Sanctions and Sanctioning Measures

The term “sanctions” is not mentioned in the UN Charter and lacks a clear definition under international law. In narrow terms, a sanction tends to refer to punitive measures taken against members of an organization for violating its rules. Over time, the term “sanction” has come to mean a wider range of coercive acts, mainly economic in nature, but also including other acts of proscription like arms embargoes and travel bans. In the UN context, sanctions typically refer to the exclusive power of the SC to issue binding measures under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. It is widely recognized that the SC has the sole authority to issue binding multilateral sanctions within the UN system. However, on many occasions over the past 78 years, the GA has recommended that the SC impose sanctions, including mandatory sanctions, and has also recommended that Member States adopt a range of sanctioning measures.

The GA is fully within its Charter authorities to discuss matters related to sanctions: under Article 10 the GA may discuss any matter relevant to the Charter; under Article 11(2), it is specifically envisioned that the GA may discuss matters related to the “maintenance of international peace and security”; and under Article 14 it can make recommendations of any “measures” that would result in “the peaceful adjustment of any situation”. These could include sanctions or related measures, either by the SC or other Member States, where the GA deems it appropriate. GA resolutions calling on the SC to impose mandatory sanctions are given additional backing by Article 11(2), which calls the SC’s attention to “situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security” and offer recommendations. Lastly, the GA’s authority under Article 22 to create “subsidiary bodies” has also enabled it to create monitoring committees or other fact-finding bodies, including those that might monitor Member State compliance with sanctions or boycotts, the effects of those measures, and then report back to the GA on their results. For more on these powers and provisions, visit the legal background chapter.

GA practice related to sanctions can broadly be separated into two phases: (1) an early period, until 1980, in which the GA was willing to issue far-reaching recommendations on sanctions; and (2) a much more restricted practice since 1980, characterized by greater GA skepticism toward sanctions, but with some willingness to support multilateral sanctions in certain situations. The menu bar at the bottom of the page and at the right offers Cases of Practice illustrating how the GA has responded to sanctioning measures. These are also hyperlinked by their case name or other descriptive phrases in the summary of practice below.

Summary table of General Assembly recommendations related to sanctions

Activating event / subject	Key or illustrative GA resolution(s)	Nature of GA sanctions recommendations
Hostilities on the Korean Peninsula	A/RES/500(V) (1951)	Recommended Member States to impose comprehensive arms embargo on areas under control of North Korean and Chinese forces; also created Additional Measures Committee with follow-up responsibilities similar to a Sanctions Committee.
Portuguese territories, decolonization of	Near-annual resolutions 1961 to 1973, including: A/RES/1699(XVI) (1961) A/RES/1807(XVII) (1962) A/RES/2708(XXV) (1970)	Recommended wide-ranging sanctions measures, including for Member States (specifically NATO members) to deny support to Portugal, limit military sales and nationals’ economic activities, introduce trade boycotts and cease diplomatic relations.
South West Africa (Namibia), South African “illegal” governance of	Near-annual resolutions 1963 to 1988, including: A/RES/1899(XVIII) (1963) A/RES/2372(XXII) (1968)	Recommended comprehensive mandatory sanctions, and for Member States to cease all dealings with South Africa, to be monitored by the UN Council of Namibia (with similar functions to a panel of experts).
Southern Rhodesia, repression of self-determination and racial oppression	Near-annual resolutions 1967 to 1979, including: A/RES/2262(XXII) (1967) A/RES/2383(XXIII) (1968)	Recommended that the SC impose “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by force” on Southern Rhodesia, and later, to extend them to countries that continued relations and assistance with Southern Rhodesia (South Africa and Portugal).
Apartheid policies in South Africa	Near-annual resolutions 1962 to 1993, including A/RES/1761(XVII) (1962) A/RES/31/6 (1976) A/RES/40/64 (1985)	Recommended wide-ranging sanctioning measures, including SC mandatory sanctions on South Africa; all Member States to cease military, economic and diplomatic engagement; and boycotts in business, trade, sports and cultural activities. Special Committee on Apartheid included tasks related to monitoring compliance with resolutions and supporting concerted pressure via sanctioning measures.
Israeli strike on Iraqi nuclear reactor	A/RES/36/27 (1981)	Recommended that Member States cease providing any forms of “arms and related material” to Israel.
Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights	A/ES-9/1 (1982)	Recommended that Member States sever diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel.
Coup in Haiti (1991)	A/RES/47/20B (1993) A/RES/48/27B (1994)	Resolutions supported SC and regional organizations’ efforts to restore democratically elected Government, which included arms and oil embargoes, and transit and asset freezes on de facto authorities in Haiti.
Taliban and terrorist activities in Afghanistan	Near-annual resolutions 2012 to 2020, including: A/RES/66/13 (2012) A/RES/71/9 (2016) A/RES/74/9 (2019)	Resolutions supported SC-mandated 1988 sanctions regime (Taliban and Al Qaeda).
Islamic State actions in Iraq	A/RES/69/281 (2016)	Resolution gave support to SC sanctions regime against ISIL.
Myanmar “state of emergency”	A/RES/75/287 (2021)	Recommended that Member States “prevent the flow of arms” into Myanmar.
Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)	A/RES/ES-10/24 (2024)	Called upon Member States to implement sanctions against “persons engaged in the maintenance of Israel’s unlawful presence in the OPT”, and to cease importation of products originating in Israeli settlements, as well as arms sales or transfers to Israel where it is suspected they may be used in the OPT.

Early practice (1945–1980): enforcing de-colonization and reinforcing other use of force responses

The earliest example of sanctions involved a 1951 GA resolution recommending an arms embargo following military intervention by the People’s Republic of China on behalf of North Korean forces in the Korean War. Resolution 500 (V) recommended that “every State: (a) apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war” (A/RES/500(V)). A Member State-enforced arms embargo was one of many measures the GA recommended in response to the situation on the Korean Peninsula; others included offering support for the (previously SC-authorized) UN forces acting in defence of South Korea, and calling on States to lend assistance to Korea and to deny any assistance to the “aggressors in Korea” (A/RES/498(V)).

This early example illustrates a broader point: where the GA recommends sanctions, it is usually not the sole or even leading recommendation. The GA usually recommends sanctioning measures in concert with other recommendations, including statements condemning the actions in question, recommendations for cessation of hostilities or of other actions deemed a threat to peace and security, or broader recommendations related to provision or cessation of assistance or support by other Member States (going beyond the sanctions themselves).

In the GA’s early practice, recommendations for sanctioning measures have been prominent in situations of post-colonial transitions and/or situations of racial oppression. This includes GA recommendations for sanctioning measures linked to its calls to respect the self-determination of the people of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the Portuguese Territories (now Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), and South West Africa (now Namibia). An overlapping issue in many of these situations, and also in the GA recommendations to sanction South Africa in the context of apartheid, was that of racial oppression. Similar to the example with Korea, in each of these situations, GA recommendations were not limited to sanctions, and in fact were usually preceded by a number of other measures first. In these four cases, the pattern was for the GA to declare the governing authorities to be invalid and to call for them to step down or withdraw,¹ but then also to recommend that Member States cut off relations, cease economic or military support or use other means of censure.

Calls for stricter, mandatory or all-encompassing sanctions measures have tended to increase the longer that non-compliance continued. The GA almost immediately condemned the 1965 declaration of independence (from the UK) by the “racialist minority” Government in Southern Rhodesia (A/RES/2024(XX)). SC resolutions calling for States to cease support followed quickly in 1965 (S/RES/216), and then, in 1966, in the form of Chapter VII mandatory sanctions on most trade, transportation and diplomatic relations (S/RES/232). When these resolutions did not appear to lead to compliance, the GA called for stricter sanctions in 1967, calling for “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by force” and condemning those States and financial companies and interests still operating in Southern Rhodesia (A/RES/2262(XXII)). Subsequent resolutions repeated calls for stricter, mandatory sanctions (and extending them to other States viewed as supporting Southern Rhodesia) and other Chapter VII measures (A/RES/2383(XXIII)).

Sanctions and other punitive measures with regard to the Portuguese Territories offer another example of this. Portugal’s refusal to defer to GA resolutions urging it to comply with Chapter XI of the UN Charter, and associated decolonization processes, with regard to its overseas territories led the GA to first call in 1961 for Member States to limit assistance to Portugal, including military sales (A/RES/1807(XVII)). The SC would reiterate many of the GA’s recommendations in two 1963 resolutions (S/5380; S/5481), including the request that States refrain from assistance and military sales. However, Portugal continued not to comply with Chapter XI, nor to take action in support of moves toward the self-determination of its colonial territories. In response the GA adopted near annual resolutions on the subject from 1963 to 1973, with increasingly urgent language and recommendations for more specific and broader sanctions. This included recommendations that Member States “separately or collectively” break off diplomatic relations with Portugal, close their ports to Portuguese vessels, boycott all trade with Portugal, prevent nationals from engaging in foreign financing or other economic activities in these territories, and that members of NATO refuse to provide assistance or engage in military support and cooperation (A/RES/2107(XX)). These resolutions also demanded greater SC attention to the matter with ever greater urgency, calling on the Security Council to make sanctions mandatory, and to take other “appropriate measures laid down in the Charter”, which might include Chapter VII action.²

As the above two examples illustrate, there was frequently an interactive effect: GA calls for sanctions were subsequently taken up by the SC in many cases. Another powerful example of this concerns the sanctions on South Africa. In 1962, with the passage of resolution 1761(XVII), the GA was among the first to call for Member States to break diplomatic relations and adopt other economic restrictions or boycotts in response to South Africa’s racial policies (A/RES/1761(XVII)).³ The resolution also requested the SC to “take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure South Africa’s compliance” with GA and SC resolutions on the subject and “if necessary, to consider action under Article 6 of the UN Charter” (ibid., para. 8). The SC took up this recommendation in 1963, explicitly noting that “world public opinion has been reflected in General Assembly resolution 1761(XVII)”; it called for States to cease arms and military sales and shipment to South Africa (S/RES/181). Following calls for broader and mandatory sanctions in numerous GA resolutions in subsequent years, these SC sanctions were then made mandatory in 1977, when the SC, acting under the authority of Chapter VII, decided that all States should cease providing arms, materiel, weapons, ammunition, military vehicles or other related equipment and manufacturing licenses to South Africa (S/RES/418, para. 2).

While the SC has taken up some GA recommendations for sanctioning measures in the past, the SC has not always been in agreement with the GA in terms of the timing and severity of the sanctions in question, as best illustrated by the case of sanctions related to Namibia (formerly South West Africa). In 1963, the GA first urged that all States refrain from supplying arms, military equipment or petroleum to South Africa due to its continued governance of Namibia (A/RES/1899(XVIII)). These calls strengthened after the GA declared South Africa’s mandate to be illegal in 1966 (A/RES/2145(XXI)). Following this, the GA called for South Africa to withdraw from Namibia (A/RES/2372(XXII)). To further induce this, the GA called upon States to refrain from any political, economic or military cooperation with South Africa until they withdrew, and for the SC to “take all appropriate steps” to secure South Africa’s compliance (ibid.). Such “appropriate” measures were not immediately forthcoming: in 1969 and 1970 the SC passed four resolutions with regard to Namibia that discussed “necessary measures” to compel compliance, but none went so far as to introduce sanctions.

Following a failed diplomatic effort to implement a SC-approved plan for elections and a transition in Namibia, the GA in March 1981 called upon the SC to “impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa, as provided for under Chapter VII” (A/RES/35/227 (J)). However, although four draft resolutions recommending mandatory sanctions were put before the SC the following month, these were vetoed by the US, the UK and France. These vetoes led to an exercise of the UFP resolution and the convening of the 8th emergency special session when the GA again urged the SC to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa, and for Member States to cease all dealings with the country (A/RES/ES-8/2). The SC did not make sanctions mandatory beyond a 1977 arms embargo (S/RES/418). The GA continued to pass annual resolutions calling for more comprehensive, stronger and more stringently enforced sanctions, up until South Africa agreed in December 1988 to take steps toward Namibian independence.⁴

GA recommendations for sanctions with regard to South Africa (both due to its internal policies of apartheid and due to its actions in Namibia and other parts of southern Africa) are also notable because they illustrate that sanctions recommendations frequently go beyond purely economic measures. In the case of South Africa, GA recommendations and actions included recommending that Member States cut diplomatic ties (A/RES/2372(XXII)); limits on South African representatives’ participation in the GA⁵; limitations on arms sales, material or manufacturing support to South Africa (A/RES/3151(XXVIII), para. (G)6; A/RES/3324(XXIX); A/RES/3411(XXX)); and suspending cultural, educational and sporting exchanges (A/RES/2396(XXIII), para. 10). The case study on sanctions measures with regard to South Africa includes a summary of these wide-ranging sanctions recommendations from some 16 GA resolutions passed between 1969 and 1985.

A final important point to highlight from this early period is that GA resolutions often established committees with sanctions monitoring, reporting and follow-up responsibilities analogous to the modern practice of establishing sanctions committees or associated panels of experts (which tend to be associated with SC-mandated sanctions regimes). After the GA in 1951 recommended an arms embargo against those deemed aggressors in the Korean Peninsula (A/RES/500(V)), it established a monitoring process to be implemented by a GA-created body, the Additional Measures Committee.⁶ It was to gather information on how Member States had taken steps to limit military and economic support to those “forces opposing the United Nations in Korea”, and report back on the effectiveness of the embargo recommended within that resolution, whether to extend or relax it, and to continue to report back on “additional measures” to be deployed (ibid., para. 2).

In the case of sanctions related to Namibia, after recommending that the SC impose mandatory sanctions, and that Member States cease all relations and trade with South Africa due to its continued governance of Namibia, the GA mandated the UN Council for Namibia to monitor the boycott and report back on compliance (A/RES/ES-8/2). Additional committees were created in the context of GA action with regard to South Africa (A/RES/1761(XVII)) and the Portuguese Territories (A/RES/1699(XVI)). While not explicitly mandated to follow whether there was compliance with sanctions recommendations, over the course of their mandates, these bodies were tasked with monitoring the degree to which those Governments complied with prior GA (and in some cases SC) resolutions, which could inform the application of further sanctions.⁷

Modern practice (1980–present): less common use, but for gross human rights violations and accountability

The dominant position of the GA in the modern era has been to urge Member States not to impose unilateral sanctions on others, or in some cases to denounce sanctions as an economic intervention in the affairs of States (e.g. the GA’s 1986 resolution critiquing sanctions on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). This shift is captured by GA resolutions and declarations on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States (A/RES/2131(XX)), the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (A/RES/2625(XXV)), and the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States (A/RES/3281(XXIX)) – all of which generally assert the principle that States should not use economic, political or any other measures to coerce another State. In 1991, the GA passed a resolution condemning the imposition of economic sanctions by other Member States and urging “the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures to eliminate the use by some developed countries of unilateral economic coercive measures against developing countries” (A/RES/46/210). A subsequent 1996 resolution reiterated the same language and observed that such measures were in violation of the UN Charter (A/RES/50/96).

Nonetheless, even in this modern period, situations of serious and widespread gross violations of human rights have still sometimes generated GA recommendations for sanctions. The GA continued to recommend sanctions measures in relation to Namibia up until 1988 and with respect to racial apartheid in South Africa until 1993. More recently, since 2014, GA resolutions with regard to the situation in the DPRK have recommended that the SC consider “the scope for effective targeted sanctions” against those responsible for extreme human rights violations in the DPRK (A/RES/69/188; A/RES/70/172; A/RES/78/218).

Calls for sanctions related to transgressions of sovereignty or acts of aggression have been rare in the modern period, but not completely absent. Following Israel’s 1981 aerial attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, in November 1981, the GA passed resolution 36/27, which not only condemned the attack but also called on Member States to “cease forthwith any provision to Israel of arms and related material of all types which enable it to commit acts of aggression against other States” (A/RES/36/27, para. 3).⁸ In relation to Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, the GA passed a resolution during the 9th emergency special session that called for the severance of “diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel” and asked Member States to refrain from “all dealings with Israel in order totally to isolate it in all fields” (A/ES-9/1, paras. 1, 12 and 13). In both of these cases, the GA not only condemned the actions in question as violations of international law and/or the UN Charter, but also cited Israel’s non-compliance with previous SC resolutions as a justification.

In the context of Serbian aggression and hostilities against Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, the GA at least one case, the GA commended all States for complying with Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and also encouraged the Security Council to support the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina by granting an exemption from an existing arms embargo (A/RES/49/10, paras. 20–23).

The GA has sometimes lent support to sanctions regimes mandated by the SC or other regional bodies as part of conflict resolution or counter-terrorism efforts in the last three decades. The GA’s annual resolutions on Afghanistan for many years cited the importance of full compliance with the SC-mandated sanctions regime related to the Taliban and Al-Qaida (the so-called “1988 regime”).⁹ In 2015, the GA passed resolution 69/281, in response to the takeover of large parts of Iraqi territory by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014 (A/RES/69/281). Within this resolution, the GA welcomed the adoption of SC resolution 2199 (S/RES/2199), which created additional sanctions against ISIL and the Al-Nusrah Front.¹⁰ While not common, this has included support for sanctioning measures adopted by the SC or other regional bodies in response to unconstitutional takeovers of power; however, in these cases, GA resolutions have often held back from directly referencing and condoning the sanctions in question.

The response of the GA to dynamics in Haiti following a military coup in 1991 illustrates this more indirect or restrained support for sanctions measures in such situations. Following the initial coup, the GA issued a number of resolutions between 1991 and 1993 that strongly condemned the coup and demanded the restoration of the democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.¹¹ These resolutions also lent support to the OAS in its efforts to enable this restoration, which among other measures, included OAS recommendations for sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes). One GA resolution from 1993 even implicitly supported the use of sanctions as a means of putting economic pressure on the de facto authorities in Haiti, by suggesting that any relaxation of “economic measures” recommended by an ad hoc consortium of States and the OAS should happen “according to progress in the observance of human rights and in the solution of the political crisis” leading to Aristide’s restoration (A/RES/47/20B, para. 6). The SC then imposed (and later re-imposed) mandatory sanctions (initially, arms and oil embargoes and asset freezes, later more comprehensive sanctions) in 1993 and 1994 (S/RES/841; S/RES/917). Although GA resolutions during this time period recalled these SC resolutions, the recommendations and provisions did not suggest approval for these sanctions measures, and instead reinforced the importance of diplomatic negotiations, lent support to a GA-mandated peace operation, and continued to call for the restoration of the democratic Government (e.g. A/RES/48/27B; A/RES/48/27A). The emphasis in these resolutions was on economic and political support to Haiti after the restoration of Aristide’s Government, rather than on economic restrictions.

There was a similar level of indirect support for the SC and regional sanctions that were instituted in response to a military coup in Sierra Leone in May 1997. In 1998, in resolution 52/14, the GA condemned the unconstitutional seizure of power by the military junta in Sierra Leone, and called upon “the international community to lend its support to” previous recommendations and initiatives by the SC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by “faithfully implementing the various measures adopted in order to accelerate the return to peace” (A/RES/52/14). Although not referenced in the GA resolution explicitly, these past recommendations and efforts had included a series of sanctions, including travel bans on members of the military junta and their families and an oil, arms and travel embargo (S/RES/1132 (1997)).¹²

Among the most significant recent actions related to sanctions, in 2021, in the face of SC deadlock over the situation in Myanmar, the GA passed a resolution that expressed concern at the military-imposed state of emergency and called upon the “Myanmar armed forces to respect the will of the people … to end the state of emergency, to respect human rights, … and to allow the sustained democratic transition of Myanmar” (A/RES/75/287). It also called upon Member States “to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar” (ibid., para. 7).

Key trends and conclusions

1. Throughout its history, the GA has been willing to recommend sanctioning measures in cases of extreme violations of human rights or of the UN Charter.

This survey of past practice illustrates a wide range of situations in which the GA has been willing to consider sanctioning measures. From 1951 up to 2021, the GA passed resolutions supporting arms embargoes, where it might prevent further acts of aggression or acceleration of a conflict. While not frequent, the GA has sometimes supported sanctions regimes mandated by the SC or other regional bodies as part of conflict resolution efforts (for example, following unconstitutional transfers of power) or as counter-terrorism measures. More commonly, in keeping with its role in assisting with the realization of human rights (under Article 13), the GA has recommended or supported the use of sanctions in response to serious, widespread and systematic violations of human rights, including those taking place in situations of post-colonial transitions and/or situations of racial oppression. GA sanctions recommendations related to serious rights violations have often coincided with situations in which the GA is fulfilling its accountability role, keeping attention on a situation of serious violations but also in the sense of holding the SC to account. In situations such as those in Namibia, South Africa, the Portuguese Territories, as well as more recently with regard to the DPRK, GA resolutions calling for sanctioning measures also called for greater SC attention to the matters in question, and for the SC to use its Charter authorities to encourage greater compliance.

2. GA sanctions recommendations frequently go beyond purely military or economic measures.

In situations where the GA has considered sanctions-related recommendations, it has frequently urged mandatory measures by the SC, often in relation to military and arms sales and transfers or other key economic measures; however, its recommendations have not been limited to these classic arenas. GA sanctions recommendations have encouraged the boycotts of key goods, cultural and sporting events, limitations on engagement by private citizens and companies, limitations in the participation of Member States in key international fora or other diplomatic freezes or isolating measures. In addition, the GA has often relied on its position representing the voice of many nations to urge action not just by the SC or key Member States but by society at large. The GA’s persistent attention to situations of racial apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, and its calls for sanctioning measures not just by the SC but by Member States and societies at large, were instrumental in galvanizing a global response to those situations. This illustrates the powerful role that GA recommendations can play, even if not binding or mandatory.

3. GA practice on sanctions has included attention to follow-on measures, including committees or panels to monitor and follow-up on sanctions.

Where the GA has recommended sanctioning measures, it has often given attention to means of following up on them and increasing their effectiveness. This may be through organizing conferences that garner wider public attention toward the underlying issues (e.g. in the cases of South Africa and Namibia), keeping attention on compliance (or lack thereof) through annual resolutions on the subject (e.g. in the cases of South Africa, Namibia, the Portuguese Territories, Southern Rhodesia, and the DPRK), or creating committees or bodies charged with monitoring or reporting on compliance with recommended boycotts or sanctioning measures, and recommending follow-on action (e.g. in the cases of Korea, Namibia, the Portuguese Territories and South Africa). The last, which were more common in the GA’s early practice, might be considered precedents for the modern practice of sanctions committees and panels of experts mandated by the SC.

4. GA recommendations to apply sanctioning measures have typically been issued only after other measures have failed or not been taken up.

While the GA has considered recommendations for sanctions throughout its history, these have often featured as a secondary, if not a last-resort action, following repeated non-compliance by the Member States in question, or perceived lack of sufficient attention by the SC. Where the GA has recommended sanctions, it has usually not been the sole or even leading recommendation, but has accompanied other recommended measures, such as requests to cease the use of force or continued occupation of a territory, to withdraw forces or to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations. Calls for stricter, mandatory or all-encompassing sanctions measures have tended to arise only after years of non-compliance with these other recommendations.

5. GA willingness to recommend sanctions has declined in the modern era, but has not disappeared, especially in situations of grave violations.

The modern practice of the GA has more commonly been to oppose imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. From a normative viewpoint, the GA has played an important role in urging States not to impose sanctions that may violate sovereignty, but also where measures may violate international humanitarian and human rights law. Nonetheless, even in this more limited modern practice, there have been cases where the GA has recommended sanctions or supported their use by the SC or other regional organizations, in response to violations of sovereignty, unconstitutional transfers of power, and especially in cases of serious human rights violations.

Going forward, this summary of practice suggests a wide range of potential areas of action for the GA with regard to sanctions, including:

• GA resolutions calling for restraint on sanctions measures that may violate international humanitarian and/or human rights law or exacerbate civilian suffering (e.g. blockades, prevention of humanitarian assistance).
• GA resolutions calling for sanctions on the basis of violations of the UN Charter and/or international law (e.g. human rights abuses).
• GA recommendations for the SC to issue binding multilateral sanctions where there is repeated non-compliance with GA or SC recommendations related to the maintenance of peace and security.
• GA resolutions creating or mandating committees or bodies (similar to sanctions panels or panels of experts) that through their monitoring and reporting may enhance the effectiveness of sanctions regimes or reinforce other legal principles and accountability measures (i.e. where such monitoring identifies actions in violation of the UN Charter or international law).