After the end of the Cold War, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to break apart amid rising tensions among its six constituent republics. The declaration of independence and subsequent recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and then of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, sparked what would become the largest active conflict on European soil since the Second World War. From 1991 to 1997, the escalating conflict was addressed by numerous SC resolutions, two SC-supported peace operations, a SC-imposed sanctions regime and arms embargo, and major international accountability mechanisms. However, the SC’s response was complemented by GA deliberations and resolutions adopted in this period.
In February 1992, the SC authorized the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to monitor an initial ceasefire and facilitate continued de-escalation of the situation.1 On several occasions, the SC condemned “the abuses committed against the civilian population, particularly on ethnic grounds” (e.g. S/RES/769, para. 4), and by October 1992 was “expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of ‘ethnic cleansing’” (S/RES/779, preamble). Nonetheless, even as “widespread reports of attacks on civilians, human rights abuses and shortages of food and medicine”2 reached the SC in August 1992, it used its Chapter VII authority only in support of humanitarian aid delivery (S/RES/770).
In the first GA resolution to respond to the situation (adopted on 25 August 1992 by 136 to 1 with 5 abstentions), the GA expressed grave alarm and condemned the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the widespread violations of IHL and human rights, including “ethnic cleansing” (A/RES/46/242, para. 6).3 It demanded an end to these practices and the massive and forcible displacement of parts of the population (ibid.). The GA took a step further a few months later, in December 1992, with resolution 47/121. By a vote of 102-0-57, it condemned Serbia, Montenegro and their associated forces for violating the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded that they “cease their aggressive acts and hostility” (A/RES/47/121, preamble, paras. 1–3). It also urged the SC to take up its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and to “use all necessary means” under Chapter VII to “uphold and restore the sovereignty” and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina should Serbian and Montenegrin forces fail to comply (ibid., para. 7(a)).
These resolutions were notable on several fronts. By using language like “aggressive acts” and by emphasizing violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the GA clearly indicated that the situation should not be treated as a deteriorating humanitarian crisis or internal armed conflict (as had been the case during SC negotiations in 1991 and the initial authorization of UNPROFOR), but as an international armed conflict. The direct naming of Serbian, Montenegrin and associated forces was also significant as in other situations where the GA has denounced acts of hostility or aggression, it has often refrained from naming the aggressor. The term “use all necessary means” was also significant, as while the GA has recommended enforcement action in the past, it has rarely called for Chapter VII action with the phrase “use all necessary means”, which can be understood to include the use of force.
A few months later, in February 1993, the SC determined that the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security and created what would become the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (S/RES/808) – measures that were directly or implicitly recommended in the two 1992 GA resolutions.4
In subsequent years, the SC remained split over certain response and enforcement measures, in particular whether to create an exception for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the arms embargo (S/PV.3454).5 The GA had already urged all States to comply with SC-imposed sanctions in 1993,6 a notable step given that since the 1980s the GA has rarely recommended sanctions. Then, against the backdrop of escalating attacks on civilians and UN-designated safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other enclaves, the GA adopted resolution 49/10 in November 1994. The resolution enumerated in great detail a range of IHL, human rights and other Charter violations, named their perpetrators, encouraged the SC to exempt Bosnia and Herzegovina from the SC-imposed arms embargo, and called upon Member States to “extend their cooperation to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter” (A/RES/49/10, paras. 22, 23).7 The SC did not take up this encouragement. A month later, in December 1994, the Russian Federation vetoed a draft resolution that would have tightened sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (S/1994/1358).
The GA continued to be active throughout the remainder of the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, responding with strong resolutions after instances of mass atrocities or IHL violations, such as following the July 1995 massacre of more than 8000 Bosniak men and boys in Srebrenica (A/RES/50/193).8 In the same resolution, it welcomed the Dayton Agreement, which brought an end to the conflict. Subsequent resolutions welcomed the SC-authorized multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR) under NATO command, which ushered in the post-conflict phase in the region (A/RES/51/203 (1996)).
Notes
- Over the course of 1992, the SC gradually expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate from initially limited operations in Croatia to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the city of Sarajevo and protecting “safe areas” around Sarajevo and other Bosnian enclaves (S/RES/758; S/RES/770; S/RES/776; S/RES/824; S/RES/836). For a more step-by-step discussion of the expansion of these tasks and the SC response, see United Nations, “Chapter IV: Europe”, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1992, vol. 46 (United Nations Publication, 1992), pp. 331–346. ↩︎
- Ibid., p. 345. ↩︎
- A SC resolution referencing ethnic cleansing was adopted less than two weeks before, on 13 August 1992 (S/RES/771), so the GA cannot be considered the first to use this language. However, the GA’s roughly contemporaneous condemnation was stronger, also in combination with the language on aggression. ↩︎
- The GA recommended that the SC establish an ad hoc international war crimes tribunal in December 1992 (A/RES/47/121, para. 10). Resolution 46/242 explicitly characterized the situation as a threat to peace and security, and resolution 47/121 implicitly did so by suggesting the situation merited Chapter VII response. ↩︎
- France, the UK, the Russian Federation and several other Council members expressed strong opposition to lifting the arms embargo, citing risks to UNPROFOR, humanitarian access and the broader peace process. Others, including Pakistan, Malaysia, Oman and Türkiye, supported the exemption proposed by the GA and urged recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. ↩︎
- These sanctions were established in resolution 757 (S/RES/757 (1992)). The 1993 GA resolution supporting those sanctions also condemned the systematic and large-scale violations of IHL and human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly those committed as policy and on a massive scale by Serbia and Montenegro and the Bosnian Serbs (A/RES/48/88, paras. 12–14). ↩︎
- The SC mandated arms embargo had been put in place in 1991 (S/RES/713). The resolution drew further attention to the plight of refugees and displaced persons, urging increased international support and humanitarian assistance (A/RES/49/10, paras. 9–10). ↩︎
- The resolution expressed outrage at ethnic cleansing, mass killings, rape and disappearances (A/RES/50/193, para. 2); condemned the attacks on the Srebrenica and Žepa safe areas and the resulting disappearance of thousands (ibid., para. 4); and held the Bosnian Serb leadership and allied political and paramilitary commanders primarily responsible for many of these acts (ibid., para. 3), reaffirming the principle of individual accountability. ↩︎
