International Civilian Mission in Haiti and International Civilian Support Mission

In September 1991, a military coup resulted in the overthrow of the Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected President. Within two weeks, the GA passed a resolution (adopted without vote) condemning the coup and demanding Aristide’s restoration (A/RES/46/7). Subsequent GA resolutions from 1991 to 1993¹ reiterated this stance, and lent support to ongoing diplomatic efforts by the Secretary-General, a UN special envoy for Haiti and the OAS. Several of the GA resolutions appeared to recommend or second the OAS responses and recommendations, which during this period included not only diplomatic efforts but trade embargoes and asset freezes. For example, resolution 47/20B suggested that any relaxation of “economic measures” (effectively sanctions) recommended by an ad hoc consortium of States and the OAS should happen “according to progress in the observance of human rights and in the solution of the political crisis” leading to Aristide’s restoration (A/RES/47/20B, para. 6).²

As a result of these diplomatic efforts, an agreement was reached to deploy a joint UN–OAS mission to Haiti in 1993, which later came to be known as the International Civilian Mission in Haiti or Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti in French (from which the acronym, MICIVIH, was derived). The UN deployment of personnel to this mission and its mandate were established in April 1993 through GA resolution 47/20B (A/RES/47/20B).³ It was the first fully integrated mission between a regional organization (the OAS) and the UN. Resolution 47/20B reiterated the goal of the international community to restore democracy and Aristide’s Government in Haiti, offered its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and the OAS, and set out the tasks of the UN personnel participating in the mission as verifying “compliance with Haiti’s international human rights obligations” and to make further recommendations that would lead to “re-establishment of democracy in Haiti” (ibid., paras. 1–2).⁴

During diplomatic efforts throughout the course of 1993, proposals by the Special Envoy to reach a compromise with the coup leaders and enable the return of Aristide faced resistance.⁵ In June 1993, the SC created a sort of ultimatum: acting under Chapter VII authority, it provided that should the de facto authorities fail to comply “in good faith” with the ongoing negotiations, that Member States should impose a series of economic and military sanctions (S/RES/841). These included preventing the sale or supply of petroleum, arms, weapons, ammunition or other military equipment (ibid., para. 5), a naval embargo on any of these goods entering Haiti (ibid., para. 6), and an asset freeze of those funds linked to the Government of Haiti or de facto authorities (ibid., para. 7). Following this, there was some traction in ongoing negotiations, and in July 1993 the parties signed the so-called “New York Pact”, agreeing to a six-month truce and efforts to move towards a peaceful transition.⁶ The following day, the SC signalled that it would be willing to suspend the sanctions attached to resolution 841, and even to terminate them upon the return of President Aristide. With the agreement of certain transition measures in place via what became known as the Governors Island Agreement (negotiated jointly by the UN and the OAS), the SC passed resolution 861 (S/RES/861) in August 1993, relaxing the asset freezes and arms embargo, but with the proviso that these could be reimposed if the Agreement was subsequently not fully implemented.

The Governors Island Agreement included not only an internal transition plan, and agreement on suspension of sanctions, but also some provisions and guarantees related to international cooperation, specifically on development, judicial reform, “modernizing the Armed Forces” and “establishing a new Police Force with the presence of the United Nations personnel”.⁷ Complementing this Agreement and to advance further implementation, the SC in September 1993 authorized the dispatch of police monitors and military trainers via a newly created peace operation, UNMIH, for a period of six months (S/RES/867). However, this dispatch of personnel was prevented from landing due to threats from armed civilians linked to the Haitian defense ministry.⁸ Due to this and other perceived instances of a “lack of will” or cooperation on the part of Haitian authorities, the SC reimposed the oil and arms embargos and asset freezes (ibid.). Despite the continued frustration of the UNMIH mission, and increasing reports of violence in Haiti, the SC extended the mandate of UNMIH in March 1994 (S/RES/905). Concurrently in April 1994, the Secretary-General requested that the GA extend MICIVIH, which the GA did in July (A/RES/48/27B). The resolution notably continued to support measures that would lead to the return of Aristide as President and for compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, but made no note, positive or negative, regarding the SC’s imposition of sanctions (ibid.).

Notwithstanding these additional measures to support peace operations, tensions on the ground and failure to carry forward the agreed transition steps continued. After another effort to shift the situation via introducing stricter sanctions (S/RES/917 (1994)) did not yield results, in July 1994, the SC in resolution 940 (S/RES/940) authorized Member States to restore Aristide’s Government, marking the first use of Chapter VII to restore a democratically elected government. Consequently, a US-led multinational force intervened, leading to Aristide’s return in October 1994.⁹ Following this restoration of Aristide’s Government, MICIVIH was able to resume its activities, while UNMIH was able to take steps to deploy and carry out its mandate in full.¹⁰ When MICIVIH, authorized in 1993, ended in 2000, the GA responded to a request from Haiti’s President to build on its work and that of a subsequently SC-authorized police mission¹¹ by creating a new peace operation in late 1999, the International Civilian Support Mission, which came to be known by its acronym in French, MICAH (A/RES/54/193). Its mandate was to support Haitian authorities in the development of democratic institutions, justice reform efforts, police professionalization, the full observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the organization of democratic elections.