United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan

Two UN peace operations and one operational body were mandated to deal with the situation in Afghanistan between the USSR withdrawal in 1988 and the overthrow of the de facto authorities known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (led by the Taliban movement) in 2001. The first was authorized by the SC and the next two were provided for in resolutions by the GA. This demonstrates the complementary relationship between the GA and SC, taking alternating but mutually reinforcing steps to address a peace and security matter despite fluctuations in Member State preferences and capacity to engage over a period of time.

The Geneva Accords were signed on 14 April 1988, establishing principles of non-interference and non-intervention between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of Afghanistan (the two main signatories), and including a timetable for withdrawal of USSR forces from Afghanistan (to be completed by February 1989). One of the provisions of the Geneva Accords requested that the Secretary-General deploy good offices to assist implementation of the agreement and to investigate possible violations for a twenty-month period. Pursuant to this, the Secretary-General sent a series of letters (S/19834; S/19835) to the SC proposing to send up to 50 military observers to Afghanistan and Pakistan to serve as “inspection teams”. The SC responded on 25 April 1988 expressing provisional agreement (S/19836); formal authorization of these observers as the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) followed on 31 October 1988 (S/RES/622).¹ While the GA did not authorize UNGOMAP, it lent its support to the Geneva Accords, and to UNGOMAP, in two resolutions during this time, including providing explicit support for the Secretary-General’s good offices to “encourage and facilitate the early realization of a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan” (A/RES/43/20; see also A/RES/44/15).

In accordance with the terms of the Geneva Accords, UNGOMAP was mandated to monitor and report on: 1) the withdrawal of USSR troops, 2) non-interference and non-intervention by Afghanistan and Pakistan in each other’s internal affairs, and 3) the voluntary return of refugees.² Refugee resettlement was not achievable within the Mission’s twenty-month mandate in light of ongoing fighting and resourcing limitations on UNGOMAP.³ The SC approved a two-month extension of the Mission (S/RES/647)⁴ but consensus around another extension could not be reached between the Geneva Accords’ signatories and so the mandate lapsed on 15 March 1990.⁵ On the same day that UNGOMAP was terminated (15 March 1990) the Secretary-General created the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP), citing his mandate under a 1989 GA resolution that had emphasized the importance of the General Accords and requested the Secretary-General to “encourage and facilitate… a comprehensive political settlement” in accordance with its provisions (A/RES/44/15, paras. 1, 10).⁶

OSGAP took up some of the functions of UNGOMAP, in particular the refugee resettlement activities that were unresolved when UNGOMAP was terminated (A/46/577-S/23146). OSGAP also had a Military Advisory Unit of officers (the same previously deployed to UNGOMAP),⁷ to provide military advice and planning that would have laid the groundwork for future peace operations had the situation evolved to that point.⁸ As such, although not a peace operation, OSGAP provides an important example of GA-supported operational body or unit that can help fill a gap or bridge some of the roles of peace operations where one is not active.

Shortly after this, in April 1992, the Afghan Government collapsed. It was replaced by a power-sharing government comprised of competing mujahedeen (armed group) factions, but this proved unsustainable, and the country quickly fell into open civil war between competing militias and warlords. Against the background of multiple years of widespread fighting and atrocities, the Taliban armed group rose to power, taking control of Kabul and most of the territory of Afghanistan by 1996, and declaring itself to be the governing authority for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

During this period of heightened internal conflict, the GA came to the fore as the more active body in trying to de-escalate the situation, address human rights violations and humanitarian assistance needs, and broker an end to the conflict. In November 1992, the Government of Afghanistan had requested that the item “Emergency international assistance for the reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan” be included on the GA agenda (A/47/661), resulting in annual GA consideration of the matter until 2005. Its consideration in December 1993 produced resolution 48/208 (A/RES/48/208), which requested that the Secretary-General establish a “special mission” to assist with political “rapprochement” and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) was initially mandated to canvas Afghan views on reconstruction, develop an action plan for rehabilitating the country, and support donor mobilization (ibid.) Subsequent renewals by the GA⁹ requested that UNSMA (still under the vein of facilitating national reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan) aim to:

• Promote the establishment of an “authoritative council” to negotiate and oversee a ceasefire, and form a transitional government (A/RES/49/140 (1995), para. 2).
• “Mediate an end to the conflict and […] facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive peaceful settlement” (A/RES/51/195B (1996), para. 8).
• “Bring about an immediate and durable ceasefire among the Afghan parties and to institute a negotiating process leading to the formation of a fully representative, broad-based transitional government of national unity” (A/RES/52/211B (1997), para. 9).

In 1999 the GA further expanded UNSMA’s mandate to include facilitating a durable ceasefire between all parties (A/RES/53/203 A-B). In 2000, the GA again modified UNSMA’s mandate to play a “primary role in conducting UN peacemaking activities” and encouraging the UN to set up additional presences in neighbouring countries (A/RES/54/189A-B). As scholar Rebecca Barber has noted, the gradual expansion of GA-authorized UNSMA “began to look increasingly like the type of operation that would more commonly be authorized by the SC.”¹⁰

The UN’s mandate in Afghanistan evolved again following terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent US-led invasion of Afghanistan and removal of the Taliban regime from power.¹¹ Lakhdar Brahimi, UNSMA’s chief, mediated the Bonn Agreement, signed on 5 December 2001, which outlined an interim governance arrangement for Afghanistan. UNSMA supported implementation of the Agreement initially, as planning for a SC-mandated mission was underway.¹² The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was authorized by the SC (S/RES/1401), replacing UNSMA in March 2002.

GA action in establishing UNSMA, and before that, providing the support for OSGAP, offers an important example of complementarity with the SC, with GA-mandated bodies taking up key good offices and conflict management roles in between the SC-authorized peace operations of UNGOMAP and UNAMA. In addition, from 1994, SC presidential statements welcomed and repeatedly expressed appreciation for UNSMA and called on all parties to assist them in their mandate.¹³ This case study reflects how GA-authorized missions and other operational bodies can bridge gaps in SC engagement on peace and security issues, allowing for an ongoing UN presence.