Good Offices, Mediation and Convening Authority

There is no single internationally recognized definition of “good offices”. In early usage the term referred to the role of a Member State or the SC in mediating international disputes, exemplified by Switzerland’s involvement in crises from the Suez to Afghanistan¹ and the SC’s role in the 1947 Good Offices Committee on the Dutch-nationalist dispute in Indonesia.² The 1992 Agenda for Peace describes good offices as “any diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur”.³ Others have argued that the term has evolved to include almost anything – from a well-timed telephone call by the Secretary-General, to exploratory conversations, or a full-fledged mediation effort conducted in his or her name.⁴ Generally, good offices “entails a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists two or more conflicting parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict without recourse to force”.⁵

In addition to its Charter-based authority to deliberate and provide recommendations related to peace and security matters (revisit the legal background chapter for further discussion of these core Charter authorities), the basis for the GA to employ good offices rests on two UN Charter articles. Article 14 authorizes the GA to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations impairing general welfare or friendly relations, including Charter violations. Article 98 instructs the Secretary-General to perform functions entrusted by UN primary organs, including preventive diplomacy on his/her own accord or at the GA’s request. Article 22 also enables the GA to establish any “subsidiary organs” necessary for carrying out its mandate, which enables the GA to mandate or appoint committees or other mechanisms to take forward diplomatic initiatives. Last, Article 13 of the UN Charter vests the GA with the responsibility to assist in the “realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Following on from this, where the GA has supported good offices it has often been to further diplomatic action to avert or halt atrocity crimes or to address violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The practice of the GA demonstrates a wide range of possible actions for the GA to support good offices, including appointing diplomatic roles, calling for the Secretary-General to take action, and even establishing committees and special political missions. The menu bar at the bottom of the page and at the right offers Cases of Practice of GA support for good offices and mediation, including through its convening power. These Cases are also hyperlinked by their case name or other descriptive phrases in the summary of practice below.

Direct appointment of representatives

The GA has rarely used its authority to directly appoint mediators in conflict settings. An important early precedent was the GA empowering the Secretary-General in 1948 to appoint a mediator in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict (A/RES/186(S-2)), with Folke Bernadotte ultimately serving in this capacity. More recent examples include the GA appointment of Special Representatives on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in 1997 (A/RES/51/77) and violence against children in 2008 (A/RES/62/141), and with the LAS, a Joint Special Envoy appointed in 2012 in response to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/RES/66/253 A).

Requests to the Secretary-General to exercise good offices⁶

More frequently, the GA requests the Secretary-General to exercise good offices to help resolve international conflicts. The Secretary-General has a limited, implicit authority to exercise good offices under the UN Charter; however, in accordance with Article 98, the Secretary-General’s mandate to exercise good offices is much stronger with explicit tasking by the SC or GA.⁷

The GA has requested the Secretary-General to exercise good offices in a range of situations, including to negotiate a political settlement and end to a conflict (e.g. in Kampuchea during the 1980s);⁸ to negotiate a more limited ceasefire or cessation of violence measures (as in the early stages of the Syrian civil war);⁹ or to negotiate for humanitarian access and safety (as in Sudan in the 1990s with Operation Lifeline). The Secretary-General may choose to fulfill this by undertaking good offices and engagement in mediation him or herself, or by appointing an envoy or mediator (e.g. appointing a Special Envoy to undertake the GA’s request for good offices in Myanmar, and three requests between 1997 and 1999 to the Secretary-General to facilitate monitoring of the human rights situation in Tajikistan (A/RES/51/30J; A/RES/52/169[I]; A/RES/53/1[K])).

Creating committees or commissions¹⁰

The GA has frequently lent support to good offices through mandating commissions or committees related to specific conflict resolution efforts or functions, including committees of Member States that can function as contact groups or otherwise take forward preparatory steps that enhance the prospects of mediation. Under Article 22, the GA can create subsidiary bodies, which can include good offices commissions or committees. The purpose or role of these commissions or committees can vary, including being mandated to:

• Identify solutions to diplomatic issues (e.g. the Special Committee on Palestine, which proposed the UN Partition Plan for Palestine (A/RES/181(II))).
• Take on a mediator role (e.g. the Good Offices Committee, comprised of Member State representatives, created to “bring about a cessation of hostilities” during the conflict on the Korean Peninsula (A/RES/498(V))).
• Play a preparatory role for peace talks (e.g. the Conciliation Commission in the Congo, a Member State-comprised Commission that was created in 1960 to conduct preparatory talks in the Republic of the Congo (A/RES/1474(ES-IV))).
• Enable confidence-building measures (e.g. the Repatriation Commission in Korea that facilitated the return of prisoners of war).
• Conduct fact-finding investigations (such as the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan during the 1990s) that can shape the issues on the agenda in a mediation process, as well as serving other accountability purposes.

In addition to serving these specific purposes, commissions and committees can help to keep attention on a protracted issue by serving as a mechanism to disseminate new information. For example, the GA established the UN Special Committee against Apartheid in 1962 to keep “under review” the racial policies of the Government of South Africa following non-compliance with SC and GA resolutions (A/RES/1761(XVII)). The Committee became one of the “most dynamic and action-oriented committees”, releasing annual reports and encouraging anti-apartheid-related public sessions that kept up public pressure and attention on the issue.¹¹

Support to elections and referenda

The GA has requested the UN to deliver specific support to a political process, usually either an election or a referendum. For example, in December 1966 the GA requested Spain to organize, under UN supervision, a referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara, also requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a special mission to support its implementation (A/RES/2229(XXI)). In 1992, the GA requested the UN to support the referendum in Eritrea, which subsequently became a GA-authorized mission (see below and in the case study on the UNOVER).

Supporting peacemaking and special political missions

A relatively rare practice involves the GA directly recommending creation of a special political mission (see also above discussion of GA practice with regard to peace operations). In 1993, the GA mandated the establishment of UNSMA, which had a strong focus on good offices and internal and regional mediation. In 1994, the GA established MINUGUA, at the request of the conflict parties and after many GA resolutions supporting the peace process and encouraging negotiations. MINUGUA was notable because it was created while the peace process was still being negotiated, and so was designed to facilitate continuing good offices and peacemaking support. The GA has also supported peacemaking efforts and good offices by lending its support to political missions created by the SC. An example was the 1999 creation of UNAMET, which was authorized by the SC (S/RES/1246), but was also influenced by a range of GA resolutions calling for peaceful resolution of the conflict in the years prior.¹²

Using convening power to promote mediation, good offices and diplomatic solutions¹³

The GA has also frequently called for conferences or diplomatic engagement, or used its convening power to organize conferences or intergovernmental processes. These have been both in response to a particular peace and security matter – for example, the GA-convened Conference on the question of Palestine and a two-State solution hosted in the 79th and 80th sessions – or covering a larger subset of issues, for example, the range of issues considered in the GA-convened Summit of the Future, which resulted in the Pact for the Future. The GA has also supported Member State-led intergovernmental processes addressing specific drivers of conflict. For example, it supported the development and launch of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which seeks to prevent trade in conflict diamonds from financing armed conflict (A/RES/55/56 (2001); A/RES/57/302 (2003)).

One extended example of the use of this convening authority to facilitate diplomatic processes that address more systemic or structured peace and security matters is the GA’s support to the creation of zones of peace and/or demilitarization. This has included GA resolutions calling for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and zones of peace.¹⁴ While these are not direct employment of good offices, they are designed to create space for political processes to occur. Additionally, many of the international treaties concluded establishing NWFZs and zones of peace were also the result of many years of GA support for good offices in this regard.

Beyond these intergovernmental processes, the GA has also used this convening power, and its ability to call for or support conferences, in support of other good offices strategies, for example, to lend support to Secretary-General’s good offices efforts (in relation to the dispute over and conflict in Kampuchea in the 1980s) or to support and enhance the good offices of GA-appointed committees.

Key trends and conclusions

1. The GA has broad and relatively unrestricted authority to support diplomatic responses to peace and security threats.

The most common practice has involved the GA recommending action by the Secretary-General, either in appointing a representative or in taking a specific course of action himself. But in a limited number of circumstances, the GA has gone further in supporting good offices, by directly creating or mandating committees, and/or appointing representatives to take forward diplomatic initiatives.

2. The GA’s broad authority to support good offices has offered a division of labour, enabling action in areas where the SC has been unwilling or unable to act.

The above practice suggests that not only has the GA been willing to act while items are on the SC’s agenda, but that the GA has often chosen to support good offices precisely in situations or with regard to issues that have not been less prominent on the SC’s agenda, for example, GA support for good offices on Kampuchea, on Myanmar, and on zones of peace. In some cases this may have been because the issues were sensitive to some of the permanent members of the SC, for example, GA support to good offices related to NWFZs and disarmament. The limited GA practice of establishing a special political mission indicates a potentially important role in cases where the SC may be unable to act, or where the GA is in a unique position to respond.