Accountability Mechanisms and Initiatives

Article 13 of the UN Charter tasks the GA with primary responsibility for making recommendations towards the “realization of human rights”. This, together with Article 10’s provision that the GA may consider and make recommendations related to any matters within the scope of the Charter, have created a natural accountability role for the GA, which comes to the fore in many peace and security situations. GA resolutions in response to instances of the use of force, unconstitutional transfers of power, and systemic or persistent threats to regional or international peace and security have frequently called attention to human rights and humanitarian law obligations implicated within these situations.

Articles 14 and 22 of the Charter offer key tools for instrumentalizing this accountability role, with Article 14 enabling the GA to “recommend measures” that would address situations “likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations” and Article 22 enabling it to create “subsidiary bodies”. These authorities have provided the GA with substantial scope to recommend, mandate and establish a range of accountability mechanisms in response to peace and security issues. These include FFMs, COIs and other investigative bodies, as well as the ability to establish judicial bodies or quasi-judicial bodies. The GA is also empowered to refer questions to the ICJ under Article 96 of the Charter, and has recommended referral to or consideration of matters by other judicial bodies (such as the International Criminal Court, ICC) in its resolutions. Visit the legal background chapter for more on the Charter basis for these GA powers and other legal aspects.

The text below provides an overview of the GA’s past practice with regard to accountability measures and initiatives. The menu bar at the bottom of the page and at the right offers Cases of Practice of GA support for accountability measures or initiatives. These are also hyperlinked by their case name or other descriptive phrases in the summary of practice below. A summary table of the matters that the GA has referred to the ICJ is also included below.

Statements and determinations on legal violations

The most common way that the GA has exercised its accountability role is in its own declarations and observations on a given situation. GA resolutions have frequently called attention to legal violations arising during conflict, situations of domestic repression and crimes against humanity, and other violations of human rights. These have been particularly pronounced in situations in which lack of unanimity in the SC has led to an absence of SC statements on the matter, and thus many statements not only identify violations but also urge further SC responses and action, including under Chapter VII.

Statements of this nature recur through most of the case studies. Select examples include:

• Palestinian territories: in several of the sessions and resolutions related to conduct in the Palestinian territories, the GA has raised the question of violations of the Geneva Conventions, and called for the SC to consider Chapter VII action (see examples in the case studies on the 7th and 10th emergency special sessions).
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: GA resolutions related to the Balkan wars during the 1990s frequently identified violations of IHL and human rights, identified the perpetrators, and urged cooperation with a range of accountability measures. Among these, the GA in a resolution (A/RES/49/196) passed in 1994, condemned IHL and human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing (attributing primary responsibility to Serbian leadership and paramilitary forces), and urged cooperation and Member State support for accountability mechanisms, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ibid.).
• Syrian Arab Republic: among several GA resolutions that relate to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since 2011, the GA in 2013 (by a vote of 107-12-58) condemned Syrian authorities’ “violations of international humanitarian law and the continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights” and encouraged the SC to take appropriate measures in response (A/RES/67/262). Subsequently, in 2016, the GA expressed its “outrage at the escalation of violence” in Syria, particularly Aleppo, and the “extensive and persistent violations of international humanitarian law” and human rights; it called for an immediate and complete cessation of all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as an end to all sieges (A/RES/71/130).
• Ukraine: following Russian activities in Crimea in 2014, the GA issued multiple resolutions calling for the Russian Federation to cease human rights violations and abuses against residents of Crimea (A/RES/71/205; A/RES/72/190; A/RES/73/263). In its response to the 2022 Russian “aggression” in Ukraine, the GA condemned all violations of IHL and attacks on the civilian population (A/ES-11/L.1, paras. 5, 11, 12).
• Myanmar: in 2021, the GA strongly condemned “the use of lethal force and violence” against “peaceful demonstrators” and civilians; called on the Myanmar military to stop the violence; and lent further support for several accountability mechanisms and inquiries (A/RES/75/287).

In addition to providing a measure of record – and thus a form of accountability – for these violations, GA resolutions or declarations calling attention to violations of international law have sometimes provided the spur or basis for accountability measures to be taken up in other bodies.¹

Although rare, GA determinations that the government of a Member State has engaged in severe violations of international law or of the UN Charter has sometimes led it to take the accountability measure of limiting participation before international bodies. As a measure of censure for its racial policies in connection with apartheid, the GA in 1965 declined to accept and then in 1973 voted to reject the credentials of the representative of South Africa before the GA, and from 1974 limited provisional participation of South African’s representatives before the GA.² Following the Qaddafi regime’s “gross and systematic” violations of human rights following Arab Spring protests in Libya, the GA took the step of suspending Libya from the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 1 March 2011 (A/RES/65/265) (adopted without vote).³ Soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in April 2022, the GA suspended the Russian Federation’s membership in the HRC due to concerns regarding human rights violations (A/RES/ES-11/3, para. 1) (by a vote of 93-24-58).

Establishing investigative or monitoring bodies: fact-finding missions, and commissions of inquiry

The GA’s authority to create FFMs and COIs is grounded in Article 22 of the UN Charter, which empowers the GA to establish “such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”. In 1991, the GA explicitly laid out its competence to establish FFMs in resolution 46/59, as a part of “exercising effectively its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security” (A/RES/46/59, para. 11).⁴

The mandates of FFMs and COIs are determined on a case-by-case basis, but they most commonly engage in two broad spheres of action: (1) the investigation of violations of IHL and occasionally international criminal law; and (2) the articulation of transitional justice reform proposals. In the last decade, these bodies have also engaged in identifying perpetrators,⁵ generally following the standards laid out by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).⁶

While FFMs and COIs are often referred to interchangeably (and tend to have similar procedures for their establishment in the GA), they differ in two important ways. First, FFMs tend to be more immediate and narrowly focused, responding to a direct risk on the ground. In contrast, COIs may have a broader scope and a more detailed mandate to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law over a longer period of time. Second, FFMs tend to generate factual information quickly and may provide few recommendations, whereas COIs tend to explore deeper, systemic causes of conflict and may include a broader range of recommendations.

Since 1945, the GA has mandated and established a number of FFMs and COIs to investigate violations of IHL and human rights. Six are included as cases of practice including three FFMs: South Vietnam (1963), Cambodia (1998), Afghanistan (1999); and three COIs: Hungary (1956), OPT (1968), Mozambique (1973). The issue of host State consent is important in this context, though it is worth noting that FFMs and COIs have been created without the consent of the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic, Myanmar and the DPRK. This practice demonstrates that the GA has an independent and Charter-based authority to form its own investigative bodies. While that practice has diminished since the creation of the HRC in 2006, it remains within the scope of GA authorities to establish such bodies.

While each case differs in its detail, the process for forming an FFM and a COI is similar and includes the following steps:

1. A GA resolution identifies the need for an investigation, typically the presence of widespread human rights violations and/or violations of IHL. The resolution typically outlines the FFM or COI’s recommended mandate, objectives and scope.

2. Drawing on that GA resolution, the Secretary-General then appoints members to the body, which are presented to the GA via a letter.

3. The team deploys to the affected area and prepares a report, which is submitted to the GA (typically via a letter from the Secretary-General, but also sometimes via direct briefings).

4. Based on the team’s report, the GA may take further action.

There are also other accountability mechanisms and investigatory or repository bodies that the GA has created that do not exactly fit into the model of FFMs and COIs but share similar aims. On 20 July 2004, the GA adopted a resolution that acknowledged the ICJ advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and laid out recommendations for responding to its findings (A/RES/ES-10/15). In its advisory opinion, the ICJ had determined that the construction of the wall was contrary to international law and recommended reparations for damage caused.⁷ Resolution ES-10/15 thus requested the Secretary-General to establish a Register of Damage caused by the wall (ibid., para. 4). Following this, during one of the convenings of the 10th emergency special session, the GA adopted a resolution on 15 December 2006 that reaffirmed the demands of resolution ES-10/15 and formally established the UN Register of Damage (A/RES/ES-10/17, para. 3) as a record-keeping entity that would document and preserve evidence of harm caused by the wall’s construction.⁸ Following another ICJ advisory opinion issued in September 2024, on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the GA recognized “the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation for all damage, loss or injury arising from the internationally wrongful acts of Israel” in the OPT and called on Member States to create an “international register of damage” to document the harm caused by those acts (A/RES/ES-10/24, para. 10).

Another example is the GA’s establishment in 2016 of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic (known as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, IIIM). Between 2011 and 2016, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic was characterized by widespread violence and allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The situation also remained deadlocked in the SC, which was unable to issue resolutions or refer the situation to the ICC due to vetoes by some of its permanent members.⁹ On 21 December 2016, the GA adopted a resolution establishing the IIIM (A/RES/71/248). The resolution passed with 105 votes in favour, 15 against and 52 abstentions, reflecting strong but far from unanimous support. The resolution provided the IIIM with a mandate to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the most serious crimes under international law in the Syrian Arab Republic from 2011 to 2016. This included collecting, consolidating, preserving and analysing evidence of violations of IHL and human rights violations. The IIIM works alongside the COI established in 2011 by the HRC (A/HRC/S-17/1). In simplified terms, the IIIM acts as a judicial preparation body, preserving evidence for eventual trials, while the COI gathers and reports information.

One interesting difference in GA-established COIs, FFMs and other investigatory bodies is that they have tended to be comprised of representatives of Member States, whereas investigatory bodies mandated by the HRC or the SC have tended to be manned by professional staff. The exception to this is the decision to have the IIIM staffed by professional staff members, independent of any Member State or other body. Given that this is the most recent example of the GA creating an accountability mechanism, this could be a reflection of GA practice keeping pace with those of other bodies. The table below summarizes information about investigatory bodies created by the GA, including with reference to this last feature of their staffing or composition.

Summary table: investigatory and fact-finding bodies established by the General Assembly

Fact-finding or investigatory mechanism, year authorized, and country concerned
Authorizing resolution or other authority	Purpose	Staffed by
2016 – International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic
A/RES/71/248	To support investigation and prosecution of serious crimes under IHL committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.	Professional, independent staff
1999 – Investigative team in Afghanistan
A/RES/54/185	To continue investigation into reports of mass killings of prisoners of war and civilians, rape and cruel treatment in Afghanistan.	OHCHR investigatory team
1998 – Group of Experts for Cambodia
A/RES/52/135	To examine past serious violations of Cambodian and international law in the years 1975–1979, including alleged human rights violations.	Representatives of Member States
1973 – Commission of Inquiry: Mozambique
A/RES/3114 (XXVIII)	To investigate reported massacres in Mozambique (prior to full decolonization from Portugal, and independence).	Representatives of Member States
1968 – Special Committee: OPT
A/RES/2443(XXIII)	To investigate Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of persons under occupation since June 1967.	Representatives of Member States
1963 – Fact-Finding Mission to South Vietnam
Government invitation, with GA approval* A/PV.1239	To ascertain the facts surrounding allegations of persecution of Buddhist community.	Representatives of Member States
1956 – Special Committee: Hungary
A/RES/1132(XI)	To collect evidence and information related to the situation in Hungary following USSR intervention, including violations of human rights.	Representatives of Member States
* Although initially a draft resolution was proposed with regard to the situation in Vietnam, it was withdrawn after the Government of Vietnam invited Member States to visit and collect information, and this was used as the basis for authorization, following no objections to this proposal during GA deliberations.

GA resolutions have also contributed to the creation of FFMs by other bodies. Three recent examples illustrate this:

• COI on the DPRK (2012): in response to the “significant persistent deterioration of the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea despite the succession of leadership” in 2012, the GA strongly urged the Government of the DPRK “to protect its inhabitants, address the issue of impunity and ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights are brought to justice before an independent judiciary”, though it did not specify which mandating authority should do so (A/RES/67/181). Shortly after, the HRC established the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to “investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights” in the DPRK (A/HRC/RES/22/13).
• FFM on Myanmar (2017): more recently, in 2017, the HRC established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Myanmar (IIFFMM) on its own authority, but after several GA resolutions calling attention to the human rights situation in Myanmar and urging accountability mechanisms (A/HRC/RES/34/22). Among others, GA resolution 70/233 adopted in December 2015, raised “serious concern about the situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine State” and called for “full, transparent and independent investigations into all reports of human rights violations and abuses” (A/RES/70/233). This created an important reference point for the HRC’s eventual establishment of the IIFFMM in 2017.
• FFM on the Beit Hanoun incident in the OPT (2006): the GA expressed its deep concern over the deteriorating situation in the OPT (A/RES/ES-10/6), specifically condemning a deadly attack in Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006. Among other recommendations, the GA called for the establishment of an FFM to investigate the Beit Hanoun incident and for a report to be submitted to the GA within 30 days (ibid., para. 3). The HRC established an FFM on this matter through a resolution (A/HRC/S-3/L.1), resulting in a report in 2008 (A/HRC/9/26).

Support to judicial bodies or courts

The authority under Article 22 to establish subsidiary bodies could also include establishment of ad hoc courts or tribunals.¹⁰ Considering the 1949 GA creation of a UN Administrative Tribunal in 1949, the ICJ affirmed the GA’s competency to establish such a tribunal, explicitly stating that the GA “had the legal capacity under the Charter” to “establish a judicial body”, although the Charter does not “confer judicial functions on the General Assembly”.¹¹ In 1973, the ICJ again found the GA competent to establish the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments.¹²

One example of the GA at least indirectly exercising this authority was its role in the creation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. In 1999, the Group of Experts in Cambodia recommended that the GA create an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge officials for crimes against humanity and genocide committed between 1975 and 1979, under its “recommendatory powers under Chapter VI of the Charter, especially Articles 11(2) and 13”, if the SC failed to do so (A/53/850-S/1999/231).¹³ The GA held dozens of debates and issued several resolutions on the need to hold the Khmer Rouge accountable; a GA resolution authorized the UN Secretary-General to negotiate with the Cambodian Government on the establishment of a tribunal; a GA resolution endorsed the draft agreement between the UN and the Cambodian Government on the court (A/RES/57/228 B); and GA resolutions facilitated international funding and logistical support to the Extraordinary Chambers (A/RES/73/279; A/RES/71/272 A; A/RES/70/248 (IV); A/RES/68/247B).

The GA has also recommended that the SC take action toward establishing a judicial body. In 1992, for example, it urged the SC “to consider recommending the establishment of an ad hoc international war crimes tribunal” for Bosnia and Herzegovina (A/RES/47/121, para. 10). The SC subsequently decided to establish what became the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (S/RES/808, para. 1; S/RES/827, para. 2).

A range of FFMs and COIs have recommended that the GA might directly establish judicial bodies, such as international criminal tribunals to adjudicate international law violations in a range of peace and security contexts.¹⁴ However, this has not yet been tested in practice. Instead, the GA has used its budgetary authorities to support the establishment of judicial bodies by other actors. For example, in 2004 the GA approved a subvention grant to the SC-established Special Court of Sierra Leone (A/RES/58/284). The GA has also allocated funds to the ICC, supporting cases referred to it by the SC.¹⁵

Requests for an International Court of Justice advisory opinion

The GA is empowered under Article 96 of the Charter to “request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. Such requests must be approved by a simple majority of the GA. Over the past 78 years, the GA has made 18 requests for advisory opinions from the ICJ (see the summary table of these requests).¹⁶ The ICJ has never failed to provide an advisory opinion requested by the GA and, while not binding on States, these opinions help to clarify key rights and obligations under international law, and may carry “legal and moral authority” in ways that influence responses to peace and security situations.¹⁷ As has been deemed permissible by the ICJ in the Wall case, the GA has referred matters to the ICJ even when the SC was still seized with them.

GA referrals to the ICJ can function as an important accountability measure. In keeping with the GA’s Article 13 responsibilities to make recommendations that assist in the “realization of human rights” and the “progressive development of international law”, many of the legal questions that the GA has referred to the ICJ have a linkage with humanitarian law or human rights violations. These have included the GA’s 2003 request for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the OPT. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated measures had violated a number of principles and provisions of international law, including the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Conventions and other provisions of human rights institute (A/ES-10/273). In 2022 the GA referred issues connected to Israeli policies and practices in the OPT, including East Jerusalem, to the ICJ. In the resolution requesting the ICJ advisory opinion (A/RES/77/247) the GA expressed “grave concern about the continuing systematic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people”, as well as the “tensions and violence in the recent period throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”.¹⁸ In July 2024, the Court released its advisory opinion, finding that a number of policies and practices had violated international law, including the Fourth Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions pertaining to occupied territories, and identifying a responsibility for the SC and the GA, in cooperation with other Member States, to help hold these to account and prevent further violations.¹⁹ The GA passed a resolution during a convening of the 10th emergency special session in September 2024 welcoming the advisory opinion and calling on States “to comply with their obligations under international law” as reflected therein (A/RES/ES-10/24, para. 2). In December 2024, the GA made a further request for an advisory opinion concerning Israel’s obligations in relation to the presence and activities of the UN, other international organizations and third States in and in relation to the OPT (A/RES/79/232). After the Court delivered its advisory opinion in October 2025, the GA welcomed and affirmed its findings (A/RES/80/116).

The GA has also referred questions to the ICJ that concern what might be framed as systemic or global threats to peace and security. These have often served an accountability function vis-à-vis the SC because they tend to concern issues that the GA had previously raised (often over many years) as critical to the maintenance of peace and security, and/or critiqued the SC for failing to take sufficient action on. In that sense, these referrals might be seen as carrying forward the GA’s responsibilities under Article 11(3) to “call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security”. For example, for many years, the GA had consistently raised issues of disarmament (A/S-15/6; A/S-12/6; A/S-10/4), in particular nuclear disarmament, and declared the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity.²⁰ In 1994, the GA requested the ICJ to consider the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. While the Court could not “reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons” (A/51/218), it affirmed an obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith” (ibid.). A more recent example is the 2023 GA request for an ICJ opinion on the obligations of States in respect of climate change (A/RES/77/276), which the Court delivered in July 2025, finding that “States have a duty to prevent significant harm to the environment” and that breaches would constitute an “internationally wrongful act” potentially requiring the offending State to provide reparations.²¹ On 20 May 2026, the GA adopted resolution 80/263 welcoming the ICJ’s advisory opinion and calling upon States to comply with obligations identified by the Court (A/RES/80/263, paras. 1, 2).

GA referrals to the ICJ have also frequently been combined with other GA recommendations for action to address ongoing disputes or threats to regional or global stability. Several of the cases where the GA has referred an issue to the ICJ have related to ongoing disputes over the status or governance of a territory. Some of these have related to disputes over decolonization, for example:²²

• Western Sahara: from 1965 to 1973, GA resolutions had supported good offices and diplomatic efforts to help settle the territorial dispute, offering its support for self-determination and arguing for Spain to release its colonial claim on the territory. In 1974, the GA observed that the “persistence of a colonial situation in Western Sahara jeopardizes stability and harmony in the north-west African region”, and referred the matter to the ICJ, asking it to offer its advisory opinion on a legal question that was at the heart of the territorial dispute (A/RES/3292(XXIX), para. 1).
• Mauritius: in 2017, the GA requested an ICJ advisory opinion related to whether Mauritius had been completely decolonized in 1965 (A/RES/71/292), an issue material to a dispute over continued British administration of the Chagos Archipelago. After the ICJ determined that full decolonization had not occurred and concluded that the UK had an obligation to end its administration, the GA followed up with a 2019 resolution welcoming the ICJ’s advisory opinion and demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw within six months (A/RES/73/295).

In 2008, the GA also referred to the ICJ the question of whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated international law (A/RES/63/3). The GA’s decision to refer the matter followed stalemate in the SC over this issue in the months prior, and thus could be seen as both an accountability measure and an effort to advance resolution of the dispute under the circumstance of a divided SC. The ICJ’s 2010 opinion found that the independence declaration did not violate international law, and the GA subsequently acknowledged the Court’s opinion and urged further diplomatic engagement by the European Union to promote dialogue, and peace, security and stability in the region (A/RES/64/298).

The table below summarizes the matters that the GA has referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. Those with a hyperlinked case name in the left column are also discussed in greater depth in case studies following this practice summary. The column on the far right includes the GA resolution making the request and a hyperlink to the opinion, where rendered. Some of these advisory opinions have also been published in a GA resolution; the document numbers have been provided with a hyperlink in the right column following the date rendered.

Summary table: Requests for an International Court of Justice advisory opinion

This summary table is a list of all matters for which the GA has requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ. There are focused Cases of Practice on this website for only some of these, each of which are hyperlinked through the title in the first column.

Title	Nature of GA request	Issue in question	GA resolution and opinion
Conditions of admission of a State to membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter)	UN Charter interpretation: admission of a State (Article 4)	As of 1947, 12 States’ application for membership had been vetoed by a SC permanent member; this advisory opinion was to interpret the conditions of Article 4 of the UN Charter, and whether the SC should offer its recommendation for admission if all the conditions were fulfilled by a State.	A/RES/113(II)B (1947) Opinion rendered 1948
Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations	Question of international law or UN Charter interpretation: inferred powers of the GA	In considering whether the UN could bring a claim against a responsible State, following the assassination of UN mediator Folke Bernadotte and members of the UN Mission to Palestine, the Court also found that the GA possesses powers that “though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties”.	A/RES/258(III) (1948) Opinion rendered 1949
Interpretation of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania	Question of international law	The matter concerned a settlement of disputes provision in a peace treaty, and whether the Secretary-General could appoint a third member to an arbitration commission where one of the treaty parties had failed to do so (as committed to in the treaty).	A/RES/294(IV) (1949) Opinion rendered 1950
Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations	UN Charter interpretation: admission of a State (Article 4)	A follow-up to the 1949 advisory opinion related to admission of Member States, this advisory opinion considered whether a SC favourable recommendation was necessary for the GA to then consider admission. The court found that it was, suggesting that a veto could block admission.	A/RES/296(IV) (1949) Opinion rendered 1950
International status of South West Africa	Status of territory	The ICJ was asked to consider whether the mandate given to South Africa to govern the territory of South West Africa (now Namibia) was valid, and whether the territory should be placed under a UN trusteeship.	A/RES/338(IV) (1949) Opinion rendered 1950
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	Question of international law	The ICJ was asked to consider whether States could attach a reservation to the Genocide convention, even if no provision was made in the treaty for such reservations.	A/RES/478(V) (1950) Opinion rendered 1951
Effect of awards of compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal	UN Charter interpretation: GA power to establish judicial bodies	In considering the legal effect of decisions by a UN staff tribunal established by the GA, the ICJ considered the legal power of the GA to establish a judicial tribunal “competent to render judgments” and decisions that would be binding on the GA and on UN staff.	A/RES/784(VIII) (1953) Opinion rendered 1954
Voting procedure on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa	Status of territory	A follow-up to the 1949 request for an advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa (now Namibia), this request for an advisory opinion considered whether GA actions (specifically introduction of a voting procedure) were within the bounds of supervision that the GA could exercise with regard to the mandated territory.	A/RES/904(IX) (1954) Opinion rendered 1955
Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa	Status of territory	A follow-up to the ICJ’s 1950 advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa (now Namibia), this advisory opinion considered whether certain procedures established by the GA (a GA-established committee that would hear complaints of petitioners) exceeded the degree of supervision it was permitted to exercise with regard to the territory.	A/RES/942(X) (1955) Opinion rendered 1956
Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)	UN Charter interpretation: GA power to engage on peace and security	To offers its advisory opinion on whether the GA had the authority to authorize expenses connected with two peace operations, the ICJ considered the respective roles of the GA and the SC with regard to peace and security matters, and also the interpretation of related Charter provisions.	A/RES/1731(XVI) (1961) Opinion rendered 1962
Western Sahara	Status of territory	The ICJ was requested to consider the status of Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain in order to consider claims of ties with various States, which was to be used to inform subsequent GA action and the proposed decolonization processes.	A/RES/3292 (XXIX) (1974) Opinion rendered 1975
Applicability of the obligation to arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947	Question of international law	The ICJ was requested to consider whether the US, as party to the agreement enabling the establishment of UN Headquarters in NY, was required to take part in arbitration, after a dispute arose with regard to the proposed Permanent Mission of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.	A/RES/42/229 (1988)Opinion rendered 1988
Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons	International law violations	After many years of GA resolutions raising concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and encouraging NWFZs and other disarmament initiatives, the GA requested the ICJ to offer its opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under international law.	A/RES/49/75 K (1994) Opinion rendered 1996, A/51/218
Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory	Human rights and international law violations	In responding to the GA’s query regarding the legality of Israel’s construction of a separation wall in the OPT, the Court not only considered the legal consequences and remedial steps, but also the division of labour between the SC and the GA on peace and security matters. It found that GA consideration of peace and security matters in parallel with the SC does not violate the UN Charter and is accepted practice.	A/RES/ES-10/14 (2003) Opinion rendered 2004, A/ES-10/273
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo	Status of territory UN Charter interpretation: GA power to engage on peace and security	The ICJ was asked to consider whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia violated international law. In addition to finding no provision of international law that would prohibit this, the Court considered whether it was within the GA’s Charter powers to pass resolutions on a matter under consideration by the SC. The Court’s findings on this reinforced those in the Certain Expenses and Wall cases.	A/RES/63/3 (2008) Opinion rendered 2010, A/64/881
Legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965	Status of territory	Concurrent with other GA resolutions concerning the decolonization of Mauritius, the GA requested the ICJ to consider whether continued UK administration of the Chagos Archipelago was consistent with full decolonization.	A/RES/71/292 (2017) Opinion rendered 2019
Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem	Human rights and international law violations	Following on from many years of GA resolutions raising concerns about legal violations in the OPT and efforts to alter the status of East Jerusalem, the GA requested this advisory opinion to consider the legal consequences arising from Israel’s occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory since 1967.	A/RES/77/247 (2022) Opinion rendered 2024
Obligations of States in respect of climate change	Human rights and international law violations	The ICJ was requested to offer an opinion on State obligations under international law to ensure protection of the climate system and the environment, and any legal consequences flowing from causing environmental harm.	A/RES/77/276 (2023) Opinion rendered 2025
Obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States	Human rights and international law violations; UN Charter: privileges and immunities, Article 105	Following the adoption of legislation by the Israeli Knesset to restricting  UN operations, including humanitarian relief, the GA requested an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations “in relation to the presence and activities” of the UN, international organizations and third states in the OPT.	A/RES/79/232 (2024) Opinion rendered 2025

Recommending referrals to the International Criminal Court

The Charter-based right of the GA to refer matters to bodies other than the ICJ is less clear, though in past practice GA resolutions have been instrumental in supporting the consideration of matters before other bodies like the ICC, other international courts or hybrid courts. Under Article 13 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the ICC envisages the referral of crimes committed on the territory of a non-party State only by the SC.²³ The SC has referred two situations to the ICC in the past: its 2005 referral of the situation in Darfur (S/RES/1593), and in 2011 of the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/RES/1970).

The GA has recommended that the SC refer matters to the ICC. In the case of the DPRK, from 2014 on, the GA passed multiple resolutions calling for the situation to be referred to the ICC. With regards to the Syrian Arab Republic, the GA in 2016 encouraged the SC “to take appropriate action to ensure accountability, noting the important role that the International Criminal Court can play” (A/RES/71/203). While neither effort resulted in a referral per se, the GA’s resolution on the DPRK contributed to placing the matter on the SC’s agenda in 2014 (A/RES/69/188). In 2014, a draft resolution was put before the SC proposing to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the ICC, but it was vetoed by China and the Russian Federation (S/2014/348).²⁴

Key trends and conclusions

1. The GA has often played an important role in mandating and shaping accountability processes.

The GA’s declarations and observations, identifying violations of international law, the UN Charter and other human rights violations (in keeping with its Article 13 responsibilities) can represent accountability measures in themselves, or may lead to accountability measures being taken up by other bodies. In addition, the GA has established impartial, fact-finding teams that generate information about ongoing conflicts, often alongside or working in cooperation with accountability mechanisms formed by the HRC or the SC.²⁵ Even where the reports of these bodies are not directly linked to other mechanisms, they have played an important role in keeping matters on the international agenda, and in maintaining pressure on the SC to act.

2. GA action with regard to accountability measures or mechanisms has frequently occurred in situations where other bodies have been unable or unwilling to act, in particular the SC.

Many of the most prominent examples of GA support for accountability measures have emerged within emergency special sessions convened in reference to the UFP resolution, or other situations in which the GA has deemed that a SC response will not be forthcoming. For example, the GA’s calls for investigations into the USSR military intervention in Hungary during the 2nd emergency special session (1956) led (in subsequent resolutions) to the creation of a COI. Another example was the GA’s referral of the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a wall in Palestinian territory to the ICJ during its 10th emergency special session. There are also examples of the GA stepping in to try to provide a measure of accountability, or a spur to do so, through resolutions passed in its regular sessions, as well as in its committee work. The IIIM established with regard to violations in the Syrian Arab Republic was not taken in reference to a UFP resolution but the resolution forming it (A/RES/71/248) made clear that it was initiated due to SC deadlock over Syria and in response to the SC’s repeated failures to refer the matter to the ICC. Similarly, GA resolutions referring to the ICJ questions related to nuclear weapons use and proliferation, Israeli policies and practices in East Jerusalem, and State obligations with regard to climate change appeared to be prompted by the perception that the SC would not take further action on these matters.

3. Attention to accountability measures and mechanisms has remained consistent and has arguably increased over time.

In contrast to other practice discussions in this Handbook, which have observed a decline in GA activity over time (for example, on peace operations or some types of use of force recommendations), GA resolutions that fulfill its accountability role, highlighting violations or creating mechanisms or bodies that will encourage other means of accountability, have not decreased over time. In fact, judging by the recent tone and pace of its referrals to other judicial bodies (including recommending referrals to the ICC) and its recent support to innovative investigatory and pre-prosecutorial mechanisms (such as through the IIIM), the GA’s willingness to take robust accountability measures has arguably increased over time.

Taking all of these examples into consideration, GA practice on accountability points to a wide range of options and tools that could be employed in the modern context:

• Independent fact-finding or verification: the GA can establish fact-finding bodies and inquiry commissions, either independently or designed to work in cooperation with other accountability mechanisms.
• Establishment of or support to judicial bodies: while seldom used, the GA has the power to establish judicial bodies, or can lend support to those created by other bodies.
• Links to other judicial bodies: where situations require a more formal judicial competency, the GA is able to refer matters to bodies like the ICJ.
• A normative power: GA resolutions, while not judicial in themselves, can play an important role in shaping the UN’s stance on matters of international peace and security.