Responses to Use of Force

GA resolutions in response to perceived acts of aggression, changes or transitions in government, or other peace and security situations have frequently included recommendations that relate to the use of force. These include: a) statements or declarations characterizing the acts in question as legal or Charter violations (e.g. declaring the acts in question to be “acts of aggression” or engagement in “hostilities” or a threat to peace and security); b) urging a cessation of hostilities or ceasefire; c) requesting a withdrawal of forces; d) recommending that military assistance either be provided or halted by other Member States; and e) recommending that the SC or other Member States take enforcement action or other security measures. Examples of each are provided in the subsections below.

The authority for the GA to make these recommendations rests in the broad remit given to it to offer recommendations on peace and security in the UN Charter. Under the Charter, the GA is empowered to discuss any matter relevant to the Charter (Article 10), in particular questions related to the “maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 11(2)). It is also empowered to call the SC’s attention to “situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security” (Article 11(3)); and to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation” (Article 14). The primary limitation established in the Charter, and reinforced in subsequent practice and ICJ advisory opinions, is that GA recommendations are non-binding and would have to be taken up and adopted by the SC to have any coercive effect. For more on these powers and limitations, visit the legal background chapter.

The most prominent, early case of GA recommendations on the use of force followed the deployment of Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula, on behalf of North Korea and fighting against US and UN forces that had been previously authorized by the SC to support South Korea. Following deadlock in the SC, the issue was passed to the GA, which found that Chinese forces had “engaged in aggression in Korea”, and called upon Chinese forces to cease hostilities and withdraw. Further, the GA called upon Member States to “continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea”, confirming and lending support to the previous UN enforcement action that had been authorized by the SC (A/RES/498(V), paras. 3–5). Scholars remain divided on whether these GA resolutions were simply ratifying the prior SC decision on the matter or going further than it, in terms of recommending the use of force.¹ Notwithstanding these differing interpretations, the GA action on Korea set an important precedent confirming the GA’s authority to issue recommendations related to the use of force and to offer its determination on acts of aggression or hostilities.

Some of the most prominent instances of the GA offering recommendations related to the use of force (or cessation of it) have happened in emergency special sessions convened in reference to the UFP resolution, including GA resolutions in response to the Suez Crisis (1956), the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), United Arab Republic intervention and deployment of US forces in Lebanon (1958); the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979); Belgian and mercenary interference in the Congo (1960); the South African “occupation” of Namibia (1981); and the 7th and 10th emergency special sessions related to Palestine. However, there have been as many instances of GA resolutions with findings or recommendations related to the use of force arising in regular sessions.² For example, the GA resolution passed in response to the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 (A/RES/68/262) came under the regular agenda item “prevention of armed conflict” (A/68/PV.80).

GA recommendations related to the use of force have also arisen in special sessions, including those related to specific peace and security situations – for example, urging military support to those fighting for independence in Namibia (A/RES/S-14/1), or urging French withdrawal from Tunisia following armed clashes (A/RES/1622(S-III)) – as well as those related to global threats, notably three special sessions on disarmament (A/S-15/6, A/S-12/6, A/S-10/4). The menu bar at the bottom of the page and at the right offers Cases of Practice illustrating how the GA has responded to use-of-force situations. These are also hyperlinked by their case name or other descriptive phrases in the summary of practice below.

Statements and decisions on legal or Charter violations

Throughout its history, the GA has regularly offered statements in response to armed attacks, military deployments or incursions on other Member States’ territory or situations of internal conflict, in some cases characterizing these as acts of aggression or engagement in hostilities, or declaring an action to be a breach of the peace or a violation of international law or the UN Charter. The GA has even sought to offer specific guidance to the SC on its determinations of acts of aggression. In its 1974 resolution on the definition of aggression it explicitly called the SC’s attention to its determination of the “existence of an act of aggression”, namely: “the use of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, or in any other way that goes against the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter” (A/RES/3314(XXIX)). GA resolutions offering statements in response to military action or intervention frequently reference this resolution and its definition of aggression.

Examples of these statements include:

• Recalling the principles of territorial integrity and of non-interference in the affairs of another Member State, following attacks or intervention in Lebanon, Burma, the Congo, Grenada, Panama, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Kampuchea (Cambodia).
• Determining that China had engaged in aggression in its deployment of troops on behalf of North Korea in 1950 and 1951 (A/RES/498(V), para.1).
• Condemning the “use of Soviet military forces” in Hungary in 1956 as contrary to specific peace treaties and the fundamental rights and freedoms embedded in the UN Charter (A/RES/1004 (ES-II)).
• Condemning the presence and “hostile acts” of Kuomintang Chinese forces in Burma in 1953 (A/RES/34/22).
• Denouncing US intervention in Panama in 1989 (A/RES/44/240), and US (and Caribbean Member States’) intervention in Grenada in 1983 as a “flagrant violation of international law” (A/RES/38/7).
• Declaring the apartheid system to be a “threat to peace and security” and the “illegal occupation” of Namibia to be an “act of aggression” (referencing the definition in resolution 3314(XXIX)); also condemning South African “acts of aggression” against other parts of southern Africa.³
• Declaring the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to be a violation of the UN Charter (A/ES-6/2).
• Characterizing Israel’s attack on Iraqi nuclear installations in 1981 as a “premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression”, as a violation of the UN Charter and international norms, and an “escalation in the threat to international peace and security” (A/RES/36/27).
• Characterizing the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 as an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security (A/ES-9/7).
• Denouncing the declaration of a “state of emergency” in Myanmar (effectively a military coup) in (A/RES/75/287).

It is notable that statements on acts of aggression appeared to be relatively less common from 2000 on, save for the more recent exception of the characterization of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine in 2022 as an act of aggression.

In addition to characterizing certain actions as an act of aggression or a threat to peace and security, the GA has also frequently issued statements related to legal violations in the course of war, in particular as relates to the impact on civilians and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights, and those deemed responsible (by the GA) for those violations. Examples of this are provided in the practice section below on accountability mechanisms and initiatives.

GA declarations on acts of aggression or the use of force have also frequently been accompanied by recommendations that Member States take measures to help those affected by conflict, including assistance with refugees or those displaced in the conflict or hostilities in: Hungary, following Soviet intervention beginning in 1956; Cyprus, following Turkish intervention and escalation of internal conflict in 1974; Afghanistan, following the Soviet invasion in 1979; in and from the territory that would become Bangladesh as a result of the India-Pakistan conflict in 1971; the former Yugoslavia, as a result of Serbian attacks, including ethnic cleansing, in the 1990s (A/RES/49/10, paras. 9–10); and in and from Ukraine following the Russian Federation’s military incursion in 2022.

Cessation of hostilities and ceasefires

GA resolutions passed in response to outbreaks of conflict have frequently called for a cessation of hostilities, often accompanied by proposed ceasefire mechanisms or processes. Examples include resolutions:

• Calling for cessation of hostilities in the Korean crisis of 1950–1951 and following Vietnamese military incursions into Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1979 (A/RES/34/22).
• Calling for a ceasefire and establishing a ceasefire process in the Suez Crisis in 1956.
• Supporting (through ratification) the agreement settling the status of the territory of West Irian, which led to the creation of UNTEA and associated ceasefire processes.
• Calling for a ceasefire in response to hostilities between India and Pakistan (over what would become Bangladesh) in 1971.
• Calling for a halt to all hostilities in the civil conflict in Afghanistan at multiple points during internal conflict in the 1990s (e.g. A/RES/53/203A-B; A/RES/54/189A-B).
• Demanding the immediate cessation of the military activities of Serbian forces and paramilitary units in the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (A/RES/49/10).
• Calling for a cessation of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic (from 2012 onward) and for all parties to comply with SC resolutions or regional organization (the LAS) efforts enabling it.
• Demanding an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” and later an “immediate, unconditional and permanent” ceasefire in Gaza, passed in the 10th emergency special session (A/RES/ES-10/22; A/RES/ES-10/26; A/RES/ES-10/27).

In cases where there have been hostilities initiated by one party against another, the GA has tended to urge that party to halt attacks or hostilities, rather than calling for a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities more broadly. Examples include:

• Calling upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to “desist forthwith from all armed attack on the people of Hungary” and from “armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary” (A/RES/1004(ES-II)).
• Calling for the “immediate cessation” of armed intervention by the US and Caribbean countries in Grenada in 1983.
• Calling upon the US to “refrain from the threat or use of force in the settlement of disputes and differences with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, following the 1986 US attack on Libyan cities in response to acts of terrorism allegedly led by the Qaddafi regime (A/RES/41/38).

Withdrawal of foreign forces

In cases where it has responded to an instance of external intervention, the GA has almost invariably called for withdrawal of foreign forces. This has often been recommended jointly with a call for cessation of hostilities and statements reinforcing the principles of territorial integrity and of non-interference in the affairs of another Member State. For example, GA resolutions called for foreign forces to withdraw:

• Following Chinese intervention in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 (A/RES/498(V)).
• In the case of Kuomintang Chinese (Taiwan-linked) forces present in Burma in 1953 (to withdraw or agree to internment) (A/RES/707(VII)).
• From Egypt in the midst of the Suez Crisis in 1956 (French, British and Israeli forces) (A/RES/997(ES-I)).
• From Hungary following the Soviet “armed intervention” in 1956 (A/RES/1004(ES-II), paras. 1, 2).
• From Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 (US and British forces, respectively) (A/RES/1237(ES-III)).
• From Tunisia in 1961, following a clash between Tunisian and French forces, with the latter maintaining a military base on Tunisian territory (A/RES/1622(S-III)).⁴
• From Cyprus in 1974 (Turkish forces) (A/RES/3212(XXIX)).
• From Cambodia (Kampuchea) in 1979 (Vietnamese forces) (A/RES/34/22).
• From Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979 (A/ES-6/2).
• From Grenada in 1983 (forces from the US and Caribbean nations) (A/RES/38/7).
• From the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 1992 to 1994 (former Soviet forces).⁵
• From the Republic of Moldova in 2018 (Russian forces) (A/RES/72/282).
• From Ukraine from 2022 to 2026 (Russian forces).⁶

Military support or assistance

Recommendations to Member States or other entities to provide or refrain from military support or assistance appear in GA responses both to external intervention or acts of aggression, and to sources of violence within some internal armed conflicts.

Recommending military support: The GA has sometimes urged Member States or other entities to provide military support, defensive means or other assistance to State(s) coming under attack. For example:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina: in response to “armed hostilities and continued aggression” by Serbian forces, the GA in 1994 called for all Member States to lend support to Bosnia and Herzegovina in defending itself and – laying the groundwork for this to include military support – called upon the SC to exempt Bosnia and Herzegovina from the previously established (1991) arms embargo (A/RES/49/10, paras. 22–23).
• Southern African States: in 1978, the GA condemned the “acts of aggression against Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia” (A/RES/33/38[A]) and requested that all Member States give “immediate and substantial material assistance” to these three Governments “to strengthen their defence capability” and defend their own territories (ibid., para. 16).

The GA has also called on Member States to provide military personnel and support to multilateral operations designed to assist Member States in quelling internal sources of violence. For example, at several points between 2002 and 2014, the GA called upon Member States to contribute “personnel, equipment and other resources” to the stabilization force established in Afghanistan (under the leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), the International Security Assistance Force (see, e.g. A/RES/59/112A-B, para. 3; A/RES/60/32A-B, para. 7).

The GA has not limited itself to recommending military support or assistance only to Member States. In certain post-colonial independence struggles or cases of occupation, the GA has recommended military support or other assistance to those working for the “liberation” of the territory, including (armed) resistance movements or the population more generally:

• Namibia: in multiple resolutions related to South Africa’s “occupation” of Namibia, the GA called on Member States to provide moral, material and military assistance to those seeking to “liberate” it, including explicit reference to military support to a resistance movement (the South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO) (A/ES-8/2, para. 6).
• Southern Rhodesia: in many of the near-annual resolutions related to Southern Rhodesia between 1967 and 1979, the GA recommended that States provide moral and material support to those seeking self-determination, including those engaged in armed resistance. For example, in 1978, the GA called for Member States to provide the “moral, material, political and humanitarian assistance necessary” to support the people of Zimbabwe and the Patriotic Front (an armed resistance movement) in resisting the white-dominated Government of Southern Rhodesia (which it had deemed to be illegitimate) (A/RES/33/38[A], para. 17).

Refrain from military support or assistance: The GA has also called for Member States to refrain from providing military support to the “aggressors” in some situations, for example, following Chinese forces’ deployment on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 (A/RES/498(V), para. 5), and following Israel’s 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq (A/RES/36/27, paras. 4,5).

The GA has commonly urged Member States to refrain from providing support or assistance to the parties involved in internal armed conflicts. During the civil war in the Congo in the early 1960s, the GA called upon Member States to exercise restraint and refrain from contributing to the escalation of violence by providing arms, military personnel or any form of military assistance to parties involved in the conflict (A/RES/1474(ES-IV), para. 6). In the context of the civil conflict and fighting in Afghanistan in the late 1990s (during a period of de facto Taliban control and governance), the GA on several occasions called on Member States to cease external military support.⁷ Calls for restraint from arming parties to internal conflicts has included not only provision of military equipment or financing, but in examples in the Congo, Southern Rhodesia and other cases in southern Africa, the GA has called for Member States to refrain from supporting or to actively prevent recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries involved in those conflicts.⁸

Use of force or enforcement action

Although not frequent, the GA has sometimes recommended use of force or enforcement action. This has happened in the following situations:

• Following acts of aggression or external intervention: As noted in the introduction, the support to UN action and for other Member States to help defend Korea in several 1951 GA resolutions has been interpreted as support for the use of force. In November 1994, following continued Serbian attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the GA called upon Member States to “extend their cooperation to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter” (A/RES/49/10, paras. 22–23).

• In relation to decolonization or situations of racial oppression: The GA has also implicitly or explicitly exhorted the use of force or enforcement action by other external Member States, especially those on the SC, in response to oppressive or illegitimate governments, especially in relation to decolonization or situations of racial oppression. In more than one of its resolutions responding to the declaration of independence by the (white-dominated) Government in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the GA recommended that the former colonial power, the UK, reject the declaration and “put an end to the rebellion” through “use of force” (A/RES/2024(XX), paras. 1,3; A/RES/2138(XXI), para. 5; A/RES/2262(XXII), para. 6). Subsequent resolutions ratified the right of the people of Zimbabwe to use “all means at their disposal” to liberate themselves – seemingly a call for the use of force not by other Member States but by the population at large (A/RES/33/38[A]). Also facing a situation of what it deemed to be illegitimate governance (by South Africa) in Namibia, the GA both called for military assistance for those fighting for independence and for Member States, and in particular “Western permanent members” of the SC, to take “enforcement action”.⁹

• Seizures of power through unconstitutional means: Rarer still, the GA has sometimes responded to seizures of power through unconstitutional means (i.e. following coups), with calls for Chapter VII action by the SC or recommendations to support coercive measures by regional organizations or Member States. For example, following a 1991 military coup in Haiti, the GA condemned the coup, affirmed its support for the (overthrown) constitutional Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and demanded its restoration.¹⁰ This led not only to the SC’s subsequent passing of a resolution mandating a naval blockade, arms and oil embargo, and other sanctions in 1993 (S/RES/841), but also mandating enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 1994 (S/RES/940), which subsequently supported the intervention of a US-led multinational force to restore Aristide’s Government. Further examples of other types of Chapter VII action following GA recommendations are provided in the subsequent practice section on sanctions.

Finally, as detailed in the practice section on peace operations, the GA has directly and indirectly supported the establishment of armed peacekeeping missions. The GA has also supported military action organized in response to internal conflicts or terrorism threats, implicitly an endorsement of uses of force to maintain or restore peace and security. For example, it offered its endorsement of both the NATO-led stabilization force, the International Security Assistance Force, established in Afghanistan after 2001 (see, e.g. A/RES/59/112A-B, para. 3; A/RES/60/32A-B, para. 7), and the parallel counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan led by the US, known as Operation Enduring Freedom (A/RES/59/112A-B, para. 6; A/RES/60/32A-B, para. 11).

Key trends and conclusions

1. GA action tends to be concurrent with, but follows that of the SC.

GA practice with regard to the use of force has almost invariably dealt with matters with which the SC was concurrently seized. In two early cases – alleged guerrilla activities supported by neighbouring States in Greek territory in 1947 (S/RES/34) and allegations of aggression in the Korean Peninsula – the SC affirmatively set these matters aside in order for the GA to engage (S/RES/34; S/RES/90). In the other cases discussed above, there was continued SC engagement, and consideration and follow-on resolutions related to the matters in question.

Although GA action has been concurrent, it has tended to follow SC action on an issue. Rebecca Barber examined 19 cases of foreign intervention or military deployments (most overlapping with those discussed in this subsection) and found that in only one of these cases had the SC not taken up the issue prior to GA action – that of Chinese Kuomintang forces in Burma in 1953–1954.¹¹ In all other cases, the SC had already passed resolutions on the issue before the GA addressed the question.

2. GA responses can be rapid, which can be important in use of force contexts.

The ability to respond promptly can be important when hostilities arise, and equally when recommendations related to use of force might form part of a crisis management response. GA responses to use of force situations have often been quite rapid. The first GA resolutions passed in response to the Russian Federation’s February 2022 intervention in Ukraine came only days after Russian forces crossed the border. The GA passed resolutions responding to the Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956) and US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) just over a week after they had begun. The GA responded to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 within a matter of weeks. As these examples illustrate, the procedural vehicle does not necessarily affect the speed of response – the GA has been able to respond rapidly both in the context of emergency special sessions (which are designed to enable a rapid, within 24 hours, response) as well as with matters taken up in regular sessions. While the Ukraine, Hungary and Afghanistan resolutions were passed in emergency special sessions, those related to Grenada and Panama were not.

Where GA responses have come later – for example, months after the outbreak of a crisis – they have often been more in the vein of the GA’s accountability role vis-à-vis the SC. They tend to identify ways that the SC has not fully addressed the issue, or not with the seriousness or strength of response that the GA deemed appropriate to the situation. Examples include the repeated GA resolutions related to what it deemed as South African “aggression” in Namibia and southern Africa, and its response several months after the fact to Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear installation.

3. The GA’s concurrent action is often complementary and reinforcing.

In many situations, concurrent SC and GA action has been complementary, with GA and SC resolutions reinforcing each other in recommending cessation of hostilities or the establishment of ceasefire mechanisms, in encouraging the active provision of military assistance or cooperation or recommending restraint from it. For example, in responses to Israel’s attack on Iraqi nuclear installations (1981), in dealing with escalating conflict in the Congo in the 1960s, and in responses to a coup d’état and then Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, SC and GA resolutions offered similar (in some cases identical) and mutually reinforcing recommendations. In some of these cases, SC or GA resolutions have explicitly referenced and seconded the others’ conclusions.¹²

Complementarity can also be seen in the way that GA engagement enabled forward action or more concerted responses in situations of SC divisions and standoff. In many of these cases, although the SC had taken some action, it had not succeeded in settling the matter, and so the GA’s taking up the issue helped defuse the crisis or bring about its resolution. For example, the GA’s resolutions passed in response to the Suez crisis (1956) came after the SC had already called for a settlement of the crisis. However, vetoes by permanent members prevented the SC from calling for withdrawal of foreign forces, recommending a ceasefire or other more significant responses. The GA’s action – which came in the form of several resolutions passed during the 1st emergency special session – immediately sent a strong message on the need for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal, and also facilitated this by authorizing the Secretary-General to follow-through on these recommendations via the creation of UNEF. It was this timely and robust GA response that helped enable the crisis to be defused.

Another example was the crisis sparked by United Arab Republic infiltration of personnel and arms in Lebanon in 1958. While the SC had already taken action on the issue and authorized UNOGIL, its operations were then hamstrung by a limited mandate and the aggravating situation of US deployment of forces in Lebanon, the latter of which created a standoff in the SC over any forward action. The GA’s intervention in this case (during the 3rd emergency special session) thus helped move towards resolution of the crisis by facilitating the withdrawal of foreign forces.

4. GA concurrent action can also function as a check.

In other cases, concurrent GA action has functioned more as a check on the SC – calling attention to issues where there had been inaction due to SC divisions¹³ – or a prod, urging the SC to take stronger enforcement action.¹⁴ Several of the resolutions making use-of-force recommendations made clear they were doing so because SC action was viewed as insufficient to addressing the peace and security issues in question, including in response to South African aggression in Namibia; and following US attacks in Grenada and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

5. GA recommendations on the use of force or in response to acts of aggression have declined.

While this overall record suggests strong precedents for the GA to offer recommendations on the use of force and in response to acts of aggression, there is also an overall trend of this type of GA action declining over time – across all the different types of use-of-force recommendations. While a relatively regular part of GA responses to peace and security crises in the first 50 years of its history, it is more difficult to find examples of these sorts of recommendations since 2000. The major exception to this trend has been statements on violations of IHL and violence against civilians. These have continued with some regularity up to the present, even in more controversial cases that have not been able to garner enough Member State support for other recommendations to be passed.

The decline in GA engagement over time does not suggest a particular change in the legal scope for the GA to take up such recommendations in the future. The GA is fully in compliance with its Charter obligations and mandate to offer observations and recommendations with regard to the use of force. Moreover, as illustrated by these examples, GA recommendations with regard to the use of force have been important in catalysing responses to significant crises or have provided a measure of accountability for reinforcing Charter provisions and international norms of territorial integrity and respect for national sovereignty, particularly in cases where lack of unanimity among permanent members of the SC prevents an SC response.