Peace Operations and Other Operational Bodies

In recent years, peacekeeping and special political missions (together referred to as “peace operations”) have more often been established by the SC acting on the authority granted to it by Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. However, the GA has a long history of engagement with peace operations, both directly mandating or authorizing their establishment, passing resolutions that enabled an extension of their mandate or functions and other means of providing support to SC-authorized peace operations.

The authority for the GA to engage with peace operations rests in the broad remit given to it to offer recommendations that contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the UN Charter, inter alia, Article 11(2)’s provision that the GA may discuss questions related to the “maintenance of international peace and security”, and Article 14’s provision that the GA may “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation”. Another important Charter authority is Article 22, which empowers the GA to establish any “subsidiary organs” necessary for carrying out its mandate. As affirmed in the ICJ’s Certain Expenses case, this is the authority that has enabled the GA to create peace operations, with these missions considered a subsidiary body.¹ The GA’s primary authority over budgetary matters under Article 17 has also in some situations enabled them to extend peace operations authorized by other bodies.² The primary limitation established in the Charter, and reinforced in subsequent practice and ICJ advisory opinions, is that GA recommendations are non-binding and would have to be taken up and adopted by the SC to have any coercive effect. As a result, the GA can only authorize a peace operation with the consent of the host country.³ Visit the legal background chapter for more on the Charter basis for these GA powers, the limitations and other legal aspects.

The following text summarizes trends in GA engagement with peace operations. The menu bar at the bottom of the page and at the right offers Cases of Practice of GA engagement with peace operations, which are also hyperlinked by their case name or other descriptive phrases in the summary of practice below.

General Assembly establishment of and support to peace operations

Although less active in its engagement with peace operations since 2000, the GA has a long history of establishing, extending the mandate or functions of, or otherwise supporting peace operations. In 1956 the GA established what is now considered the first UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which was authorized in response to the Suez Crisis. The GA was called to consider the matter following a veto of proposed responses to the Suez Crisis in the SC, leading the SC to request an emergency special session in reference to the UFP resolution. In its first resolution in the 1st emergency special session that followed, the GA called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces; however, following concerns that a UN monitoring or policing force would be necessary to see through these measures a subsequent resolution set up “an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities” (A/RES/1000(ES-I)). It was tasked to monitor the ceasefire and later to oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory. Egypt, on whose territory UNEF operated, consented to the force.

The GA also provided the authority for the first UN peace operation to administer a territory (in 1962) and authorized the first example of a joint peace operation with a regional body (in 1993):

• In 1962, the GA provided the authority (A/RES/1752(XVII)) for the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and a related security force, the United Nations Security Force (UNSF), which assumed direct administrative responsibility for the territory of West New Guinea (now part of Indonesia).⁴ This set a precedent for subsequent SC-authorized administrative authorities in East Timor and in Kosovo.⁵
• In April 1993, the GA authorized (A/RES/47/20B) the deployment of UN personnel for the newly created monitoring mission, International Civilian Mission in Haiti, known as MICIVIH for its acronym in French,⁶ the first fully integrated mission between a regional organization (the Organization of American States, OAS) and the UN.

In addition to these precedent-setting examples, the GA has mandated many other peace operations, whether those involving armed peacekeepers or those whose tasks and functions are more analogous to the current profile of special political missions (see Table 1). These have recurred nearly every decade up until 2000. GA support to operational bodies, good offices initiatives, or other immediate response measures have also laid the foundation for subsequent peace operations. For example, in 2012, the GA mandated the creation of a Joint Special Envoy (with the League of Arab States (LAS)) in response to the outbreak of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011 (A/RES/66/253). This later evolved into the special political mission of the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria.

Equally important, the GA has lent critical support to peace operations established by the SC, enabling them to continue at difficult moments (for example, when the SC was divided over forward action), supporting them budgetarily, or in some cases, expanding their functions and tasks. During the 3rd emergency special session in 1958, the GA requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan, effectively expanding the mandate of the SC-authorized peace operation, the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), to allow it to oversee the withdrawal of forces deployed by the United States of America in Lebanon — an issue that had triggered deadlock in the SC over future UNOGIL operations.

Beginning in 1960, the GA helped extend and amplify the SC-authorized UN Operation in the Congo / Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC). During the 4th emergency special session in 1960, GA resolutions helped maintain ONUC and enable it to respond to an escalating security situation in the Congo, notwithstanding SC deadlock over the matter (A/RES/1474(ES-IV)). It then later (outside of the context of an emergency special session) extended ONUC’s operations for a period of time by providing additional budgetary support. ONUC was the second case considered within the Certain Expenses ICJ advisory opinion. In ratifying GA actions with respect to ONUC as permissible under the UN Charter, the ICJ affirmed that the GA is within its Charter authority to both create and to extend peace operations, including those created by the SC.

A unique case involved GA resolutions supporting UN forces in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and 1951. In late 1950, Chinese forces intervened on behalf of North Korea, attacking the position of US and UN forces authorized by the SC to defend South Korea’s territorial integrity. With deadlock in the SC over the matter, the GA stepped in and passed resolution 498(V), which affirmed UN “action in Korea to meet the aggression”, called upon all States and authorities to “continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea”, and called upon Member States not to give assistance to the “aggressors in Korea” (A/RES/498(V)). While this case concerns an enforcement action rather than peacekeeping forces, it features a case where GA resolutions were seen to extend the activities of UN forces where SC political divisions prevented it from doing so.

There have also been cases where the GA indirectly supported the creation of peace operations, as illustrated with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Although UNTAC was established by the SC, GA support for good offices helped lead to the 1991 Paris Conference on Cambodia, which provided for the creation of UNTAC. The GA endorsed the Paris Agreements in November 1991, including explicit support for UNTAC (A/RES/46/18, para. 2). Other examples include the 1999 creation of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which was authorized by the SC (S/RES/1246), but was influenced by a range of GA resolutions calling for peaceful resolution of the conflict;⁷ and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH),⁸ created by the SC in 1993 (S/RES/867), but following multiple GA resolutions⁹ calling for restoration of the democratically elected Government following the 1991 coup. It worked with the GA-created mission MICIVIH noted above.

Lastly, although more commonly the GA has provided support to peace operations initially created by the SC, the inverse has also happened. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Guatemala, the SC authorized a temporary attachment of military advisors to the GA-mandated mission already deployed in Guatemala – the UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA). This example helps reinforce the complementarity between SC and GA action on peace operations.

The table below offers a summary of GA engagement with peace operations, distinguishing between cases of GA authorization versus extension or provision of additional support.

Summary chart of past General Assembly-supported missions and bodies

All acronyms in this chart are expanded upon in the case studies, and in the full acronym list in the About section of this website.

Peace operation or operational body Full titles in hyperlinked case studies	Location of deployment	Relevant GA resolution(s)	Nature of GA engagement
UNSCOB	Greece	A/RES/109(II) (1947)	Mandating peace operation
UN Forces on the Korean Peninsula (enforcement force)	Korea	A/RES/498(V) (1951)	Extending support for UN forces
Repatriation Commission (operational body)	Korea	A/RES/610(VII) (1952)	Mandating a body with tasks common to peace operations
UNEF	Egypt	A/RES/1000(ES-I) (1956)	Mandating peace operation
UNOGIL	Lebanon	A/RES/1237(ES-III) (1958)	Extending / supporting peace operation
ONUC	Congo	A/RES/1474(ES-IV) (1960) A/RES/1885(XVIII) (1963)	Extending / supporting peace operation
UNTEA ; UNSF (territorial administration)	West New Guinea	A/RES/1752(XVII) (1962)	Providing authority for peace operation
OSGAP (operational office)	Afghanistan and Pakistan	A/RES/43/20 (1988)	Support for subsequent peace operations / bridging role
UNOVER	Eritrea	A/47/544 (1992)	Mandating peace operation
UNSMA	Afghanistan	A/RES/48/208 (1993) A/RES/53/203A-B (1999) A/RES/54/189A-B (2000)	Mandating peace operation; expanding peace operation
UNTAC	Cambodia	A/RES/46/18 (1991)	Laying the foundation for future peace operation
MICIVIH; MICAH	Haiti	A/RES/47/20B (1993) A/RES/54/193 (1999)	Mandating peace operation
MINUGUA	Guatemala	A/RES/48/267 (1994)	Mandating peace operation
Joint Special Envoy for Syria and regional observer mission (operational body)	Syrian Arab Republic	A/RES/66/176 (2011) A/RES/66/253 (2012)	Laying the foundation for future peace operations

Range of functions in General Assembly-supported missions

The peace operations that the GA has mandated in the past have taken on a range of functions and roles in peace and security situations, mirroring the full range of activities currently undertaken by peacekeeping missions or special political missions. These include:

• Facilitating transfer of prisoners of war and returnees, and supporting disarmament and demobilization: In December 1952 following the conclusion of the Korean War, the GA established a Repatriation Commission in Korea which was mandated to facilitate the return of prisoners of war and other returnees (A/RES/610(VII)). Over the course of its mandate, UNEF also took on some functions related to disarmament and demobilization, as part of facilitating foreign forces’ withdrawal.
• Supporting transition processes, including elections or referenda: In 1992, the GA established the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) which helped oversee the 1993 referendum that led to Eritrean independence (A/47/544). In December 1999, the GA created the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (known by the acronym MICAH) (A/RES/54/193). Following on the heels of a critical transition moment in Haiti,¹⁰ MICAH was mandated to assist in the development of democratic institutions, justice reform efforts, police professionalization and the organization of democratic elections.
• Monitoring human rights or other conditions related to conflict resolution: The GA-mandated mission in Haiti known as MICIVIH was tasked with verifying “compliance with Haiti’s international human rights obligations” and to make further recommendations that would lead to “re-establishment of democracy in Haiti” (A/RES/47/20B).¹¹ The subsequent GA-mandated peace operation in Haiti, MICAH, incorporated part of the MCIVIH mission, retaining the mandate to monitor and support the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms (A/RES/54/193).
• Peacemaking, mediation and good offices to defuse internal and/or cross-border tensions: In October 1947 the GA created the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) to help mediate between parties following a situation in which Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were alleged to be supporting communist guerrilla fighters against the Greek Government (A/RES/109(II)). In 1993, the GA requested the Secretary-General to establish what became known as the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) to assist with political “rapprochement” and reconstruction in Afghanistan (A/RES/48/208). The GA later expanded its mandate to include facilitation and monitoring of a ceasefire and leading “UN peacemaking” both in Afghanistan and with regard to the engagement of neighboring countries (Pakistan) (A/RES/53/203A-B; A/RES/54/189A-B).
• Facilitating and monitoring compliance with peace agreements: In September 1994, the GA established MINUGUA (A/RES/48/267) at the request of the parties involved – which was notable because the mission was instituted midway through the negotiation process, before a ceasefire had been agreed. Its mandate was to implement interim agreements (regarding human rights, Indigenous rights, etc.) and ultimately the final ceasefire and peace agreement.
• Maintaining ceasefires and supporting law and order: GA-mandated peace operations have frequently been authorized to help maintain ceasefires, including UNEF, ONUC, UNTEA/UNSF, UNSMA and MINUGUA. ONUC in the Congo – initially a SC-created force – was mandated by the GA to support the Congolese Government in “the restoration and maintenance of law and order”, a task that was in line with the original SC mandate for the force, but much stronger (A/RES/1474(ES-IV), para. 2). UNTEA and its associated security forces under UNSF had an explicit mandate to support law and order in West New Guinea (A/RES/1752(XVII)). The MICAH mission in Haiti had a substantial focus on police reform, professionalization and other related security-support tasks.

Key trends and conclusions

1. Situations referencing the UFP are an important prompt, but not the sole route for GA engagement on peace operations.

Some of the most forward-leaning action by the GA with regard to peace operations and peace enforcement have drawn on the UFP resolution or (in the two cases preceding the UFP) situations with similar political dynamics. These include: GA support for the first major UN peace enforcement action (the ratification of UN forces in Korea), the first armed peacekeeping mission (UNEF, in response to the Suez Crisis), the first case of the GA expanding and sustaining a SC-authorized force (UNOGIL), and a significant expansion and sustaining of an important early peacekeeping force in the Congo. However, there have been equally significant examples of GA engagement with peace operations outside of a UFP context. Deliberation over and passage of the resolution creating UNSMA arose under a regular agenda item. GA engagement with the peace operations described above in Haiti, Cambodia, Guatemala, and others, also arose during regular sessions, not in reference to the UFP resolution. This underlines that while situations recalling the UFP resolution can provide an important political prompt, the GA’s engagement in peace operations need not be limited to these contexts.

2. GA and SC action on peace operations have often been complementary.

The examples of peace operations illustrate the frequency of parallel – and complementary – action between the SC and GA. In several of the above cases, GA action on peace operations has helped advance responses to a crisis where the SC was not able to act. Three cases that arose in connection with the UFP resolution illustrate this: GA recommendations for creating UNEF, for expanding the tasks and mandate of UNOGIL, or enabling continuance of peace operations in the case of ONUC allowed the UN to help address crisis situations even in the face of SC divisions. The GA’s creation of UNSCOB in 1947 took place before the UFP resolution but represented similar dynamics, with the SC passing the situation on to the GA (S/RES/34) so that some response could go forward notwithstanding SC divisions.

The follow-on actions in each of these cases also illustrates complementarity and cooperation between the GA and SC. Initially, the SC could not reach a consensus on responding to the 1947 crisis surrounding foreign support for guerrillas in Greece. But once the GA did develop a response, establishing UNSCOB, the SC could then cooperate with and support this initiative. UNSCOB’s committee members were staffed by representatives of SC members, lending their credibility to the good offices to be undertaken by the Committee. In the case of ONUC, the GA stepped in at a crucial moment of SC division to enable ONUC to be sustained, and even to expand its remit and scope to deal with an escalating situation. Subsequent to this GA action, the SC again took up the matter, and further extended ONUC’s mandate and tasks, which the GA subsequently ratified in follow-on GA resolutions. This back-and-forth between the SC and GA enabled the mission to continue a robust response at key moments.

The GA’s role in establishing UNSMA in Afghanistan offers another strong example of complementarity. While Afghanistan was regularly on the SC agenda throughout the 1990s, the SC appeared to welcome GA action, noting its support for UNSMA activities in several presidential statements. Other examples of complementarity include both the GA and the SC creating parallel missions, operating alongside each other, in the 1990s in Haiti; the SC’s expansion of the GA-created MINUGUA political mission in Guatemala; and cooperative and complementary actions by the GA that lent support to the SC-created missions in Cambodia and East Timor.

3. The GA role in peace operations has declined over time, but the authority to engage remains.

Most GA engagement with missions involving armed peacekeepers took place in the early years of the UN. There was continued GA mandating of, and significant engagement with political missions in the 1990s, but even that level of engagement has fallen off since 2000. No recent peacekeeping or special political missions have been authorized by the GA. This does not suggest a legal limitation on GA action in this realm, but may reflect shifting preferences or political dynamics within the GA, including vis-à-vis the SC.

Going forward, when considering recommendations regarding peace operations, this summary of practice suggests the following key considerations for Member States:

• Concurrence: the GA is clearly permitted under the UN Charter and ICJ rulings to make recommendations on peace operations concurrently with the matter being on the SC agenda.
• Consent: consent of the host country is required for the GA to play a direct role in mandating or shaping a peace operation.
• Synergies: Member States might seek to support GA action on peace operations in areas where the SC is unable to find consensus. In the past, this has tended to lead to productive synergies and cooperation with the SC over the missions and operations in question.