Throughout the 1990s, concerns grew about the role of illicit diamond trading in fuelling armed conflict, with Angola and Sierra Leone offering examples.1 In Angola, the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (known by its acronym in Portuguese, UNITA) appeared to be significantly financing its operations through profits from illicit diamond smuggling throughout the mid- to late 1990s. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front seized control of diamond-rich areas beginning in the early 1990s to fund its insurgency, with the trade peaking in the mid-1990s. Use of these so-called conflict diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone represented a broader pattern in which natural resource exploitation fuelled prolonged and transnational violence across West and Central Africa. In response to these dynamics, the SC imposed targeted sanctions, banning the import of diamonds from UNITA-controlled areas in Angola in June 1998 (S/RES/1173) and, in July 2000, restricting diamond exports from Sierra Leone unless certified by the Government (S/RES/1306).
Momentum for more coordinated international action began building with the release of a Panel of Experts report in March 2000 on violations of SC sanctions against UNITA, commonly known as the Fowler Report (S/2000/203). The report detailed how UNITA had systematically circumvented existing sanctions, including an arms embargo, travel and diplomatic restrictions, the diamond export ban, and an asset freeze and aviation ban.2 In response, South Africa initiated a series of intergovernmental meetings, beginning in May 2000 in the town of Kimberley. These brought together key diamond-producing countries (such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Botswana), major trading hubs (including Belgium, the UK and India) and leading consumer countries (including the US, Canada, Australia and the Russian Federation). The process culminated in an intergovernmental ministerial statement in 2000 (A/55/638) to establish an intergovernmental process and “international certification scheme for rough diamonds” to respond to trade in conflict diamonds as a driver of prolonged wars.
Although this process grew out of SC efforts to address conflict minerals through sanctions, a broader framework would be needed to establish a more inclusive intergovernmental process. The SC lacks the mandate to establish universal trade governance frameworks. In this respect, the GA was better positioned to foster broad-based intergovernmental consensus on international certification standards.3 The GA had not directly taken up the issue of conflict minerals previously. Nonetheless, building on the momentum from the meeting in Kimberley, in December 2000, the GA adopted resolution 55/56 (A/RES/55/56), which focused explicitly on the “role of diamonds in fuelling conflict” and formalized what is now known as the Kimberley Process.4 It called for the establishment of an international certification scheme and encouraged active participation by Member States, industry and civil society. The initiative was conceived as a voluntary framework combining government oversight, industry self-regulation and civil society engagement. Following further consultations and negotiations among Member States, the GA welcomed the launch of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme with resolution 57/302 (A/RES/57/302) in 2003 and encouraged wider participation in the initiative.
Over two decades later, the Kimberley Process remains one of the most recognized multilateral efforts to regulate the international trade in conflict diamonds and to mitigate their role in financing armed conflict. As of 2024, it included 59 participants representing 85 countries and was estimated to cover over 99 per cent of the global trade in rough diamonds.5 While implementation and enforcement remain uneven, the process has been credited with raising international standards, embedding certification in domestic systems and facilitating cooperation between governments, industry and civil society in reducing the flow of diamonds that fund conflict.6 The GA continues to pass resolutions on it regularly, usually annually.
Notes
- For background and examples of these issues manifesting in different country contexts, see Global Witness, A rough trade: the role of companies and Governments in the Angolan conflict (London, 1998); S/RES/1343 (2001); S/RES/1173 (1998); A/RES/54/234 (1999); Report of the Panel of Experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA, S/2000/203 (2000). ↩︎
- See S/RES/864 (1993); S/RES/1127 (1997); S/RES/1173 (1998). ↩︎
- Holly Cullen, “Is there a future for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for conflict diamonds?”, Macquarie Law Journal, vol. 12 (2013), pp. 63–64. Cullen notes that while the SC imposed binding sanctions in specific conflicts, the Kimberley Process emerged as a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative more appropriately situated within the GA’s inclusive, consensus-based framework. ↩︎
- The ministerial statement issued at the culmination of the meetings in Kimberley in May 2000 already referred to that initiative as the Kimberley Process (A/55/638), as was also recognized in resolution 55/56 itself. ↩︎
- Maheen Rasul, “An evaluation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’s efficacy in limiting the trade of conflict diamonds”, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, vol. 6, No. 1 (2024); GA/12590. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
