United Nations Operation in the Congo

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, ONUC, in French) was established by SC resolution 143 and was operational from July 1960 to June 1964 (S/RES/143, para. 2). Following the declaration of independence of the Republic of the Congo in June 1960, Belgium deployed troops to its former colony with the declared purpose of restoring order and protecting Belgian citizens.¹ This intervention was met with resistance, particularly from soldiers of the colonial-era military force, Force Publique, and supporters of the newly-appointed Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.² The tension was heightened by Belgium’s efforts to promote the secession of the mineral-rich province Katanga.³

Shortly after the Belgian troops deployed, on 14 July 1960, the SC demanded their withdrawal and authorized the Secretary-General to take action to support the Congolese Government with military assistance (S/RES/143). This led to the formation (in less than 48 hours) of ONUC, with forces drawn from Asian and African countries.

By September 1960, escalating tensions within the Congo and an internal power struggle among key leaders of the newly formed Government posed significant challenges to ONUC’s mission and threatened the outbreak of renewed violence. On 14 September 1960, a coup staged by Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko, who had Western support, led to the removal of Prime Minister Lumumba. Subsequently, a draft resolution (S/4523) proposing to reinforce ONUC’s role (by soliciting additional voluntary contributions) was vetoed by the USSR.⁴ Following this veto, on 17 September 1960, by a vote of 8 for, 2 against (Poland, the USSR) and 1 abstention (France), the SC decided to call an emergency special session of the GA, citing the “lack of unanimity of its permanent members” and the UFP resolution, 377A(V) (S/RES/157).⁵

Within the two resolutions that were passed in the 4th emergency special session, the GA requested the Secretary-General to “continue to … assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory … and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity, and political independence in the interests of international peace and security” (A/RES/1474(ES-IV), para. 2). Although in line with the spirit of the original SC resolution authorizing ONUC, this request was arguably an expansion of ONUC’s mandate, with a more explicit mandate to maintain law and order, and safeguard the territorial integrity of the Congo.

Subsequent developments in the Congo, notably the killing of Lumumba in January 1961, prompted renewed SC action to forestall a civil war. On 21 February 1961, the SC passed resolution 161, which urged the UN (implicitly including UN forces in the Congo) to take “all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary” (S/RES/161, para. 1). The same resolution urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including mercenaries, and for Member States to prevent further forces from being dispatched from the Congo (ibid., paras. 2–3). In November 1961, the SC then followed up on this with resolution 169, which authorized the Secretary-General and the UN Command in Congo to execute the tasks set out in resolution 161, effectively expanding ONUC’s mandate (S/RES/169, para. 4). In the same year, GA resolutions 1599(XV) and 1600(XV) endorsed many of the same recommendations and, effectively, ONUC’s expanded mandate (A/RES/1599(XV); A/RES/1600(XV)).

ONUC had begun to phase out by February 1963, but the GA played one last crucial role – authorizing and approving the budget for a small number of troops for an additional six months (A/RES/1885(XVIII), paras. 1–2). This additional action would be the subject of the advisory opinion in the ICJ’s Certain Expenses case, which validated the steps and recommendations adopted by the GA with regard to ONUC as falling within the scope of the GA’s authority under the Charter. This precedent (and the ICJ’s validation of it) gave support to the principle that the GA can not only establish peace operations, but it can also rely on its authority to extend the mandate or operations of an existing (SC-authorized) peacekeeping force. The overall impact of the GA’s actions with regard to ONUC were to help to sustain and support an existing peace operation that might have otherwise expired due to SC deadlock.