Cases of Practice | Responses to Use of Force Situations

Last updated 30 August 2024This case study was part of the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024).

Korea Peninsula (1950–1951)

Following the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the General Assembly identified acts of aggression, called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces, and supported UN enforcement action.

Related practice summaries: Responses to use of force, Peace operations

On 30 June 1950, after North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, the SC declared that North Korean actions constituted a “breach of the peace”, and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of North Korean forces (S/RES/82). In the subsequent two weeks, noting the failure of North Korean forces to withdraw or cease hostilities, the SC recommended that Member States assist South Korea in repelling the armed attack (S/RES/83), and recommended that Member States contribute support under a unified command to be led by the US (S/RES/84).1

By late 1950, US and UN forces had retaken Seoul from North Korean forces and by October 1950 had advanced north to take control of Pyongyang. China then intervened on behalf of North Korea beginning in November 1950, ultimately deploying an estimated 300,000 Chinese forces to wage an offensive both against South Korean forces and the US and UN forces supporting them. The USSR had been boycotting the SC during the passage of the prior resolutions, but at this point it had rejoined SC activities and threatened to veto any further resolutions. The stalemate in the SC led to the creation of the UFP resolution in November 1950. In January 1951, the SC decided that it was no longer seized with the question of aggression on the Korean Peninsula, effectively passing it to the GA (S/RES/90).

On 1 February 1951, with a vote of 44-7-9, the GA passed a resolution noting that the SC had “failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to the Chinese communist intervention in Korea” (A/RES/498(V)). It further found that Chinese forces had “engaged in aggression in Korea”, and called upon Chinese forces to cease hostilities and withdraw (ibid., para. 1). Importantly, it affirmed UN “action in Korea to meet the aggression”, called upon all States and authorities to “continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea”, and called upon Member States not to give assistance to the “aggressors in Korea” (ibid., paras. 3–5).

While the GA’s actions are generally agreed to be recommending or calling for the use of force in this situation (in supporting the continuance of the US-led UN operations), there is disagreement as to whether the GA was simply ratifying the prior SC decisions on the matter or proposing something further.2

Notes

  1. Ultimately 16 Member States would provide forces to the UN forces in Korea, and additional Member States provided medical contingents. ↩︎
  2. For further discussion and sources see Rebecca Barber, “A survey of the General Assembly’s competence in matters of international peace and security: in law and practice”, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, vol. 8, No. 1 (2021), pp. 35–36. ↩︎

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