) (2024), para. 1).

subsequent resolution entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, adopted in December 2024.⁵⁹ Resolution 79/81, adopted by a vote of 157-8-7, welcomed the announcement of a “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the two-State Solution, to be held in June 2025”, and included further modalities of the conference in the annex ([A/RES/79/81](#), para. 2, annex).

The conference was held at the GA in New York from 28 to 30 July 2025, after being postponed due to an escalation of conflict in the region the month prior.⁶⁰ It resulted in an outcome document (the “New York Declaration”) by the two co-chairs of the conference and relevant working groups, entitled the *New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of the Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution* ([A/CONF.243/2025/1](#)). Signatories of the New York Declaration “committed to taking tangible, timebound, and irreversible steps for the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine and the implementation of the Two-State solution” (ibid., para. 6). The resulting peace agreement would end the occupation, resolve final status issues, achieve lasting peace, ensure security for all and enable full regional integration, including mutual recognition in the Middle East (ibid., para. 7). Steps toward this end enumerated in the Declaration include bringing parties back to implementing the January 2025 ceasefire agreement mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the US (ibid., para. 8), unifying Gaza and the West Bank under the governance of the Palestinian Authority (ibid., paras. 10-13) and deploying a temporary UN “stabilization mission” with a mandate to include monitoring the ceasefire and any future peace agreement (ibid., para. 15). The conference co-chairs invited Member States to endorse the Declaration by the end of the 79th session of the General Assembly⁶¹ and proposed that the conference reconvene in the future to take action on the text.⁶² Subsequently, in the first week of the 80th session, the GA adopted a resolution endorsing the outcome document by a vote of 142-10-12.⁶³

The conference was also associated with several unilateral declarations by Member States on recognizing the State of Palestine. On 24 July, four days before the 28 July start date, the President of France (one of the two conference co-chairs alongside Saudi Arabia) announced that France will recognize Palestine as a State at the 80th session of the General Assembly in September 2025.⁶⁴ Several countries subsequently followed suit, announcing during and after the conference that they would recognize Palestine at the 80th session, or consider doing so, including the United Kingdom, Malta, Canada, Portugal and Australia.⁶⁵ Several of these States introduced conditions to their recognition of a Palestinian State that might lend pressure toward a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The United Kingdom noted that it would recognize the State of Palestine “unless the Israeli Government acts to end the appalling situation in Gaza, ends its

⁵⁹ The resolution is part of a recurring series of resolutions passed annually with the same title and much of the same language since the 1990s; however, the paragraph on the conference was a new and unique addition. The resolution repeated prior GA calls for “the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination and the right to their independent State”, and laid out further modalities for the conference in the annex ([A/RES/79/81](#)).

⁶⁰ The conference was initially scheduled to convene on 17 June 2025. For more information on the cause for postponement, see: United Nations the Question of Palestine, “Statement of the Co-Chairs of the United Nations High-Level International Conference on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine on the suspension of the conference”, 18 June 2025. Available at <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/statement-of-the-co-chairs-of-the-united-nations-high-level-international-conference-on-the-peaceful-settlement-of-the-question-of-palestine-and-the-implementation-of-the-two-state-solution-non-un-do/>.

⁶¹ UN News, “With Gaza smouldering, ministers renew push for two-State solution at UN”, 30 July 2025. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165536>. See also: UN News, “UN sounds alarm over Syria as sectarian clashes and Israeli strikes escalate”, 17 July 2025.

⁶² United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “High-Level Conference on Two-State Solution Concludes General Debate, Will Reconvene to Consider Outcome Document”, 30 July 2025. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2025/pal2250.doc.htm>.

⁶³ The digital copy of the resolution was not yet available at the time of publication, but the draft resolution voted upon was available through: [A/80/L.1/Rev.1](#).

⁶⁴ AP News, “French President Macron says France will recognize Palestine as a state”, 24 July 2025. Available at <https://apnews.com/article/france-recognize-palestine-state-macron-800ed63143f0653a7f215ad96f7038d3>. The other co-chair, Saudi Arabia, had already recognized Palestine in 1988 after the Palestine National Council, the legislature of the Palestine Liberation Organization, issued the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine ([A/43/827-S/20278](#)).

⁶⁵ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “General Assembly Hears Calls for Accountability, Concrete Steps towards Palestinian State, as High-Level Conference Continues”, 29 July 2025. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2025/pal2249.doc.htm>; Reuters, “Malta to recognise Palestinian state in September”, 29 July 2025. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/malta-recognise-palestinian-state-september-2025-07-29/>; Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by Prime Minister Carney on Canada’s recognition of a Palestinian state”, 30 July 2025. Available at <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/07/30/statement-prime-minister-carney-canadas-recognition-palestinian-state>; Reuters, “Portugal makes cautious move towards recognising Palestinian state”, 31 July 2025. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/portugal-makes-cautious-move-towards-recognising-palestinian-state-2025-07-31/>; Prime Minister of Australia, “Australia to recognise Palestinian State”, 11 August 2025. Available at <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-recognise-palestinian-state>.

military campaign and commits to a long-term sustainable peace based on a two-State solution”.⁶⁶ The Canadian Prime Minister noted that Canada would recognize the State of Palestine on condition that the Palestinian Authority hold “general elections in 2026 in which Hamas can play no part, and to demilitarize the Palestinian state”.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “General Assembly Hears Calls for Accountability, Concrete Steps towards Palestinian State, as High-Level Conference Continues”.

⁶⁷ Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by Prime Minister Carney on Canada’s recognition of a Palestinian state”.

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