Sudan: Operation Lifeline Sudan (1989–2005)

In August 1988, during the Second Sudanese Civil War, famine, severe flooding and torrential rain struck Sudan, severely worsening humanitarian conditions and necessitating urgent, large-scale aid. Meanwhile, peace talks were stalled due to division within Sudan’s ruling coalition and continued fighting with the opposition group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In October 1988, the GA adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General, “in close cooperation with the Government of Sudan, to coordinate efforts of the United Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts” (A/RES/43/8, para. 5). This and a series of resolutions over the subsequent decade lent support to a range of Secretary-General initiatives to strengthen humanitarian coordination in Sudan, and in the process created a productive mediation track around humanitarian access that laid the groundwork for later political reconciliation.¹

The humanitarian mission that resulted from the GA’s request, OLS, began in April 1989. A first step, facilitated through the GA’s authorization to the Secretary-General, was to negotiate and then take forward the Khartoum Plan of Action, which was an agreement reached under UN auspices between conflict parties and non-governmental organizations for the implementation of OLS.² It laid out key principles by which all parties would abide, including recognition of the neutrality of humanitarian relief and the guarantee of free access throughout Sudan. Another key component of the agreement was commitments by both sides to eight “‘corridors of tranquility’, along which supplies could be transported without interference for the entire duration of the relief operation” (A/44/571, para. 21). The Secretary-General’s first report on the operation noted that “OLS has set an important and historic precedent among complex relief operations” for opposing sides agreeing to allow for assistance to reach civilians in need on both sides of a conflict (ibid., para. 77). Reinforcing the Khartoum Plan of Action and encouraging its full implementation was highlighted in the first GA resolution following this agreement (A/RES/44/12, preamble).

Despite this agreement to freely allow humanitarian aid, OLS operations over the next decade continued to depend on humanitarian negotiations and good offices to enable access, permission and safe passage. In practice both government and opposition forces limited access at certain points in time by denying flights or transport access for humanitarian actors, demanding taxation to facilitate aid or pay for commodities, or pressuring for aid to flow only through their structures or for them to control beneficiary lists.³ Throughout the 1990s there were also repeated attacks near relief sites, some direct attacks and kidnapping of aid workers, and other insecurity and threats that constrained humanitarian access.⁴ Still acting under the GA mandate to coordinate aid, the Secretary-General’s representatives within OLS had to continually negotiate with the conflict parties to address these issues throughout this period.⁵

The GA supported and encouraged these continuing negotiations, for example, in 1993 noting with appreciation “the cooperation between the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations” resulting in “agreements and arrangements to facilitate relief operations and enhance their efficiency and effectiveness” (A/RES/48/200, para. 1). Annual resolutions on OLS and emergency assistance to Sudan also urged conflict parties to ensure “the safety of humanitarian personnel, as well as safe and unhindered access for providing relief assistance to all affected populations” (e.g. A/RES/45/226 (1990); A/RES/47/162 (1992); A/RES/53/1[O] (1998)). In addition, the GA appealed to parties to end hostilities in order to facilitate relief efforts (i.e., A/RES/51/30 [I] (1996)) and urged conflict parties to “offer all feasible assistance, including facilitating the movement of relief supplies and personnel, so as to guarantee the success” of OLS (A/RES/53/1[O], para. 11).

As OLS continued, the GA at times was more specific in its responses to certain developments or incidents. For example, in 1999, the GA welcomed “the decision of the Government of the Sudan to provide access to the Nuba Mountains” (A/RES/54/96[J], preamble), a contested area in government territory that had previously been restricted.⁶ In the same resolution, the GA condemned two violations of IHL: the abduction and later killing of four Sudanese nationals accompanying a humanitarian mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross by the SPLM/A and the detention of 11 humanitarian personnel of sub-Saharan international development organizations (ibid., paras. 12, 13). In this way, the GA used its authority to call out violations of international law and to encourage all parties’ compliance with the commitments undertaken with respect to OLS.

The case of OLS illustrates how the GA can support good offices towards different ends – not just encouraging ceasefire or conflict resolution but also good offices aimed purely at facilitating humanitarian relief. External analyses of OLS tend to recognize it as an early example of “humanitarian diplomacy” and cite to it as an example of how negotiations surrounding humanitarian issues can sometimes overtime contribute to progress in political dialogue.⁷ One report found that there was “a profound connection between OLS and opportunities for peacemaking”, particularly given that the SPLM/A had not met with the sitting Government prior to OLS.⁸ This new line of contact gave way to the first peace talks between the parties in June 1989; however, these were discontinued following an unconstitutional change in Government later that month.⁹ Peace talks were taken up under the auspices of the IGAD later in the 1990s, and the GA repeatedly passed resolutions offering support to this mediation.¹⁰