5th Emergency Special Session: Middle East (the Six-Day War) (1967)

The 5th emergency special session of the GA was convened in response to the so-called Six-Day War that took place from 5 to 10 June 1967. A day following Israel’s initial surprise military attack on Egypt, on 6 June 1967, the SC unanimously called for a ceasefire (S/RES/233). The SC unanimously adopted three further resolutions in June 1967 demanding an immediate ceasefire (S/RES/234; S/RES/235; S/RES/236).¹ Unable to garner the support for three draft resolutions it proposed in the SC (S/7951; S/7951/Rev.1; S/7951/Rev.2), the USSR instead requested an emergency special session of the GA by invoking Article 11 of the Charter, rather than referencing the UFP (A/6717).² The USSR made the point that it sought to raise the issue via Article 11 because it did not recognize the UFP resolution as a valid basis for action (ibid.). Despite US opposition to the request on the grounds that the SC was still considering the matter (A/6718), 98 Member States voted for the motion, 3 abstained and 3 “did not concur” (Botswana, Israel and the US).³

The 5th emergency special session of the GA initially encompassed 25 meetings from 17 June to 5 July and was then reconvened on 14 July and 18 September 1967 respectively. The general debate exposed differing opinions on the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on 5 June 1967.⁴ Initially, seven draft resolutions were considered by the GA, five of which failed to clear the required two-thirds majority or were not put to a vote due to disagreement about whether to call for a ceasefire and the attribution of responsibility.⁵ The GA then adopted 2252(ES-V) (by a vote of 116-0-2) (A/RES/2252(ES-V)); 2253 (ES-V) (by a vote of 99-0-20) (A/RES/2253(ES-V)); and 2254 (ES-V) (by a vote of 99-0-18) (A/RES/2254(ES-V)). The first emphasized obligations under the Geneva Conventions and recommended measures related to humanitarian assistance and the latter two called upon Israel to rescind all existing measures and to “desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem”.⁶ After a brief recess for consultations, the GA adopted two additional resolutions, resolution 2256 ES-V (A/RES/2256(ES-V)) (by a vote of 63-26-27), requesting the Secretary-General to forward the records of this session to the SC, and resolution 2257 ES-V (A/RES/2257(ES-V)) (by a vote of 93-0-3), placing the item on the agenda of its regular session.⁷

The SC met during the special session’s recess to consider complaints from the United Arab Republic and Israel, each raising a complaint that the other had violated the SC’s ceasefire resolutions.⁸ Despite ongoing disagreements over who was responsible for the conflict, as recorded in UN meeting records (S/PV.1365; S/PV.1366), the SC issued a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to arrange for UN military observers to be stationed in the Suez Canal area, asking explicitly for “the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine … to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO” (S/8047). Both the SC and the GA continued to discuss the matter concurrently and later that year the SC passed resolution 242 in 1967 (S/RES/242), which became the basis for UN engagement in the Middle East for decades.