Southern Rhodesia (1967–1979)

On 11 November 1965, the Government of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), led by Ian Smith, issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the UK. However, Smith’s Government, dominated by members of the white minority population of Rhodesia, was viewed as an expression of racial oppression and apartheid in southern Africa. Within hours of the UDI, the GA passed resolution 2024 (XX) with 107 votes in favour, 2 against (notably South Africa and Portugal), and 1 abstention, condemning Southern Rhodesia’s UDI and urging the UK to “put an end to the rebellion”, while recommending that the SC address the matter urgently (A/RES/2024 (XX), paras. 1,3).¹ In 1965, the SC passed a resolution the next day with 10 votes in favour, none against and 1 abstention, condemning the UDI and urging all nations to reject the “illegal racist minority regime” and cease any support for it (S/RES/216, paras. 1,2). In 1966, the SC passed resolution 232 (by a vote of 11-0-4), which instituted the first mandatory sanctions regime in UN history on Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/232). Relying on its Chapter VII authority, the SC compelled Member States to cease all interactions with Southern Rhodesia, including trade, transportation and diplomatic relations, except for specific humanitarian purposes (ibid., paras. 2, 3, 5).

In subsequent years, the GA continued to condemn the Southern Rhodesia Government, and to urge stricter sanctions and greater compliance by both Member States and other private interests with any sanctions imposed. In November 1967, the GA passed resolution 2262(XXII) on the basis of the report of the Fourth Committee. It affirmed the GA’s “conviction that the sanctions adopted so far will not put an end to the illegal racist minority regime” and instead called for “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by force” (A/RES/2262(XXII), para. 5).² It further condemned those States “still trading” with the regime and called on them to sever all economic ties and relations, as well as the foreign financial interests and companies still engaged in exploiting the “human and material resources” of Zimbabwe, thus undermining the effect of sanctions (ibid., paras. 9,10), and drew the SC’s attention to the “need for applying the necessary measures envisaged under Chapter VII” (ibid., para. 17).

Throughout the same time period, the GA also exerted pressure through other activities, linked to but also extending beyond the recommendations passed in GA resolutions. In 1966, the GA requested (A/RES/2202(XXI)[A]) the Secretary-General to convene an international seminar on apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa, which was ultimately convened as the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa in 1967.³ This seminar was a significant platform for non-aligned countries and representatives from the African liberation movement to advocate for stronger sanctions measures. The seminar’s report, transmitted in September 1967 (A/6818), highlighted the inadequacy of existing sanctions against the regimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, with many speakers criticizing the lack of effectiveness of selective sanctions, attributing this to the support these regimes received from countries like Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US as well as the increased trade with other Western countries and Japan (ibid., chapter III, paras. 63, 73–74). Members of the African liberation movements, in particular, urged a review by the SC to ensure full implementation of sanctions and to consider more comprehensive measures, including “total mandatory sanctions backed by force as necessary” (ibid., chapter III, para. 74).

In May 1968, the SC followed up with a more comprehensive mandatory (exercised under Chapter VII) embargo in resolution 253 (S/RES/253). However, GA engagement continued, with the GA resolution 2383 (XXVIII), passed on 7 November 1968, emphasizing the “urgent necessity” for the SC to expand the scope of sanctions, and also to extend them to the Governments of South Africa and Portugal in connection with their lack of compliance with prior resolutions related to Southern Rhodesia (A/RES/2383(XXVIII), para. 9). The SC seemingly responded to these recommendations in March 1970 with resolution 277; relying on its Chapter VII authority to decide that Member States should “refrain from recognizing this illegal regime or from rendering assistance to it”, calling on Member States to take more stringent measures to enforce the previously enacted mandatory sanctions (in resolutions 232 and 253) and specifically condemning South Africa and Portugal’s continued political, economic and military support for the regime (S/RES/277).

The GA continued to pass resolutions recommending that sanctions and other measures remain in place until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, with one or more resolutions related to the situation per year throughout the 1970s.⁴ For example, even as late as 1979, as diplomatic negotiations seemed to be on the way to negotiating full independence and self-determination, the GA deplored the “moves by certain States to lift sanctions unilaterally” (A/RES/34/192).

What this example illustrates is that the GA (and many individual Member States within it) were a driving force for putting pressure on what was viewed as an illegitimate regime via sanctions. There is also an observable interaction between the GA and the SC, with both institutions passing the issue back and forth in a process that was, overall, reinforcing. The GA’s calls for pressure on the Southern Rhodesian regime were more powerful with the backing of an SC, Chapter VII-mandated sanctions regime, but the GA’s continued pressure on this and backing from a broader number of Member States likely also pushed the SC to do more to follow-up and enforce sanctions.