In December 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Kampuchea (now Cambodia), ousting the Government of Democratic Kampuchea (also known as the Khmer Rouge regime), and supporting the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The SC met on three occasions between January and March 1979 to consider the issue; however, two proposed draft resolutions were vetoed by the USSR.1 The GA took up the matter in November 1979 with a resolution proposing a range of conflict resolution and conflict management measures. The GA would continue to pass annual resolutions on the situation in Kampuchea for the next decade, and was the lead institution supporting good offices and mediation of the conflict, as well as a range of other humanitarian support and conflict mitigation measures. This not only helped to keep the issue on the agenda, but also supported the mechanisms, initiatives and measures that would ultimately lead to resolution of the conflict in 1990 with the Paris Peace Conference (at which point the SC resumed its engagement). This case helps illustrate the range of measures and tools that the GA can use to respond to conflicts and crises, and also the complementary role it can play alongside the SC in addressing peace and security matters.
Prioritizing humanitarian needs alongside cessation of hostilities
The first GA resolution on the matter passed in November 1979, 10 months after the veto of a similar resolution in the SC (S/13027). As with most GA resolutions responding to external intervention, the resolution called upon all parties to cease hostilities and for all foreign forces to immediately withdraw and refrain from further threats of aggression or interference (A/RES/34/22, paras. 6-7).2 However, unusually for this time period, the resolution gave priority to humanitarian relief. The conflict had triggered a large displacement of Kampucheans to neighbouring countries, with 630,000 Kampucheans fleeing to the border with Thailand between 1979 and 1981.3 Kampuchea was also experiencing extreme famine, which by conservative estimates had claimed several hundred thousand lives, further exacerbating internal displacement of Kampucheans and the need for humanitarian relief.4 The GA resolution prioritized attention to this urgent crisis, with the first few operative paragraphs appealing to all States and international organizations to support humanitarian relief, requesting urgent “measures to resettle” displaced Kampucheans, welcoming the Secretary-General’s efforts to coordinate relief, and urging all parties to cooperate in humanitarian assistance (A/RES/34/22, paras. 1–4).
Arguably acting on the mandate given by the GA (as there was no parallel SC measure at the time), the Secretary-General convened a pledging conference in New York on 5 November 1979 (A/35/501, para. 6) and implemented a multi-year Programme of Humanitarian Assistance to the People of Kampuchea, which was funded largely by voluntary contributions from Member States (A/37/496, para. 10).5 In its resolutions on the issue of Kampuchea from 1982 to 1989, the GA annually renewed the Secretary-General’s mandate of “coordinating humanitarian relief assistance and monitoring its distribution”, with particular attention to “the Thai-Kampuchea border and in the various encampments in Thailand” (A/RES/40/7, para. 11; A/RES/44/22, para. 12).6 The United Nations Border Relief Operation was established in 1982 and took over responsibilities for humanitarian relief in the border areas, working in conjunction with other UN agencies.7 As early as 1980, the Secretary-General regarded Kampuchea as “among the most massive and complex humanitarian” relief operations undertaken by the UN (A/35/501, para. 6). The effort would endure for more than a decade and ultimately involve 140 voluntary organizations and the operation of multiple refugee camps.8
Requesting and empowering the good offices of the Secretary-General
A key focus of the GA’s annual resolutions on Kampuchea from 1982 to 1989 was to empower the good offices of the Secretary-General, from requesting him to exercise good offices in the initial 1979 resolution (A/RES/34/22, para. 11), to subsequent resolutions supporting his efforts to reach a comprehensive political settlement over the next decade (A/RES/36/5, paras. 5, 8; A/RES/37/6, paras. 3, 9; A/RES/44/22, paras. 6, 10). The GA’s support for good offices gave the Secretary-General a clear mandate to pursue mediation – which was important given that the SC’s failure to pass a resolution meant there was no clear mandate coming from the SC on this issue.
In addition, GA resolutions helped provide the mandate for other initiatives and mechanisms that could help advance that peace process. In both the initial 1979 resolution and a follow-on 1980 resolution, the GA proposed an international conference with the aim of reaching a “comprehensive political settlement”, which opened a new political track for dialogue, led by the Secretary-General over the subsequent decade (A/RES/35/6, para. 2).9 The conference also established the Ad Hoc Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea, composed of representatives of Member States, to “elaborate concrete proposals” with the conflicting parties and, in consultation with the Secretary-General, prepare a conducive environment for negotiations between parties at the next convening of the conference (A/CONF.109/5, para. 6).10 The initial conference and the follow-on committees illustrate how GA creation of other mechanisms, alongside support for Secretary-General good offices, can lend support to those good offices by lending momentum to talks and creating processes that enable further intermediary and preparatory steps towards conflict resolution. The additional support for the humanitarian relief efforts discussed above offers another example of how parallel GA action may advance the Secretary-General’s mediation position, by addressing other ongoing conflict factors in ways that might either contribute to confidence building, or reduce the risk of a relapse in talks due to deteriorating conditions on the ground.
Nearly a decade of such continued good office efforts, spearheaded by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, ultimately led to the first face-to-face talks between parties in July 1988.11 The four key parties met for a series of talks in 1988 and 1989, laying the groundwork for the Paris Peace Conference held in July 1989. It was at this point that the SC re-engaged with the situation in Kampuchea. The permanent members participated in the Paris Conference, which resulted in an agreement between the parties in 1990.12 The GA welcomed the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in November 1991 and also lent its support to a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (A/RES/46/18, para. 2), which was established by the SC (S/RES/745, para. 2) to ensure the implementation of the agreements and the holding of elections.
From the Paris Peace Conference onward, the SC took the lead in passing resolutions and creating mechanisms that would enable Cambodia’s transition and post-conflict phase. Nonetheless, the GA continued to be involved, primarily in urging or creating accountability mechanisms.13 In 1998, the GA requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Group of Experts on the crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979 (A/RES/52/135, para. 16). GA resolutions also supported the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).14
Notes
- The first vetoed draft resolution called upon all foreign forces to withdraw, and for all parties to observe a ceasefire and end hostilities (S/13027). The second called on all parties to cease hostilities and for the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as the settlement of disputes by peaceful means (S/13162). For more on the context surrounding these vetoes, see United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, vol. 33 (United Nations Publication, 1979), p. 271. ↩︎
- The resolution further noted that the Kampuchean people “should be enabled to choose democratically their own government, without outside interference, subversion or coercion” (ibid., para. 10). ↩︎
- Kimmo Kiljunen, “The tragedy of Kampuchea”, Disasters, vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1983), p. 133. ↩︎
- Randle C. DeFalco, “Justice and starvation in Cambodia: the Khmer Rouge famine”, The Cambodia Law and Policy Journal, vol. 2 (January 2013), p. 46. ↩︎
- The Secretary-General designated the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as lead agency for humanitarian relief alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross to manage camps for displaced Kampucheans on the Thai-Cambodian border. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, vol. 34 (United Nations Publication, 1983), p. 335. ↩︎
- For further discussion of the connection between these border refugee camps and other conflict dynamics, see United Nations, “Chapter X: Questions Concerning Asia”, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, vol. 34 (United Nations Publication, 1980), pp. 335–339.; United Nations, “Chapter VII: Asia and the Pacific”, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1983, vol. 37 (United Nations Publication, 1987), pp. 224–231.; Kiljunen, “The tragedy of Kampuchea”, p. 139; Fergal Quinn and Kevin Doyle, “Cambodia and the United Nations 1980–2000 (and beyond)”, in Cambodia and the West, 1500–2000, T.O. Smith, ed. (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). ↩︎
- “The UN in Cambodia”, United Nations in Cambodia. UN Border Relief Operation was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance for the Kampuchean People. Tony Jackson, Just waiting to die? Cambodian refugees in Thailand (Oxford, UK, Oxfam, 1987), p. 1. ↩︎
- David Bull, The Poverty of Diplomacy: Kampuchea and the Outside World (Oxford, UK, Oxfam, 1983), p. 10; Y-Dang Troeung and others, “A Forum on remembering Cambodian border camps, 40 years later”, Canadian Literature, vol. 246 (2021). To illustrate the size of the operation, the largest camp held 180,000 people by 1989. ↩︎
- The International Conference on Kampuchea was held in New York from 13 to 17 July 1981, and the GA adopted the conference’s declaration, the Declaration on Kampuchea, which set out elements to be negotiated for a comprehensive political settlement (A/RES/36/5, para. 3). The declaration included proposals to work towards a ceasefire, foreign forces withdrawal and the holding of free elections (A/CONF.109/5, annex 1, para. 10). ↩︎
- Throughout the 1980s, the Ad Hoc Committee held consultations with concerned States “with a view to increasing understanding of the issue” and “to encourage the initiation of a process of negotiation” (A/CONF.109/9, para. 31); however, the committee ultimately did not prove as significant in the mediation as the Secretary-General’s efforts. ↩︎
- The Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Humanitarian Affairs in South-East Asia conducted multiple visits to the region with the aim of assessing and gradually reconciling the positions of the concerned parties. Importantly, in a report to the GA in 1985, the Secretary-General identified, and thus recorded for the first time, elements of a comprehensive political settlement which had “a reasonable degree of convergence” between the concerned parties (A/40/759, para. 13). ↩︎
- The agreement was endorsed unanimously the same year by the SC in its first resolution on the issue of Kampuchea since 1964 (S/RES/668). ↩︎
- In multiple resolutions between 1998 and 2001, the GA drew attention to the human rights violations committed by the Khmer Rouge and appealed to the Government of Cambodia to investigate or prosecute those leaders accused of such violations. A/RES/54/171, para. 10; A/RES/55/95, para. 18; A/RES/56/169. ↩︎
- The GA further supported the ECCC through funding and logistical support. A/RES/73/279; A/RES/71/272 A; A/RES/70/248 (IV); A/RES/68/247B. ↩︎