The dispute over the status of the territory of Western Sahara began during the wave of decolonization that followed the conclusion of World War II. Western Sahara had been colonized by Spain, but sovereignty over Western Sahara was also claimed by Morocco, Mauritania and an Indigenous movement known as the Polisario Front. This historical case of practice focuses on early GA engagement with this matter, and does not follow the situation up to the present.
In 1965, the GA formally declared Western Sahara to be a non-self-governing territory and requested that it be decolonized (from Spain) (A/RES/2072(XX)). The GA subsequently requested Spain to organize a referendum on self-determination, under UN supervision, and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a special mission to recommend practical steps for the implementation of the relevant GA resolutions in 1966 (A/RES/2229(XXI)). This demand was repeated annually from 1967 to 1974.1 With the dispute still outstanding, in 1974 the GA requested an ICJ advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory before the colonization of Spain (A/RES/3292(XXIX)).
After Spain relinquished control of Spanish (now Western) Sahara in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the territory between themselves. The GA subsequently requested the Secretary-General to supervise the “act of self-determination” (A/RES/3458(XXX)[A], para. 8) and references that a representative appointed by the Secretary-General will assist with this (A/RES/3458(XXX)[B], para. 4).2 The SC did not intervene in the dispute until 1975, but when it did its recommendations and requests largely complemented GA action on the matter. In October 1975, the SC requested the Secretary-General to enter into negotiations with the concerned parties, also noting that this should be undertaken “without prejudice” to any actions taken by the GA under resolution 3292(XXIX) (referral of the matter to the ICJ) (S/RES/377). The subsequent SC resolution 379 of 2 November 1975 reaffirmed GA resolution 1514(XV) of 1960 “and all other General Assembly resolutions on the Territory”, urging all parties to avoid escalating the situation, and continue supporting the Secretary-General’s good offices (S/RES/379). One week later, the SC issued another resolution (S/RES/380) calling on “Morocco immediately to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants” who took part in a declared march on Western Sahara, and for all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General’s mandate.
In 1976, the GA took up the issue again, acknowledging the role of the Organization for African Unity (OAU, now the African Union), in finding a resolution to the dispute (A/RES/3412(XXX)). Successive GA resolutions reiterated that the parties should enter into direct negotiations and urged them to implement the referendum on self-determination (A/RES/32/22 (1977); A/RES/36/46 (1981)).
In 1984, after continuing absence of a resolution to the issue, the GA requested that the “parties to the conflict undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a ceasefire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination” (A/RES/39/40, para. 3; also A/RES/43/33, paras. 4, 8).3 The Secretary-General subsequently facilitated talks that led in 1986 to a Settlement Plan, which laid the basis for the 1991 ceasefire and was subsequently supported by the SC in 1991 (S/RES/690). Following this, the SC established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara and authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative in 1988 (S/RES/621). Subsequent resolutions by the GA continued to support further initiatives and urged all parties and regional States to fully cooperate with the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, as well as with each other.4
Notes
- A/RES/2354(XXII) (1967); A/RES/2428(XXIII) (1968); A/RES/2591(XXIV) (1969); A/RES/2711(XXV) (1970); A/RES/2983(XXVII) (1972); A/RES/3162(XXVIII) (1973). ↩︎
- See also: Riccardo Fabiani, “The Western Sahara conflict: a fragile path to negotiations”, Atlantic Council, 3 August 2023. This sentence was slightly expanded from the original version in the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024) to provide more direct language from the two cited GA resolutions. ↩︎
- This sentence was slightly expanded from the original version in the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024) to provide more direct language from the two cited GA resolutions. ↩︎
- A/RES/46/67 (1991); A/RES/47/25 (1992); A/RES/48/49 (1994); A/RES/50/36 (1995); A/RES/51/143 (1996); A/RES/52/75 (1997); A/RES/53/64 (1998). For examples of similar provisions and further initiatives in more recent resolutions, see: S/RES/75/106 (2020); A/RES/76/89 (2021); A/RES/77/133 (2022); A/RES/78/85 (2023). The resolutions from 2020 on were added during the 2026 revisions to provide additional context of further initiatives and did not appear in the original footnote. ↩︎
