Syrian Arab Republic (2011–2016)

After the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, several proposed SC responses were stalled due to divisions among permanent members. The GA stepped in during this period, repeatedly calling for a cessation of violence and for compliance with human right standards, backing a regionally led observer mission and diplomatic efforts, urging all actors to support humanitarian relief and mandating the creation of a Special Envoy. Through these measures, GA resolutions not only supported immediate good offices and de-escalation efforts but also laid the groundwork for subsequent SC responses and for future accountability mechanisms and engagement by other actors.

Support for cessation of hostilities, good offices, and peace operations measures

By mid-2011, protests in Syria initially had transformed into the beginnings of civil war. Government crackdowns on protestors, including through mass arrests, use of live fire and heavy weapons, and deployment of tanks and troops to populated areas, sparked international outcry and condemnation by many regional and international Member States, including by the GA (A/RES/66/176). On 4 October 2011, France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom introduced a draft SC resolution that would have demanded an immediate end to all violence, that Syrian authorities cease violations of human rights and use of force against civilians, and enable humanitarian access (S/2011/612, paras. 1-4). The draft resolution also requested the appointment of a Special Envoy, called for States to exercise restraint in the sale or transfer of arms into Syria, and expressed an intention to consider Article 41 sanctions measures (ibid., paras. 6, 9, 11). Nine Council members voted in favour of the draft resolution, however it was vetoed (by the Russian Federation and China).¹ On 19 December 2011, the GA adopted resolution 66/176, taking up many of the provisions of this vetoed SC resolution. It strongly condemned the “grave and systematic human rights violations by the Syrian authorities”, calling on them to end such violations (A/RES/66/176, paras. 1, 2).

Additionally the December 2011 GA resolution lent support to an ongoing regional initiative toward a cessation of violence. Throughout this period, the LAS remained actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to address the situation. In November 2011 the LAS adopted a ‘Plan of Action’ and created an Observer Mission to monitor it.² The Syrian Government signed the Plan of Action on 19 December 2011. The GA resolution passed on the same day, resolution 66/176, welcomed these developments and called on Syrian authorities to fully comply with a LoAS Plan of Action (A/RES/66/176, para. 3).³ The resolution also invited the Secretary-General to provide support to the League of Arab States Observer Mission, consistent with the decisions of the LAS (ibid., para. 4).

The League of Arab States Observer Mission deployed teams in over 20 locations across Syria in December and January 2012, but faced limitations on and attacks on observers.⁴ A second draft SC resolution introduced on 4 February 2012 that would have condemned the widespread and gross rights violations and demanded that the Syrian Government comply with the Plan of Action, among other provisions, was again vetoed by Russia and China (S/2012/77).

Only days after the SC veto, on 16 February 2012, the GA passed a resolution that largely replicated (even using verbatim language in many operative paragraphs), the content of the vetoed SC resolution (A/RES/66/253).⁵ In addition, the GA went one step further and requested the Secretary-General to provide support to peace efforts led by the LAS, through good offices and “the appointment of a special envoy” (A/RES/66/253, para. 11). Drawing authority from this GA resolution, the Secretary-General and the LAS Secretary-General then jointly appointed Kofi Annan as the Joint Special Envoy on 23 February 2012.⁶ In a presidential statement the SC subsequently welcomed the appointment following the GA resolution (S/PRST/2012/6).

As one of his first steps in the role of the Joint Special Envoy, Annan proposed a six-point plan for peace that called on Syrian authorities to commit to a Syrian-led political process, steps toward cessation of all violence, ensuring humanitarian assistance, and a number of measures related to human rights obligations. Annan’s plan also proposed that a UN supervision mechanism oversee any sustained cessation of hostilities. Annan consulted with the Government of Bashar al Assad before submitting his plan to the SC, an approach that according to their statements in the SC, had been a contributing factor to shifting some of the positions of the permanent members.⁷ Two subsequent SC resolutions proposed in April 2012 passed unanimously. The first of these affirmed the SC’s full support for the six-point plan, called upon the Syrian Government to respect its commitments, and supported an advance team of 30 unarmed military observers to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of armed violence (S/RES/2042). The second reiterated these points and also established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor and consolidate the cessation of violence (S/RES/2043).

After a brief pause in fighting, violence quickly resumed and there was no longer a ‘cessation of violence’ to monitor. An intermediate SC resolution extending the mission had provided that the continuation of UNSMIS was contingent on reaffirmed commitments to a cessation of violence, which did not come to pass (S/2012/523, paras. 59-61).⁸ As a result, when the mission’s mandate expired on 19 August 2012, the SC did not renew it. A further GA resolution that was adopted a little over two weeks before the mandate would lapse placed renewed pressure on the parties, in particular the Government of Syria, to comply with the prior SC resolutions and halt the violence (A/RES/66/253(B)).⁹

Annan stepped down on 31 August 2012.¹⁰ The Joint Special Envoy position was subsequently transitioned into a Special Envoy only of the UN (rather than jointly with the LAS) from 2014.¹¹ With SC resolution 2254 in December 2015, the Special Envoy was given a formal mandate under oversight by the SC, effectively formalizing it as a special political mission (S/RES/2254).¹²

Attention to international law violations, humanitarian needs and accountability measures

From the earliest resolutions, the GA expressed its strong concern for and condemnation of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. However, as the situation shifted towards a protracted conflict following the failure of the Plan of Action and stalling of the Geneva talks, condemnation of international legal violations and calls for accountability became an even more prominent focus of GA resolutions. From 2012, the GA began adopting annual resolutions under the item “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic”. These resolutions frequently documented a wide range of violations, often with extensive detail and references to other UN accountability mechanisms and actors.¹³ From 2016, this became the main avenue for GA engagement on the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Some GA resolutions were clear and direct responses to particular legal violations or incidents – such as the use of chemical weapons on civilians in Gouta in 2013 (A/RES/68/182) and the IHL violations associated with the siege of Aleppo in 2016 (A/RES/71/130). Others focused generally on demands for civilian protection and condemned attacks on civilians and civilian objects and indiscriminate attacks,¹⁴ and in some resolutions, siege and starvation tactics.¹⁵ Many of the resolutions also condemned and detailed at great length specific human rights violations, in particular torture and inhumane treatment, arbitrary detentions and detainee abuses, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.¹⁶

All of these resolutions could be seen as an accountability measure in themselves, as they act as an official register of violations, called out or condemned in the widest intergovernmental forum. In doing so, the GA also frequently cited reports of other accountability bodies or monitoring mechanisms (e.g. the Commission of Inquiry created by the Human Rights Council), or expressed a need to ensure access for those monitoring and documenting human rights violations.¹⁷ This can also be a means of supporting and reinforcing these accountability mechanisms and actors.

Additionally, the GA took extraordinary measures to advance referral to judicial bodies and legal prosecution – to a greater degree than in almost any other situation considered in the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024). Already in late 2013, the GA was urging formal accountability with a resolution (A/RES/68/182, para. 10) that implicitly encouraged the SC to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the ICC (the only route to enable ICC jurisdiction, given that the Syrian Arab Republic has not ratified the Rome Statute). In May 2014, the SC considered a draft resolution (S/2014/348) that would have referred the situation to the ICC, but it was vetoed by the Russian Federation and China (S/PV.7180, p. 4). Subsequently, from late 2014, the GA almost annually adopted resolutions that “regretted” that the draft resolution was not adopted and noted the important role that the ICC could play in ensuring accountability.¹⁸

With this avenue closed, in December 2016, the GA established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) (A/RES/71/248). The IIIM was mandated to collect, preserve and analyse evidence of grave international crimes and to prepare files to support future prosecutions in domestic, regional or international courts. The IIIM has been recognized as an innovation in accountability mechanisms. The Human Rights Council has recently created similar accountability mechanisms based on this model to support collection of evidence and prosecutions with respect to human rights violations in Myanmar and Afghanistan.

Although the weight of most of the resolutions was on legal violations and accountability, most also stressed the need for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, for ensuring necessary medical evacuation and other humanitarian support.¹⁹

Overall, this example illustrates SC and GA concurrence and mutual support in responding to an active conflict situation, and of the GA stepping in to respond to a use of force situation through supporting mechanisms for enabling a cessation of hostilities, as well as support to good offices and accountability measures at periods when the SC was deadlocked.

Accountability vis-à-vis the Security Council

The GA’s engagement vis-à-vis the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic from 2011 onward not only highlights a range of tools that the GA can use to respond to crisis and conflict situations, but also the GA’s accountability role vis-à-vis the SC (see also case studies on GA support to cessation of hostilities and good offices, on the IIIM, and on referral of the matter to the ICC). From 2011 through 2016, the GA stepped in shortly after five SC vetoes to give authority or impetus to recommendations, mechanisms and initiatives in those vetoed resolutions. This included efforts to pressure for a cessation of violence, for full compliance with international law, to cease particular attacks (such as those surrounding the siege of Aleppo in 2016 (A/RES/71/130)) and for specific conflict resolution mechanisms, like support for the LoAS Plan of Action, the appointment of a joint Special Envoy, and the monitoring activities and full implementation of the Special Envoy’s six-point plan (A/RES/66/176, A/RES/66/253). While these resolutions were often adopted following SC vetoes, the SC explicitly or implicitly endorsed the GA’s actions at several points, for example, recognizing and welcoming the GA’s joint appointment of Kofi Annan as Special Envoy (S/PRST/2012/6).

To illustrate the complementary nature, the chart below offers a comparison of some of the language in the vetoed SC resolutions with the GA resolutions that followed them, as well as the key measures enabled by these GA resolutions.

SC vetoed resolution	GA resolution following it	Key measures or initiatives enabled by GA action
S/2011/612, 4 October 2011 Would have called for an immediate end to all violence and for Syrian authorities to cease HR violations and cease use of force on civilians; supported LoAS mediation; requested good offices and appointment of Special Envoy; expressed intention to consider Article 41 measures (sanctions) in case of non-compliance.	A/RES/66/176, 19 December 2011 Calls on Syrian authorities to put an end to all HR violations and calls for immediate end to all violence; supports LoAS Plan of Action; invites the Secretary-General to support LoAS good offices and observer mission.	Encouraged early conflict de-escalation through calls for halts to human rights violations and escalating violence. Lent support to LoAS Plan of Action and observer mission.
S/2012/77, 4 February 2012 Would have condemned widespread and gross violations of HR and use of force on civilians by Syrian authorities; demanded Syrian Government end all HR violations and attacks and cooperate with LoAS Plan of Action and other accountability bodies; welcomed Secretary-General support to LoAS efforts.	A/RES/66/253, 16 February 2012 Condemns widespread and systematic violations of HR and use of force on civilians by Syrian authorities; calls upon Syrian Government to end all HR violations and attacks on civilians; demands that the Syrian Government comply with the LoAS Plan of Action; requests Secretary-General support LoAS efforts, including with appointment of a Special Envoy.	Reinforced LoAS efforts and Plan of Action as a way to enable cessation of hostilities.Appointed Joint Special Envoy, a proposal that had been vetoed in SC draft resolution S/2011/612.
S/2012/538, 19 July 2012 Acting under Chapter VII, would have expressed grave concern at escalation of violence and called upon all parties to comply with the six-point plan; demanded that all Parties cease violence and work with the Joint Special Envoy to implement the transition plan; and renewed the mandate of UNSMIS.	A/RES/66/253B, 3 August 2012 Expresses “deep concern at the lack of progress towards implementation of the six-point plan” and deplores “the failure of the Security Council to agree on measures to ensure the compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions” with specific provisions that condemn use of heavy weapons and indiscriminate shelling and continued HR violations; demands that all parties comply with SC resolutions to achieve a cessation of armed violence; lends full support to the Joint Special Envoy, deplores violations of six-point plan and demands that all parties work to implement the transition plan; stresses the importance of accountability and encourages “the Security Council to consider appropriate measures in this regard”.	Took steps to salvage the six-point plan enabling a cessation of violence and UNSMIS monitoring amid SC inaction.Held the SC to account for not taking forward measures to compel compliance or ensure accountability.
S/2016/846, 8 October 2016 Would have demanded that all parties comply with prior SC resolutions; urged immediate implementation of cessation of hostilities and safe and unhindered humanitarian access; demanded that all actors cease collaboration with terrorist groups; and expressed full support for Special Envoy’s efforts. S/2016/1026, 5 December 2016 Would have set a deadline (24 hours) for all parties to cease attacks on Aleppo; demanded immediate implementation of cessation of hostilities; demanded that all parties comply with IHL and ensure humanitarian access; made demands related to ceasing collaboration with terrorist groups; demanded full implementation of political process and offered support for Special Envoy.	A/RES/71/130, 9 December 2016 Demands an immediate and complete end to all attacks on civilians and an end to all sieges, including in Aleppo; demands immediate cessation of hostilities as described in prior SC resolutions; demands all parties comply with obligations under IHL and IHRL; demands that all parties fully comply with prior SC resolutions; reaffirms support for political process and efforts of Special Envoy; emphasizes need for accountability; urges the SC to take additional measures to address the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, “in particular the devastating humanitarian crisis”, and “stresses in this regard Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations”.	Called attention to extreme violations and urgent situation in Aleppo.Held the SC to account by explicitly referencing the GA’s Article 11 responsibility to call matters to the SC’s attention.

The GA stepping in where the SC has been unable to agree on measures can be seen as part of the checks and balances built into the UN Charter. As illustrated in the chart above, the GA used several of these resolutions to call out SC failures to take measures that would fulfil its primary peace and security responsibilities, and to underline the GA’s Article 11 power to refer matters and situations to the SC. This is a core element of the GA’s accountability role vis-à-vis the SC. The GA also referenced or “regretted” the SC’s failure to adopt measures with regard to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in other post-2016 resolutions – for example, in those related to the SC’s failure to refer the Syrian Arab Republic situation to the ICC (discussed in the prior section).

On the same spectrum of the GA’s complementary or accountability role, the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024) conclusions noted that an important role of the GA is its ability to keep items on the agenda, even when the SC is deadlocked. The GA’s persistence in annually raising attention towards the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the need for accountability, even as some of these measures were not taken forward in SC resolutions, also illustrates this role.