United Nations Emergency Force

The GA’s authorization of the first-ever armed peacekeeping force was part of actions taken in the 1st emergency special session in 1956 under the UFP resolution in response to the Suez Canal crisis. In the first resolution issued as part of the session, the GA had called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces (A/RES/997(ES-I)); however, the Secretary-General and other Member State representatives raised concerns that a UN monitoring or policing force would be necessary to ensure the implementation of these measures.¹ Two days after the initial resolution, on 4 November 1956, the GA issued resolution 998 (ES-I) requesting the Secretary-General to develop a plan for setting up “an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities” (A/RES/998 (ES-I)). Subsequent resolutions adopted the Secretary-General’s plan and created UNEF along with its key functions and guiding principles, and established an Advisory Committee to assist the Secretary-General and to request the convening of the GA on it as needed, as provided in (A/RES/999 (ES-I)) and (A/RES/1001 (ES-I)), both adopted in 1956.

These resolutions passed with wide margins, with even the two foreign powers whose deployment of forces was significantly at issue, France and the UK, voting with the majority in some of these resolutions.² Nonetheless, there was some dissension about the legal grounding for the force. The USSR explained its abstention on the 1956 resolution that helped establish the basis for UNEF (A/RES/1000 (ES-1)) by noting that it viewed the force as contrary to the UN Charter.³

Given that UNEF was established by the GA, it operated under the authority of the GA (which under Article 22 may establish “subsidiary organs”) but was under the direction of the Secretary-General.⁴ A subsequent advisory opinion by the ICJ that directly considered the GA’s authority to mandate UNEF found that this fell within the bounds of the Article 14 provision that the GA can recommend “measures”, including those that have some writ and meaning in action.⁵ However, the ICJ found that because the GA does not enjoy the SC’s enforcement power, consent of the Member State is necessary in such cases.⁶ UNEF could enter and operate in Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian Government, which was granted following extensive consultation with Egypt by the Secretary-General.⁷

UNEF began operations in Egypt from 12 November 1956 which were continued through June 1967 (coinciding with the outbreak of the Six-Day War). In the first month, UNEF monitored the cessation of hostilities negotiated by the Secretary-General and maintained a buffer zone between Anglo-French forces on one side and Egyptian forces on the other. After the withdrawal of French and British forces, UNEF helped maintain the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and later oversaw the successive withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Although the Secretary-General periodically reported to the GA and the SC about dynamics surrounding UNEF and consulted members of the SC at critical points, he declined to formally have issues surrounding UNEF brought before the SC (as was permissible under Article 99 of the UN Charter), even when Egypt was poised to withdraw consent for the force in 1967.⁸