Last updated 30 August 2024This section was part of the Assembly for Peace Handbook (2024).
Area of Practice
Uniting for Peace
Background on the Uniting for Peace resolution, resolution 377(V) of 1950, and past General Assembly deliberations and action in connection with it.
Over the past 78 years, the GA has acted under its Charter-based authority in a wide range of settings, and offered recommendations on a range of peace and security-related matters, including responses to outbreaks of conflict, incursions (or threats of incursions) on other Member States’ territory, actions perceived as breaching the peace or threatening regional stability, unconstitutional transitions of power, or global threats such as those related to nuclear weapons or climate change. Although GA engagement on peace and security has occurred throughout the GA’s regular sessions, committee work, budgetary responsibilities and other work, some of the most prominent examples of GA engagement on peace and security matters have occurred in connection with the United for Peace (UFP) resolution.
This section will first introduce the UFP resolution, and then other procedural developments related to its use. Each of the 11 emergency special sessions, and the single regular session item linked to the UFP resolution, are described further in Cases of Practice hyperlinked in the menu bars at the bottom and right of this page, and incorporated in the text below.
The Uniting for Peace resolution
The UFP resolution was proposed in 1950 after split views among SC permanent members over military action on the Korean Peninsula highlighted the risk that a divided SC could block collective responses to critical peace and security issues. The key provision of the UFP resolution is as follows:
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security (A/RES/377(V)) (emphasis added).
The condition that there be “lack of unanimity” in the UFP resolution text has generally been understood to refer to either a negative vote by one of the permanent five members (a veto), or threat to do so.1 While these conditions should be present for the UFP resolution to be exercised, they do not generate an automatic response. There have been many situations in which the conditions in the UFP resolution have been present – what was perceived as a threat to peace or act of aggression occurred, and the SC response was hampered by divisions – but neither the SC nor the GA have passed resolutions referencing the UFP resolution and requesting an emergency special session.2 In some of these cases, the GA has gone on to deliberate on the matter, and passed resolutions with recommended responses, but without relying on the UFP resolution.3
In addition to laying out the above conditions, the UFP resolution created a special procedure to facilitate the GA’s consideration of matters in the case of SC deadlock. It provides that if the GA is not in session at the time,4 it may convene an emergency special session within 24 hours to consider the matter in question. This emergency special session can be requested by (i) the SC, on the vote of 9 members (not subject to veto);5 or (ii) a majority of Member States in the GA. Of the 11 emergency special sessions (and 1 regular session) called with respect to the UFP resolution so far, 8 have been requested by the SC, versus 4 by the GA.6 There has been one case so far – in 1971 – in which the conditions within the UFP resolution were met and the SC explicitly referenced resolution 377(V) in referring the matter to the GA, but it was not necessary to convene an emergency special session given that the GA was in session and the matter could be taken up immediately under an existing agenda item. This case, concerning India-Pakistan hostilities over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) is included in the Cases of Practice related to the UFP below.
The UFP resolution does not create new powers for the GA beyond those expressly laid out in the UN Charter. As noted in the ICJ’s Wall opinion, the UFP resolution provides a procedure, premised on certain conditions (those noted with emphasis above), by which the GA may exercise its Charter-based powers.7 In that sense the process created by the UFP resolution might be seen as one procedural route among many by which the GA exercises its Charter-based powers.
“The UFP resolution does not create new powers for the GA [… It] provides a procedure… by which the GA may exercise its Charter-based powers.”
The resolutions adopted within these emergency special sessions have included the same range of responses and recommendations seen in regular sessions, overlapping with those discussed in the other Areas of Practice: establishing or extending peace operations, recommending sanctions, demanding cessation of hostilities or withdrawal of foreign troops, mandating or urging accountability measures, and providing for assistance to refugees.
Summary chart of sessions linked to the UFP resolution
This table summarizes all the emergency special sessions, and the one regular session, held in conjunction with the Uniting for Peace resolution, with shorthand titles in the left column linking to the full Cases of Practice for each. Abbreviations are used for any peace operations mentioned; follow the hyperlink to the relevant case study of those peace operations or visit the full acronym list for the full title.
| UFP-linked session | Overview of the resolutions passed |
| 1st Emergency Special Session: Middle East (Suez Crisis) (1956) | In response to French, British and Israeli military action in Egypt during the Suez Crisis, the GA called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, and authorized the first ever deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNEF). |
| 2nd Emergency Special Session: Hungary (1956) | Following Soviet military forces’ intervention in Hungary in 1956, the GA passed five resolutions that condemned the “armed intervention” and “repression” of Hungarian rights, called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, requested the Secretary-General to investigate (leading later to a GA-mandated Commission of Inquiry), and called for humanitarian aid and support to refugees. |
| 3rd Emergency Special Session: Middle East (Lebanon) (1958) | Following the deployment of American forces to Lebanon and British forces to Jordan, the SC was divided on how to respond to the situation in Lebanon, and extend support to the already SC-mandated peace operation there, UNOGIL. The GA requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces, effectively extending the mandate of UNOGIL to include withdrawal of foreign forces. |
| 4th Emergency Special Session: Question of Congo (1960) | Following divergent SC views over continued support to an SC-established peace operation, the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC), the GA reaffirmed ONUC’s mandate and empowered it to respond to an escalating situation through more “vigorous action”, while also calling on all States to refrain from action that might disturb law and order in the Congo. |
| 5th Emergency Special Session: Middle East (Six-Day War) (1967) | Responding to the beginning of the Six-Day War, GA resolutions recommended the provision of humanitarian assistance, and called on Israel to rescind past actions and not take further action to alter the status of Jerusalem. |
| Regular Session: The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent (1971) | Following the outbreak of India-Pakistan hostilities, the SC passed a resolution requesting an emergency special session in accordance with the UFP; as a regular session item was available, the GA considered the matter in its 26th session, recommended an immediate ceasefire, urged cooperation to address the refugee crisis, and called upon the SC to take appropriate action. |
| 6th Emergency Special Session: The situation in Afghanistan (1980) | Following Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the GA called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, for Member States to support voluntary return and humanitarian relief, and for the SC to consider how it could implement the resolution. |
| 7th Emergency Special Session: Question of Palestine (1980–1982) | Convened in two separate sessions, resolutions passed in the first session called for Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories, affirmed Palestinian rights to self-determination, and requested the SC to consider Chapter VII action. Resolutions passed in the second session, after Israeli troops engaged in hostilities in Lebanon, called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, and investigations into civilian harm. |
| 8th Emergency Special Session: Question of Namibia (1981) | After repeated (since 1966) GA and SC denunciation of South Africa’s continued control over Namibia, the GA in this emergency special session called for military support for the “liberation” of Namibia, and for the SC to impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII. |
| 9th Emergency Special Session: situation in the occupied Arab territories (1982) | Convened after vetoes of SC draft resolutions that would have imposed sanctions in response to Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights, the GA passed a resolution condemning the Israeli annexation as an “act of aggression” and called for the severance of “diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel” and other measures to sanction and isolate Israel. |
| 10th Emergency Special Session (East Jerusalem and OPT) (1997–ongoing) | Convened over seven years (and still ongoing), the resolutions responded to outbreaks of violence and construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and military operations in Gaza across two periods. GA resolutions condemned acts of violence and violations of international law, requested an ICJ opinion on the wall, and created a Register of Damage. Most recent sessions granted additional rights and privileges of participation to the State of Palestine beginning in the 79th session, and called for the SC to give “favourable consideration” to full Palestinian membership in the UN. The 10th emergency special session is ongoing and can be resumed at any point at the request of Member States. |
| 11th Emergency Special Session (Ukraine) (2022–ongoing) | GA resolutions characterized the Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter and demanded complete and unconditional withdrawal, and an immediate halt to attacks on civilians. Additional resolutions called for accountability mechanisms and an international Register of Damage. The 11th emergency special session is ongoing and can be resumed at any point at the request of Member States. |
Trends in Uniting for Peace-related Practice
Since the 7th emergency special session that commenced in 1980, there has been a trend for these sessions to occur on a rolling basis, temporarily adjourn and then reconvene at the request of Member States. The first emergency special session to do this – the 7th, which was related to the matter of Palestine – was reconvened four times. The 9th, 10th and 11th emergency special sessions have followed this pattern and have been adjourned and resumed at multiple points. The last two are ongoing. Although not initially foreseen in the discussions that led to the UFP resolution (in particular given the emphasis on “immediacy” within it), the International Court of Justice in its Wall opinion found that there is nothing improper in reconvening these sessions, even in situations “when the regular session of the General Assembly was in progress” and that the “validity of resolutions or decisions” adopted in these resumed sessions was never disputed.8 A new instance of a veto or threat of a veto is not required to reconvene a session, although this has served regularly as the impetus.
It is important to distinguish these emergency special sessions from special sessions. Article 20 of the UN Charter provides for the GA to convene special sessions “as occasion may require”, to be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the SC (9 of its 15 members) or the majority of the GA.9 There have been 32 special sessions since 1950, with only the second session on Palestine (1948) requested by the SC. A notable distinction between emergency special sessions and special sessions relates to timing and the rapidity with which they are called. While there is no specific timing associated with special sessions, the UFP is explicit that emergency special sessions may be organized within 24 hours to consider the matter that was the subject of a permanent member’s veto (or threat of). Not all emergency special sessions have taken place within 24 hours, but many have taken place rapidly following SC deadlock.
Many special sessions have dealt with topics related to peace and security, in some cases even directly overlapping with the matters at hand in emergency special sessions convened in relation to the UFP. For example, both preceding and following the 1981 8th emergency special session on Namibia, the GA convened special sessions on Namibia in 1967, 1978 and 1986. These took up many of the same issues and topics as in the 8th emergency special session. There also have been special sessions dealing with the financing of a (SC-authorized) peace operation (A/S-8/10), several dealing with issues of disarmament (A/S-15/6; A/S-12/6; A/S-10/4), as well as special sessions that resulted in resolutions related to withdrawal of foreign forces (A/RES/1622(S-III)) or other recommendations on peace and security matters.
These emergency special sessions can provide an important forum for GA consideration of peace and security matters because of the political focus that often accompanies the UFP resolution. However, these are certainly not the only venues through which the GA exercises its Charter-based authority on the maintenance of peace and security. In its regular sessions, the GA has regularly taken up matters related to threats or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and has passed resolutions involving a range of peace and security responses, from recommendations related to the use of force, to the imposition of sanctions, to denouncement of unconstitutional transfers of power or other actions deemed a threat to regional or international peace. In some cases, GA resolutions within emergency special sessions have proposed that the matters in question be taken up further in regular sessions, leading to continuing consideration of the issues under regular agenda items in years to come (e.g. A/RES/1119(XI), A/RES/1008(ES-II)).
Explore Areas of Practice
Case studies related to Uniting for Peace
Notes
- General practice and the majority of scholarship discuss this condition as either the use or threat to use a veto. However, some scholars contend that it is limited only to the actual use of the veto (not merely the threat of it). See, for example, Larry D. Johnson, ‘“Uniting for Peace’: does it still serve any useful purpose?”, American Journal of International Law Unbound, vol. 108 (2014), p. 107. ↩︎
- Examples of such situations include lack of SC action with regard to the aerial campaign of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the former Yugoslavia in 1999, following the intervention of the US in Iraq in 2003, or with regard to conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since 2011. ↩︎
- For example, the UFP has not been raised with regard to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, despite multiple SC vetoes on draft resolutions since 2011. Nonetheless, the GA has considered the matter, and passed resolutions creating or recommending accountability mechanisms for the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. ↩︎
- The provision made for the GA to convene an emergency special session, and rapidly (within 24 hours), was important in the first three decades of the UN, when the GA only met from mid-September to mid-December and then adjourned for the next nine months. ↩︎
- The original language stipulated that the SC could request an emergency special session on the vote of seven members (A/RES/377A(V), para. 1). This changed with the expansion of the SC, which took effect in 1965. In keeping with that expansion, the Charter provisions related to SC voting (Article 27) were amended, changing the affirmative votes required from seven to nine (A/RES/1991 (XVIII)). The decision to request an emergency special session is considered a procedural matter, and so under Article 27(2), it is not subject to a veto by the permanent members. ↩︎
- The following seven emergency special sessions came at the request of the SC: 1st (1956), 2nd (1956), 3rd (1958), 4th (1960), 6th (1980), 9th (1982), 11th (2022); and these four at the request of the GA: 5th (1967), 7th (1980), 8th (1981), 10th (1997). As noted in the text, the SC decided to “refer the question” of India-Pakistan hostilities in 1971 to the GA (S/RES/303 (1971)) in reference to the UFP resolution, which was then dealt with as a regular session agenda item. ↩︎
- A/ES-10/273, para. 30. For the Court’s further discussion on the GA’s Charter-based authorities vis-à-vis the SC on peace and security matters, see paras. 25–29. ↩︎
- A/ES-10/273, paras. 33–34. ↩︎
- For further discussion of the procedures involved in a special session, see the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, rules 16 to 19. ↩︎
